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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts' 
Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement: 
A Model of Neoclassical Contract Law and a 
Model of Confusion and Inconsistency 
Daniel P. O'Gorman· 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement'') states that 
the formation of a contract requires that a bargain's terms be "reasonably 
certain. " It seeks to make this vague standard clearer with the following test: 
"The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for 
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 
The Second Restatement then provides comments and illustrations to help 
explain the test. This Article shows, however, that the test and its supporting 
comments and illustrations create more confusion than clarity. 
The confusion stems from inconsistent signals as to whether indefiniteness is 
to be assessed as of the time of the bargain 's formation or at the time of the 
lawsuit. These inconsistent signals cause farther confusion about the answers 
to two more specific questions. First, if only the plaintiff's promise is too 
indefinite to enforce does this automatically mean no contract was formed, or 
is the defendant's sufficiently definite promise still enforceable as part of a 
contract as long as the plaintiff's promise is not relevant to the dispute that 
arises? Second, what is meant by an "appropriate" remedy, and, 
specifically, can a remedy be appropriate only if it protects a party's benefit 
of the bargain (the so-called expectation interest), or can a remedy be 
appropriate if the plaintiff seeks something less, such as damages to 
compensate for the plaintiff's reliance on the promise? 
The answers to these questions will not only help answer the temporal 
question referenced above, but will reveal whether the entity that adopted and 
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promulgated the Second Restatement, the American Law Institute ("ALI''), 
views the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality--a rule 
requiring a bargain to be in a certain form and that can have consequences 
contrary to the parties' intentions-or as simply a restatement of other 
doctrines designed to enable a court to resolve the dispute before it (or 
perhaps a bit of both). In other words, although it is clear that the Second 
Restatement sought to relax the traditional certainty requirement, did the ALI 
intend to simply minimize it or did it intend to abolish it? The answers to 
these questions are important because they will affect how often bargains fail 
to be contracts. And if more bargains fail to be contracts because of 
indefiniteness, more promisees will have to proceed under an alternative 
theory of enforcement, primarily promissory estoppel, a theory under which it 
is usually more difficult for promisees to prevail. 
Though the answers are far from clear, the better interpretation of the Second 
Restatement's reasonably certain terms requirement is that even though it 
remains a formation doctrine, whether the bargain's terms enable a court to 
determine the existence of a breach should be assessed as of the time of the 
lawsuit, thus, it is not a requirement that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently 
definite. However, only an award protecting the plaintiff's expectation 
interest is an appropriate remedy even if the plaintiff is only seeking 
something less, such as reliance damages. The test, therefore, has aspects of 
a legal formality while at the same time having aspects of simply enabling the 
court to resolve the dispute that arises. In this respect, the Second 
Restatement is a model of neoclassical contract law, retaining some of 
classical contract law's focus on the moment of contract formation while at 
the same time encouraging courts to look at post-formation events to reach a 
just outcome in individual cases. But because a formation doctrine cannot 
logically look at such events, it is also a model of inconsistency. 
"[W]e have tried to be a little more helpful in spelling out what is meant by 
[the reasonably certain terms requirement}. "1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"), 
consistent with established law,2 states as a black letter rule that the 
2 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932) ("An offer must be so definite 
in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and 
performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain."); ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 143 (One Vol. Ed. 1952) ("Vagueness of 
expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement, 
may prevent the creation of an enforceable contract."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 
108 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that to have a contract, an agreement must be definite enough to 
be enforceable); JEFFREYFERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS§ 5.11, at289 (2d ed. 2009) 
("[T]he terms of an agreement must be reasonably definite in order for an agreement to be 
enforced. If the terms are so indefinite that the court would find it impossible to detect a 
breach, or, even if a breach could be identified, to frame a remedy, no contract can be 
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formation of a contract3 requires that a bargain's terms be "reasonably 
certain.'"' "If this minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no 
contract at all."5 
The Second Restatement seeks to make this vague standard6 clearer7 by 
providing the following test, which, though not part of the Restatement 
(First) of Contracts ("First Restatement"),8 was modeled after a Uniform 
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") provision:9 "The terms of a contract are 
reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 10 The Second Restatement 
then provides comments and illustrations to help explain the test. 11 
But if the Second Restatement's test and its supporting comments and 
illustrations are designed to spell out what is really meant by the reasonably 
found." (footnote omitted)); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS§ 39, at 
93 (5th ed. 2011) ("It is commonly suggested that, although parties intend to form a contract, 
ifthe terms of their agreement are not sufficiently definite or reasonably certain, no contract 
will be said to exist."); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS§ 2.9, at 
43 (6th ed. 2009) ("[E]ven ifthe parties intend to contract, ifthe content of their agreement 
is unduly uncertain no contract is formed."). 
3 Although the Second Restatement defines a contract as any legally enforceable 
promise, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 ( 1981) ("A contract is a promise or 
a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."), including one enforceable as a result of 
the promisee's reliance, id. § 90(1), this Article uses the term contract to refer only to a 
legally enforceable bargain. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (revised 4th ed. 1968) 
(defining contract as "[a] promissory agreement between two or more persons that creates, 
modifies, or destroys a legal relation[]" and "[a]n agreement, upon sufficient consideration, 
to do or not to do a particular thing." (emphases added)). 
4 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981). 
5 Id. § 362 cmt. a. 
6 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REv. 1685, 1695 (1976) (recognizing that the U.C.C.'s test for reasonably certain terms, 
which is the model for the Second Restatement's test, is a standard, not a rule). 
7 See AMERICAN LA w INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[W]e have tried to be a little 
more helpful in spelling out what is meant by that (standard].") (remark by Reporter Robert 
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's 
terms be reasonably certain). 
8 See Robert Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 
302, 308 (1964) (noting that the test provided for the reasonably certain terms requirement is 
a new standard for the Second Restatement). 
9 See id. (noting that the new standard follows the U.C.C.). 
to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(2) (1981); see also Robert E. Scott, A 
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2003) ("A 
contract ... must be sufficiently complete such that a court is able to determine the fact of 
breach and provide an appropriate remedy."). 
II RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. & illus. (1981). 
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certain terms requirement, 12 they fall short of the mark. Despite the good 
intentions of the American Law Institute ("ALI"), 13 the test and its 
supporting comments and illustrations result in more confusion than clarity. 
The confusion stems from the ALI sending contradictory signals as to 
whether a court should assess indefiniteness as of the time the bargain was 
formed (and thus not consider post-formation events) or at the time of the 
lawsuit (and thus consider such events). These inconsistent signals make 
the answers to two more specific questions unclear. First, if only the 
plaintiffs promise is too indefinite to enforce does this automatically mean 
that no contract was formed (the position taken in the First Restatement), 14 
or is the defendant's sufficiently definite promise still enforceable under a 
contract theory as long as the plaintiffs promise is not relevant to the 
dispute? Second, what is an "appropriate" remedy under the Second 
Restatement's test? Specifically, can a remedy be appropriate only if it 
protects a party's expectation interest, or can a remedy be appropriate if the 
plaintiff seeks something less, such as reliance damages?15 
The significance of the answers to these questions can be illustrated with 
the following two hypotheticals: 
A and B enter into a bargain under which A, an elderly woman, promises 
to B, a caregiver, the following: to pay B a specified amount of money; to 
provide room and board to B while B cares for A; and to reimburse B for the 
reasonable expenses incurred by B in caring for A. In exchange, B promises 
to "take care of' A for the next six months. The parties do not discuss what 
"take care of' means, and there is no relevant evidence to determine its 
meaning other than the express language used. Assume B's promise is not 
12 See supra note 7. 
13 See Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969) 
(stating that the Restatements are "a modest but essential aid in the improved analysis, 
clarification, unification, growth and adaptation of the common law"). Professor Wechsler 
was the ALI director from 1963 to 1984. Norman I. Silber, Wechsler, Herbert, in THEY ALE 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 577, 578 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). The 
ALI promulgated and approved the Second Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Foreword (1981) (foreword written by Herbert Wechsler). 
14 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932) ("An offer must be so definite 
in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and 
performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)). 
15 The promisee's expectation interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain 
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344(a) (1981). The promisee's 
reliance interest is "his 'interest' in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the 
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not 
been made .... " Id. § 344(b); see generally Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-56 (1936) (explaining the 
distinction between expectation interest and reliance interest). 
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reasonably certain under the Second Restatement's test, 16 but that A's 
promises are sufficiently definite. Before the time B is to begin performing, 
A repudiates the bargain, without justification, for a reason other than the 
vagueness of B's promise. 17 B sues A for breach of contract and seeks 
expectation damages, not specific performance. Assume the amount of cost 
or other loss avoided by B from not having to perform can be determined to 
a reasonable certainty primarily because A was going to provide room and 
board to B and reimburse B for B's reasonable expenses. A admits 
repudiating without justification, but defends on the ground that B's 
promise to "take care of' A is vague, and, thus, no contract was formed due 
to the bargain lacking reasonably certain terms. B maintains that whether 
B's promise is too vague is irrelevant because all the court must do is 
determine whether A breached (or repudiated) A's promise and give an 
appropriate remedy to B, and A's promise is sufficiently certain to do both 
of these things. 18 
If the court requires that both parties' promises be sufficiently definite, 
A's defense will succeed and the court will conclude that no contract was 
formed. 19 If B hopes to enforce the promise, then B will have to establish 
the elements of promissory estoppel.20 If the court requires that only the 
defendant's promise be sufficiently definite, then A's defense will fail and 
the court will find A liable for breach of contract. 
Consider the next hypothetical, assuming that A and B entered into the 
same bargain as in the prior hypothetical: 
After entering into the bargain, A expends money remodeling a portion of 
her house so that she can provide suitable living quarters for B. B was 
aware, at the time the parties entered into the bargain, that A would have to 
incur these expenses. Before B is to begin performance, but after A makes 
the expenditures, B repudiates the bargain, without justification, for a 
reason other than the vagueness of B's promise. A sues B for breach of 
contract and seeks reliance damages, not expectation damages or specific 
performance. B admits repudiating without justification, but defends on the 
16 See Dombrowski v. Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the 
phrase "take care of' was too vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 
A. 106, 107-08 (Me. 1917) (enforcing an agreement to maintain and care for one of the 
parties). 
17 These two hypotheticals do not require that a party repudiate. Rather than repudiate, 
the party whose performance is due first could fail to perform when performance is due. See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 ( 1981 ). 
18 Hypothetical and explanations provided by the author. 
19 See Dombrowski, 362 N.E.2d at 258 (holding that the phrase "take care of' was too 
vague to be enforced). 
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (setting forth the elements 
of promissory estoppel). 
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ground that "take care of' is vague and thus no contract was formed due to 
the bargain lacking reasonably certain terms. A maintains that whether B's 
promise is too vague is irrelevant because all the court has to do is 
determine whether B breached (or repudiated) B's promise (which B clearly 
did, irrespective of its vagueness), and although B's promise might be too 
indefinite to protect A's expectation interest, A is seeking only reliance 
damages. 21 
If the court considers an appropriate remedy to be limited to an award 
protecting the plaintiff's expectation interest, and assuming the court 
concludes B's promise is too indefinite to determine to a reasonable 
certainty the position A would have been in had B performed as promised, 
B's defense will succeed, and the court will conclude that no contract was 
formed. If A hopes to enforce the promise, then A will have to establish the 
elements of promissory estoppel.22 If the court considers an appropriate 
remedy to be an award protecting the plaintiff's reliance interest, then B's 
defense will fail and the court will find B liable for breach of contract and 
award reliance damages to A. 
The Second Restatement's answers to these hypotheticals depend on 
when the court is to assess a bargain's indefiniteness. If the test directs 
courts to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's formation (and 
thus to not consider post-formation events), then both parties' promises 
must be sufficiently definite because at the time of formation it would not 
be known which party will breach. Also, only an award protecting each 
party's expectation interest could be considered an "appropriate" remedy 
because at the time of formation neither party will have relied upon the 
bargain. 
If the test directs courts to assess indefiniteness at the time of the lawsuit 
(and thus consider post-formation events), then it would not be a 
requirement that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite because the 
plaintiff's promise might not be relevant to determining whether the 
defendant breached or to giving the plaintiff a remedy. Also, an award 
protecting the plaintiff's reliance interest might be considered an 
"appropriate" remedy if the plaintiff relied upon the bargain and is seeking 
such a remedy. Thus, without knowing whether under the Second 
Restatement's test the court is to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the 
bargain's formation or at the time of the lawsuit, an answer to these two 
hypotheticals cannot be provided. 
An answer to this temporal question will not only provide answers to 
these more specific questions, but will help identify the underlying policies 
21 Hypothetical and explanations provided by the author. 
22 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981). 
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served by the Second Restatement's test. If the test directs courts to assess 
indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's formation, it views the 
reasonably certain terms requirement as a so-called legal formality-a 
requirement that a bargain be in a particular form to be a contract and which 
at times operates contrary to the parties' intentions. 23 But if it directs courts 
to assess indefiniteness at the time of the lawsuit, the test might be viewed 
as nothing more than a restatement of other doctrines designed to enable a 
court to resolve the dispute before it-such as the requirement that the 
plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
breached the contract24-as well as to establish any requirements for the 
particular remedy being sought. 25 
The ALi's contradictory signals on the temporal issue make it unclear, 
however, whether the requirement has just a "formal" aspect or just a 
"practical" aspect, or perhaps a bit of each. In other words, though it is well 
known that the Second Restatement sought to relax the traditional certainty 
requirement,26 it is unclear whether the ALI intended to simply minimize it 
or to abolish it. 
The answers to these questions are important because if the reasonably 
certain terms requirement has a formal aspect, more bargains will fail to be 
contracts than if it has just a practical aspect.27 And if more bargains fail to 
23 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-92 (discussing legal formalities and noting that 
"they operate through the contradiction of private intentions" and that "the formality means 
that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be 
ignored"); id. at 1692, 1698 (referring to the "sanction of nullity"); Joseph M. Perillo, The 
Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 39, 41 n.22 (1974) ("[T]he term 'form' or 'formality' means any manner of expressing 
or memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual expression."); Gregory 
Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1726, 1743 (2008) ("A legal formality is a type of act, such as the utterance of special words 
or the production of a document in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance."). 
24 See Pisani v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 710, 719 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the plaintiff in a breach of contract action has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached the contract). 
25 See Lands Council v. Packard, No. CV05-210-N-EJL, 2005 WL 1353899, at *8 (D. 
Idaho June 3, 2005) ("The burden is on Plaintiffs to establish that the remedy requested is 
appropriate."). Of course, the rules applicable to whether a particular remedy will be 
granted might include a legal formality, but that would not make the general rule requiring 
the plaintiff to establish the appropriateness of the requested remedy itself a legal formality. 
26 See Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of 
Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the 
Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 403 n.129 (1986) (recognizing that the Second 
Restatement "relaxed the traditional certainty requirement to provide for 'reasonable' 
certainty"). 
27 Of course, if parties are sufficiently aware of the requirement's status as a legal 
formality, more bargains might be saved due to parties setting forth their bargains in greater 
2014 I REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS 177 
be contracts because of indefiniteness, more promisees will have to proceed 
under an alternative theory of enforcement, primarily promissory 
estoppel,28 a theory under which it is usually more difficult for promisees to 
prevail.29 
As will be shown, though the Second Restatement's treatment of the 
reasonably certain terms requirement is not a model of clarity, the best 
reading of it is that courts should assess definiteness at the time of the 
lawsuit (a practical aspect), but that the test also retains a formal aspect. 
With respect to a bargain's terms having to provide a basis for determining 
the existence of a breach, they are sufficiently definite as long as they 
enable a court to determine a breach in the dispute before it.30 Thus, this 
portion of the test serves a practical purpose, and the plaintiffs promise 
being sufficiently definite is, therefore, not a requirement as long as it is not 
relevant to resolving the dispute. An "appropriate" remedy, however, is 
only one that protects the plaintiffs expectation interest (i.e., full 
enforcement of the defendant's promise) even if the plaintiff is seeking a 
detail, thereby saving some bargains that would otherwise have failed under the requirement 
even if it were not a legal formality. 
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (setting forth the elements 
of promissory estoppel). If the promisee conferred a benefit upon the promisor, the 
promisee could sue for restitution instead of seeking to enforce the promise. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 31(1) (2011) ("A person 
who renders performance under an agreement that cannot be enforced against the recipient 
by reason of ... indefiniteness ... has a claim in restitution against the recipient as 
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."); id. cmt. d ("If a contract cannot be enforced 
because the terms specified by the parties fail to yield 'a reasonably certain basis for giving 
an appropriate remedy' via damages or specific performance (U.C.C. § 2-204(3)), a 
performing party is entitled to restitution of a prepaid price, or to the value of a contractual 
performance for which the performer has not received the promised equivalent."); PERILLO, 
supra note 2, § 2.9, at 44 ("If ... the agreement is fatally indefinite, any payments made for 
which a return performance has not been rendered must be disgorged and the value of any 
uncompensated performance can be recovered."). 
29 See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: 
An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 580 (1998) (reporting a low 
success rate for promissory estoppel claims). But see Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall 
of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It 
Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 542 (2002) (disputing Hillman's 
conclusion and finding that "promissory estoppel claims succeed at significant rates when 
demonstrably weak claims are subtracted"). Even if "promissory estoppel claims succeed at 
significant rates when demonstrably weak claims are subtracted," id., such a claim is still 
more difficult to establish than a claim for breach of contract because the promisee must 
establish reliance on the promise; that the reliance was sufficiently foreseeable; and that 
injustice would result if the promise was not enforced. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (listing elements of claim for promissory estoppel). 
30 See infra Part V.A. 
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remedy that would only partially enforce the defendant's promise (e.g., 
reliance damages). 
Thus, the Second Restatement's test has both a practical and a formal 
aspect. In this respect, it is a model of neoclassical contract law,31 retaining 
some of classical contract law's focus on the moment of the bargain's 
formation, while at the same time encouraging courts to look at post-
formation events to reach a just outcome in individual cases. But because a 
formation doctrine cannot logically look at such events, it is also a model of 
inconsistency. 
Part II of this Article explains the different ways in which bargains are 
indefinite. Part III addresses why parties might enter into bargains with 
indefinite terms. Part IV provides an overview of the reasonably certain 
terms requirement, with a focus on the Second Restatement. Part V 
discusses the uncertainty in the Second Restatement's test for reasonably 
certain terms and attempts to remove the uncertainty. Part VI explains how 
the Second Restatement's test, as interpreted in Part V, is a model of 
neoclassical contract law, but also a model of inconsistency. The last part 
is a brief conclusion. Parts II, III, and IV are descriptive, and those familiar 
with the topics covered in those Parts might wish to proceed directly to Part 
V. For those unfamiliar with the topics, Parts II, III, and IV provide 
background information that will be helpful when reading the subsequent 
parts. 
II. WAYS IN WHICH BARGAINS ARE INDEFINITE 
An indefinite bargain is one in which the parties have failed to expressly 
or impliedly agree upon a matter within the bargain's scope.32 There are 
two principal ways in which a bargain might be indefinite.33 First, the 
bargain might have a gap, which is when the bargain is incomplete because 
of an omitted term.34 Second, the parties might have a misunderstanding 
31 See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 
738 (2000) (referring to the law of the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement as neoclassical 
contract law "because it addresses the shortcomings of classical law rather than offering a 
wholly different conception of the law"). 
32 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 43. 
33 Id. § 2.9, at 44-45. Professor Perillo identifies three categories (gaps, 
misunderstandings, and agreements to agree), but, as discussed below, an agreement to agree 
is simply a type of gap. Id. 
34 Id. 
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about what each party believes has been agreed upon.
35 
Each type of 
indefiniteness is discussed in more detail below.
36 
35 Id. at 44. 
36 A bargain's incompleteness is sometimes divided into two other categories-patent 
(or intrinsic) ambiguities and latent (or extrinsic) ambiguities. A patent ambiguity is "[a]n 
ambiguity that clearly appears on the face of a document, arising from the language 
itself .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 2009); see also PERILLO, supra note 2, 
§ 3.10, at 131 n.23 ("A patent ambiguity is apparent on the face of the document .... "). A 
latent ambiguity is "[a]n ambiguity that does not readily appear in the language of a 
document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied 
or executed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93; see also PERILLO, supra note 2, 
§ 3.10, at 131 n.23 ("[A] latent ambiguity exists when the term appears clear but extrinsic 
information makes it ambiguous."). 
In the categories identified in this Article, patent ambiguities generally include 
ambiguities of syntax, conflicting language, and gaps regarding matters essential to 
performance. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93 (providing as an example of a 
patent ambiguity when two different prices are expressed in a written agreement); see W. 
Way Builders, Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 1, 15 (2008) (stating that patent ambiguities 
include obvious drafting errors and gaps). Latent ambiguities generally include vague 
words, ambiguities of term, and gaps regarding matters that might not be essential to 
performance. See Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 245 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Idaho 
1952) (holding that latent ambiguity existed when parties' agreement referred to "pump" and 
the term could refer to different types of pumps); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93 
(providing as an example of a latent ambiguity when a written agreement for the sale of 
goods states that the goods will arrive on the ship Peerless, but two ships have that name); 
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3 .10, at 131 n.23 (referring to the case of the two ships named 
Peerless as "[t]he best known illustration of a latent ambiguity"); Riera v. Riera, 86 So. 3d 
1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ("'[I]fa contract fails to specify the rights or duties of 
the parties under certain conditions or in certain situations, then the occurrence of such 
condition or situation reveals an insufficiency in the contract not apparent from the face of 
the document.' ... This insufficiency is ... considered a latent ambiguity .... " (quoting 
Hunt v. First Nat'! Bank ofTampa, 381 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980))). 
In some jurisdictions, the distinction is relevant to whether extrinsic evidence will be 
admitted to give meaning to an ambiguous word or phrase; extrinsic evidence is admitted to 
explain a latent ambiguity but not a patent ambiguity. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:43, at 1197-98 (4th ed. 
2012) ("[T]he distinction remains significant in a number of jurisdictions, the court[']s 
ruling that while parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity, it may not be 
admitted when the ambiguity is patent."). "According to this view, a patent ambiguity must 
be removed by construction according to settled legal principles, and not by extrinsic 
evidence." R.T.K., Annotation, Rule that Latent Ambiguities may be Explained by Paro/ 
Evidence but that Patent Ambiguities may not, 102 A.L.R. 287 (1936). But even for those 
jurisdictions that consider the distinction relevant, the practical effect might not be as 
significant as commonly thought. See id. ("Even a casual examination of the cases, 
however, discloses that such a statement of the rule is too broad. According to the better 
view, or the more accurate statement of the true rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
show the situation of the parties and all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding 
them at the time of the execution of the instrument, for the purpose of explaining or 
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As the discussion proceeds, it is important to recognize the difference 
between indefiniteness in fact and indefiniteness in law. Indefiniteness in 
fact means there was a .pap or a misunderstanding when considering the 
parties' states of mind.3 But, as will be discussed below, as a result of 
legal rules that will apply in such situations (includin~ so-called "gap 
fillers"38 and the so-called "objective theory of contract"3 ), the law might 
not consider the bargain indefinite even though there was indefiniteness in 
fact. In these situations, it can be said that even though there 1s 
indefiniteness in fact, there is not indefiniteness in law. 
Also, it is possible to have a combination of the two forms of 
indefiniteness (a gap and a misunderstanding).40 One party might believe 
the parties have impliedly reached an agreement on a particular issue, while 
the other party never gave the issue any thought. An example might be a 
usage of trade and a bargain between a well-established business and a new 
business. The well-established business might believe the usage of trade is 
impliedly part of the bargain while the new business, unaware of the usage 
of trade, never gave it any thought. 
Further, it will sometimes be difficult to distinguish between a gap and a 
misunderstanding. The parties might reduce their bargain to a written 
document that includes a provision covering a particular topic, but the 
parties might not have given the particular provision any thought or have 
even been aware of the provision (this might be particularly true in the case 
of a form contract).41 Or the parties might have given the provision thought 
but not considered how the provision would apply to a particular situation 
that later arises. 
resolving even a patent ambiguity."). 
37 Though it has been sai'd that even "the devil himself knoweth not the mind of men," 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), the situation 
referred to here is one in which the fact finder in a lawsuit concludes (or assumes) that the 
parties to the bargain had such a misunderstanding. Fact finders routinely make findings 
regarding a person's state of mind, particularly in criminal law cases and tort cases. 
38 A gap-filler is "[a] rule that supplies a contractual term that the parties failed to 
include in the contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 749. 
39 The "objective theory of contract" is "[t]he doctrine that a contract is not an 
agreement in the sense of a subjective meeting of the minds but is instead a series of external 
acts giving the objective semblance of agreement." Id. at 1178. 
40 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. 
REv. 860, 873 (1968) ("[S]ince at least two parties will be involved, and several persons may 
act on behalf of a single party, there may be several different reasons for the omission."). 
41 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 12 (2013) (explaining why consumers do not read boilerplate in form 
contracts); Perillo, supra note 23, at 60 ("The utilization of standardized printed contract 
forms by large industrial and commercial companies has resulted in a situation in which 
contracting parties are frequently uninformed as to the content of the printed form."). 
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A. Gaps ("Omitted Terms") 
A gap exists in a bargain when the parties, at the time the bargain is 
formed, do not expressly or impliedly address a particular matter within the 
bargain's scope.4 Gaps tend to be more numerous in bargains formed 
through conduct (so-called "implied-in-fact contracts");43 the lack of a 
written document makes it likely the parties have not agreed, even 
implicitly, about numerous topics. But gaps also exist in express 
agreements (even express agreements that are evidenced by a written 
document).44 Although often unintended,45 gaps can even be intentional. 
For example, an intentional gap includes the so-called "agreement to 
agree," which is when the parties to a bargain agree to work out the details 
of a particular matter within the bargain's scope at a later time.46 In such a 
situation, a~~ exists at the bargain's formation regarding the term to be 
agreed upon. 
1. Types of gaps 
Gaps are of two types. The first type-more significant but less common 
than the second type-is when the parties do not address at the time of the 
bargain's formation something that must be known for one or both of the 
parties to perform.48 Such a term may be called an "essential term." The 
42 Even if the bargain's language appears to cover a particular matter, there is a gap if 
"neither party intended the language to cover the case." Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 875. 
43 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 370 (defining an implied-in-fact 
contract as "[a] contract that the parties presumably intended as their tacit understanding, as 
inferred from their conduct and other circumstances"). 
44 See id. at 369 (defining an express contract as "[a] contract whose terms the parties 
have explicitly set out"). 
45 See infra Part III, for a discussion of why parties enter into bargains with indefinite 
terms. 
46 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 78 (defining an agreement to agree 
as an agreement that "leav[es] some details to be worked out by the parties"). For example, 
an agreement for the lease of an apartment might include a provision giving the tenant an 
option to extend the lease term upon a rate to be agreed upon by the parties. 
47 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 53. 
48 These gaps are less common than the first type because parties tend to pay more 
attention to the requirements of performance than other matters when forming a bargain. 
See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 870-71 ("The most likely expectations to be selected for 
reduction to contract language are those that describe the performance of each party in the 
usual course of events. [Professor Stewart] Macaulay concluded that 'businessmen pay 
more attention to describing the performances in an exchange than to planning for 
contingencies or defective performances or to obtaining legal enforceability of their 
contracts."' (quoting Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
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second type-less significant but more common than the first type-is 
when the parties do not address at the time of the bargain's formation what 
the consequences will be if a particular fact exists (or does not exist) or if a 
particular event occurs (or does not occur).49 Such a term may be called a 
"non-essential term." 
Examples of a gap regarding an essential term include a failure to address 
the services, land, or goods (or the amount of goods) to be exchanged for a 
. d . 50 h . c h . d . 1 d d 51 promise pnce; t e pnce 1or t e promise services, an , or goo s; or 
the time, place, or manner for performance (such as the time or place for 
delivery of goods).52 These gaps are more serious than the second type 
because, as a result of the gap, it is certain that a party will not know how to 
perform at least part of his or her end of the bargain. These gaps will be 
apparent at the time the bargain is formed. 53 
The second type of gap (a gap regarding a non-essential term) tends to 
involve a failure to qualify a party's duty to perform if an unknown fact 
exists at the time of the bargain's formation or a particular unanticipated 
event occurs after formation. Examples include the following: a bargain to 
buy and sell a cow believed to be infertile that does not address what will 
happen if the cow is in fact fertile;54 a bargain for the use of a music hall 
that does not address what will happen if the hall bums down before the 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 60 (1963))). 
49 See Eric A. Posner, The Paro/ Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the 
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533 (1998) (stating that a 
gap exists when "the terms are silent with respect to a contingency"). 
50 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 cmt. b (1932) (noting that "[p]romises 
may be indefinite ... in the work or things to be given in exchange for the promise"); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 201 ("Simple examples of agreements that do not meet the 
requirement are those in which the description of the subject matter is inadequate, as where 
the description or quantity of goods to be sold is lacking."); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS§ 37, at 56-57 (1920) ("A lack of definiteness in an agreement may concern 
the ... work to be done, [or the] property to be transferred .... "). 
51 See WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56-57 ("A lack of definiteness in an agreement 
may concern ... the price to be paid ... "). 
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. d (1981) ("Valid contracts are 
often made which do not specify the time for performance."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 32 cmt. b (1932) (noting that "[p]romises may be indefinite in time or in 
place ... "); WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56-57 ("A lack of definiteness in an 
agreement may concern the time of performance .... "). 
53 See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 796 (1982) ("Some failures of agreement are apparent from the 
time the parties conclude the bargain. For example, the bargain may say nothing about price 
or may explicitly leave the price 'to be agreed' upon by the parties."). 
54 Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), overruled in part by Lenawee Cnty. 
Bd. ofHealth v. Messerly, 331N.W.2d203, 208 (Mich. 1982). 
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date for its use;55 a bargain to use an apartment to watch the king's 
coronation procession that does not address what will happen if the 
procession is cancelled because the king falls il1;56 a bargain that fails to 
specify whether the parties are required to correct an obvious mistake by 
the other party regarding the bargain's terms;57 and a bargain that does not 
specify the remedy for a breach,58 including whether the non-breaching 
party will be excused from performing. 59 
All bargains are incomplete in this second (non-essential term) sense 
because the future events that might have some impact on the parties' 
bargain are limitless, and foresight is imperfect. 60 This type of gap will not, 
however, necessarily have an effect on the parties' abilities to perform the 
bargain because the facts are probably as believed, and the unanticipated 
future event that is not addressed will likely never occur. The cow is 
probably barren (as believed); the music hall will probably not burn down 
before the concert; the king will probably not fall ill; the parties will 
probably not make a mistake about the bargain's terms; and the bargain will 
probably not be breached. Often, it will not even be apparent at the time 
the bargain is formed that there is a gap of this type.61 The older view was 
that in these situations there was not even a gap, based on the notion that a 
duty not expressly qualified is unqualified.62 
2. Situations in which it appears the bargain has a particular gap, but it 
55 Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.). 
56 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
57 Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387 
(N.J. 2005). 
58 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 
1386 (1992) ("[A]lthough it is relatively easy for contracting parties to specifythe 
performances they want, it is often extremely difficult to specify remedies in advance of 
knowing the nature of the breach and the circumstances of the world at the time of the 
breach."). 
59 Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
60 Scott, supra note 10, at 1641 ("All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states 
of the world and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance 
on each possible state are finite."); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of 
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 956 (1967) ("The parties may simply not have foreseen the 
problem at the time of contracting."); FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 5.11, at 289 ("Even in large 
transactions, with both parties adequately represented, the parties and their lawyers might 
fail to successfully anticipate every matter upon which an agreement might be useful."). 
61 See Speidel, supra note 53, at 796 ("[Some failures of agreement] become apparent as 
performance unfolds, new information is discovered, or circumstances change."). 
62 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEA TH OF CONTRACT 49-53 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., Ohio 
State Univ. Press 1995) (1974) (describing the idea of absolute contractual liability in 
England and in the United States). 
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does not (either in fact or in law) 
There are three situations in which it might appear that a bargain has a 
particular gap, but it does not (either in fact or in law): a written document 
has a particular gap but the parties' bargain does not; the parties' express 
bargain has a particular gap but the gap is filled with an implied-in-fact 
term; and the parties' bargain in fact (including express and implied-in-fact 
terms) has a particular gap but the gap is filled by the court with an implied-
in-law term. Each of these situations is discussed below. 
a. Gap in written document only 
First, the parties might make an effort to reduce the bargain's terms to a 
written document, yet fail to include in the document all of the terms that 
are part of the bargain.63 As long as such terms are not excluded from their 
bargain under the parol evidence rule,64 those terms are part of it and their 
exclusion from the written document would not mean the bargain has gaps 
regarding those matters; it would mean only that the written document is an 
incomplete expression of the bargain, a so-called "partially integrated 
agreement."65 The term "agreement" (which is part of the definition of 
"bargain")66 is not limited to the express terms in a written document; 
rather, it extends to all of the terms to which the parties manifested assent.67 
Thus, when referring to a bargain having a particular gap, one is referring to 
the parties' entire bargain, and not simply a written document providing 
evidence of the bargain. 
63 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 95, at 145. 
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(1)-(2) (1981) (providing that "[a] 
binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with them" and "[a] binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to 
the extent that they are within its scope"). 
65 See id. § 210(2). When the parties reduce their agreement to a written document but 
mistakenly omit a term agreed upon (a so-called mistake as to expression or mistake in 
integration), see JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 421 (10th ed. 
2013) (referring to a drafting error as a "mistake in expression" or "mistake in integration"), 
"the court, at the request of a party, may reform the writing to express the agreement actually 
reached." FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 430-31; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 155 (1981). Reformation is also available if the parties mistakenly included a 
term not agreed upon or incorrectly stated a particular term. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, 
at 431. 
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981) ("A bargain is an agreement to 
exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange 
performances."). 
67 See id. ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more 
persons."). 
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b. Implied-in-fact terms 
Second, the terms of a bargain include those that are implied in fact.68 
An implied-in-fact term is one upon which the parties impliedly manifested 
assent, as opposed to expressly manifesting assent, through the use of oral 
or written words.69 Such terms are inferred by logical deduction from 
70 d fr h d. . 71 . 1 d. express terms an om t e surroun mg circumstances, me u mg 
"standard terms, trade or local usages, a course of dealing between the 
. . h d f fi ft . "72 parties pnor to t e agreement, an a course o per ormance a er it. 
Similarly, the Second Restatement provides that "the word 'promise' is 
commonly and quite properly ... used to refer to the complex of human 
relations which results from the promisor's words or acts of assurance, 
including the justified expectations of the promisee and any moral or legal 
duty which arises to make good the assurance by performance."73 For 
example, in the celebrated case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the 
court, in an opinion by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, found that an agreement 
providing one party with the exclusive privilege to market the fashion 
designs of the other included an implied promise by the former to the latter 
to make reasonable efforts to market the designs.74 
A bargain's express silence on a topic might mean, however, that the 
parties manifested an intention that the existence (or non-existence) of a 
particular fact or the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a particular event 
would not have an effect on the parties' legal rights and duties as expressed 
in the bargain. Because "contracts generally are a device for allocating 
risks,"75 the issue will be whether a reasonable person would believe the 
68 See id. § 4 ("A promise ... may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."); id. § 33 
cmt. a ("Terms may be supplied by factual implication .... "). It was not always so. See 
Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 862-63 ("Courts in the seventeenth century, with a literalism 
characteristic of their time, sought to confine themselves to the bare framework provided by 
the parties through the letter of their contract language."). 
69 See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865 (stating that an implied-in-fact term is one that 
"was 'intended' by the parties and the intention [is] reasonably inferable from conduct other 
than words ... "). 
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. c (1981 ). 
71 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 46-47. 
72 Id. at 47; see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of 
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836 (1964) (noting that under the doctrine of "practical 
construction," the parties' "conduct during the course of performance may support 
inferences ... as to their intentions with respect to gaps and omissions in the contract"). 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 cmt. a (1981). 
74 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also Laclede 
Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that a buyer impliedly 
promised to purchase all of its propane gas requirements from the seller). 
75 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 59 
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parties' silence on the topic meant they manifested an intention that the 
bargain's expressly stated rights and duties be left undisturbed by the fact or 
event. 
The more likely it is that the particular fact exists or that the particular 
event will occur, the more likely a reasonable person would believe the 
parties impliedly manifested an intention that their expressly stated rights 
and duties be left undisturbed, and vice versa. For example, "[i]n a contract 
for future delivery [of goods] the seller takes on himself the risk that the 
goods will rise in price or that for some other reason it will become more 
burdensome for him to perform, and the buyer assumes reciprocal risks."76 
In this sense, the parties' silence regarding the consequences of the fact 
existing or the event occurring is no gap at all. But whether there has been 
an implied manifestation of an intention that a particular risk has been 
assumed is always a matter of interpreting the bargain, taking into account, 
along with any other relevant evidence, the bargain's language, whether the 
event was discussed duri~f negotiations, the bargain's context, and how 
foreseeable the event was. 
c. Implied-in-law terms 
Third, even when there is a gap "in fact," the omitted term, if essential to 
a determination of the parties' rights and duties
7 
is supplied by the court.78 
These terms are called implied-in-law terms, 9 constructive terms,80 or 
(1981). 
76 Id. 
77 For example, in the well-known case of Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 
1887), "the court found that the seller [of a cow] had not transferred nor had the buyer paid 
for the chance that [the] apparently barren prize cow was in fact pregnant." FRIED, supra 
note 75, at 59. But see Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 45 (Wis. 1885) (holding that the 
seller of a stone that the parties thought was probably a topaz assumed the risk that it was an 
uncut diamond). 
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 (1981); see also id. § 33 cmt. a ("[I]n 
recurring situations the law often supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary."); id. ch. 9 intro. note ("[R]ules of law must fill the gap when the parties have not 
provided for the situation which arises."); Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 864 ("Gradually, 
courts began to go beyond the parties' actual expectations as well as their contract language, 
and came to read into the contract what they themselves thought was fair or just, on the 
pretext that it was the parties' 'intention."'); id. at 866 ("It was admitted that the agreement 
of the parties was not an exclusive source, but only one to be deferred to when it could be 
established."). 
79 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 823 (defining "implied in law" as 
"[i]mposed by operation of law and not because of any inferences that can be drawn from 
the facts of the case"). 
8° Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865. 
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default rules.81 As stated by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, "A court, 
having determined that there is a contract, cannot refuse to decide a case on 
the ground that the parties failed to provide for the situation."82 Courts may 
even supply a term when the gap is the result of a so-called "agreement to 
agree," which is when the parties agree to work out the details of a 
particular matter at some point after the bargain is formed.83 Although 
"[t]he traditional rule is that an agreement to agree as to a material term 
prevents the formation of a contract[,]"84 under both the Second 
Restatement and the U.C.C., courts are to fill these gaps as well.85 
Professor Edwin W. Patterson aptly called gap-filling terms "aids for the 
·1· ,,86 ai mg agreement. 
The court will supply a term as directed by a particular statute (such as 
the U.C.C.) or, in the absence of a statutory directive, a term that is 
"reasonable in the circumstances."87 In the absence of a statutory directive, 
81 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1446 (defining "default rule" as "[a] 
legal principle that fills a gap in a contract in the absence of an applicable express provision 
but remains subject to a contrary agreement"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 5 (1981) (referring to such a term as a "term of a contract" as opposed to a 
"term of a promise or agreement"-the latter phrase referring to express and implied-in-fact 
terms). 
82 Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 860 n.2; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT LAW 67 (!st ed. 2004) ("Despite some decisions to the contrary, courts should 
make every effort to fill gaps and enforce agreements when the parties intended to 
contract."); id. at 253 ("[C]ourts are inclined to fill gaps for the parties, rather than give up 
on the contract."); Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 837 (Alaska 1971) ("[C]ourts should fill 
gaps in contracts to ensure fairness where the reasonable expectations of the parties are fairly 
clear. The parties to a contract often cannot negotiate and draft solutions to all the problems 
which may arise."). 
83 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at78 (defining "agreement to agree" as 
an agreement "leaving some details to be worked out by the parties"). 
84 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 53 (emphasis omitted); see also Walker v. Keith, 382 
S.W.2d 198, 205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (refusing to enforce an agreement to agree upon the 
rental price of a parcel ofland). 
85 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 illus. 8 (1981) (providing that when 
there is an agreement to agree on price and the parties do not ultimately agree on a price, but 
manifest an intent to be bound, the court should supply a reasonable price term); see also 
u.c.c. § 2-305(1)(b) (2013). 
86 STATE OF NEW YORK, I REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY 
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 275 (William s. Hein & Co. 1998) (remark by 
Professor Edwin W. Patterson). 
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 (1981); see also MURRAY, supra note 
2, § 91, at 485 ("When an omitted term is supplied by a court, it is not interpreting the 
contract, i.e., it is not discovering such a term by discerning the meaning of the parties' 
expression of agreement. The process is one of judicial construction, in which courts supply 
an omitted term which is fair and reasonable under the circumstances." (emphasis in 
original) (internal citations omitted)). 
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there are two different ways courts will decide which term to supply. First, 
under the traditional approach,88 which has been referred to as the 
"hypothetical model of the bargaining process,"89 the court supplies a term 
that it believes the parties would have agreed to had they considered the 
matter when forming the bargain. 90 
Second, under the Second Restatement's apfiroach (which rejects the 
hypothetical model of the bargaining process) 1 a term is supplied that 
"comports with community standards of fairness and policy."92 This 
approach considers principles and policies, such as seeking "substantial 
equivalence in commercial exchanges[,]" "discourag[ing] litigation by 
promoting certainty[,]" "plac[ing] the risk in a way that is thought desirable 
from the point of view of a particular market or of society in general[,]"93 
encouraging due care by not having a prudent party pay for the loss of a 
careless party, and reducing problems of administration (including having 
default rules that will avoid the judicial expense involved with a systematic 
legal inquiry).94 An example of using policy reasons to fill in a gap (and 
the antithesis of the hypothetical model of the bargaining process) is the so-
called "penalty default," under which the term selected is "purposefully set 
at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to 
reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)."95 
In most cases, the distinction between the hypothetical model of the 
bargaining process and supplying a term that "comports with community 
standards of fairness and policy" is likely insignificant because courts will, 
one expects, probably conclude that the parties would have agreed to a term 
that turns out to be consistent with community standards of fairness. The 
88 Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 891. 
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981). 
90 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 47; Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865; see 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 98 (8th ed. 2011) 
(advocating for such an approach to gap filling based on the belief it results in efficient 
terms). 
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981) ("[W]here there is in 
fact no agreement, the court should supply a term which comports with community 
standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining 
process."). 
92 Id.; see also id. § 5 cmt. b ("Much contract law consists of rules which may be varied 
by agreement of the parties. Such rules are sometimes stated in terms of presumed intention, 
and they may be thought of as implied terms of an agreement. They often rest, however, on 
considerations of public policy rather than on manifestation of the intention of the parties."). 
93 Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 878-79 (citations omitted). 
94 FRIED, supra note 75, at 62-63. 
95 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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distinction would be relevant, however, if the court considers policy matters 
when supplying a term. 
An important example of an implied-in-law term is the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.96 When a party engages in conduct the legal 
consequences of which the parties did not expressly or impliedly agree 
upon (i.e., conduct that was not anticipated at the time of the bargain's 
formation), the court will consider such conduct a breach if it is not 
consistent with "community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness. "97 
Courts will usually only refuse to fill a gap when the omitted term is 
important98 and relates to a matter that is particularly subjective (such that it 
is difficult or impossible to say what would be "reasonable in the 
circumstances"). Examples include, "where the parties have omitted from 
their agreement the kind or quantity of goods or the specifications of a 
building contract .... "99 Unfortunately, however, because "[it] cannot be 
said that the legal system has adopted any ... criteria [for gap filling] as 
exclusive ... it is difficult to know, without research, when the courts will 
or will not supply a gap-filler, and, if they will, how the gap will be 
filled. "100 
The legislatures and the courts have, though, established default rules for 
certain recurring gaps. For example, if the parties fail to agree on a price 
for a service or for goods, "a court will hold that the parties intended that a 
reasonable price should be paid and received." 101 Similarly, if no time is 
specified for performance, performance is due within "a reasonable 
96 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
97 Id. cmt. a. 
98 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 212 ("[A] court may be more willing to supply a 
term if the court regards the term as relatively unimportant."). In deciding the importance of 
a missing term, the Second Restatement encourages courts to take into account the dispute 
that has arisen. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981) ("It is less 
likely that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by construction as to a matter which 
has been the subject of controversy between the parties than as to one which is raised only as 
an afterthought."). Such an approach seems inconsistent with classical contract law's focus 
on the time of formation. 
99 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 48 (internal citations omitted). 
100 Id. § 2.9, at 47. 
IOI Id. See also RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981); U.C.C. § 2-
305 (2013). For an argument that such a term is an implied-in-law term based on the policy 
against unjust enrichment, at least when goods have been delivered and accepted (or services 
provided and accepted), and not an implied-in-fact term, see Patterson, supra note 72, at 835 
("Yet if goods have been delivered and accepted, the context may show that no gift was 
intended, as the recipient knew, and the court will construe (imply) a duty to pay the 
reasonable value of the goods. The policy seems to be to prevent unjust enrichment, yet the 
duty construed is contractual, not quasi-contractual."). 
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time."102 If the parties fail to agree on a place for the delivery of goods, the 
place for delivery is the seller's place of business. 103 If the parties fail to 
agree on a time for payment for goods, payment is due when the buyer 
receives them. 104 If the parties fail to specify the consequences of a party's 
non-performance, the other party is entitled to suspend its own performance 
if the non-performance is material, 105 and if the non-performance is a 
breach, it is entitled to recover damages to protect its expectation 
interest.106 The courts have also established default rules for situations 
involving a mistake of fact at the time of contract formation, 107 involving 
an unanticipated event occurring after contract formation that makes a 
party's performance impossible or much more difficult than expected,108 
!OZ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981); u.c.c. § 2-309(1) 
(2013); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 48. 
IOJ U.C.C. § 2-308(a). 
104 Jd.§2-310(a). 
!OS See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 237 (1981). Under the U.C.C.'s perfect 
tender rule, a buyer has the privilege to suspend performance under a non-installment 
contract ifthe goods fail to conform in any respect to the contract. U.C.C. § 2-60l(a). 
!0
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). A party's expectation 
interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position 
as he would have been in had the contract been performed." Id. § 344(a). 
107 See id. § 152(1) ("Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as 
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he 
bears the risk of the mistake .... "); id. § 153 ("Where a mistake of one party at the time a 
contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material 
effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is 
voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake ... and (a) the effect of the 
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other 
party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake."). Of course, if the 
parties have expressly or impliedly agreed about the consequences of a mistake of fact, the 
default rule does not apply. See id. § 154(a) (providing that a party bears the risk of mistake 
when "the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties"). 
ws See id. § 261 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance 
is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."). The fact 
that the default rule regarding impracticability is considered an implied-in-law term and not 
an implied-in-fact term is shown by the Second Restatement's Introductory Note to the 
relevant Second Restatement chapter. See id. ch. 11, intro. note ("The rationale behind the 
doctrine[] of impracticability ... is sometimes said to be that there is an 'implied term' of 
the contract that such extraordinary circumstances will not occur. This Restatement rejects 
this analysis .... "); see also id. § 204 cmt. a (indicating that the default rule regarding 
impracticability is an implied-in-law term). Of course, if the parties have expressly or 
impliedly agreed about the consequences of an event making performance impracticable, the 
default rule does not apply. See id. § 261 (noting that discharge of the duty does not occur 
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and involving an unanticipated event occurring after contract formation that 
makes one party's performance meaningless (or virtually meaningless) to 
the other party. 109 
As a result of implied-in-law terms, it is unusual that a bargain will be 
unenforceable because of a gap. As discussed above, such a result will 
occur only when there is no statutory or judicially-recognized default rule 
to fill the gap and the gap relates to an important and particularly subjective 
matter, such that it would be difficult or impossible to determine what 
would be a reasonable term in the circumstances. 110 
Importantly, however, it should be recognized that gaps might mean that 
a reasonable person would conclude that the varties did not even reach an 
agreement (and thus did not form a bargain). 11 As the Second Restatement 
provides, "[t]he fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left 
open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended 
112 to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance." "The more terms the 
parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a 
binding agreement."113 And gap filling with implied-in-law terms does not 
occur until it is determined that the parties have manifested assent to a 
bargain. If, however, the parties have manifested assent to a bargain, under 
under the default rule if"the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary"). 
109 See id. § 265 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of 
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to 
render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the 
contrary."). Like the impracticability doctrine, the fact that the default rule regarding 
frustration of purpose is considered an implied-in-law term and not an implied-in-fact term 
is shown in the introductory note of chapter 11 in the Second Restatement. See id. ch. 11, 
intro. note ("The rationale behind the doctrine[] of ... frustration is sometimes said to be 
that there is an 'implied term' of the contract that such extraordinary circumstances will not 
occur. This Restatement rejects that analysis ... . ");see also id. § 204 cmt. a (indicating that 
the default rule regarding frustration of purpose is an implied-in-law term). Of course, if the 
parties have expressly or impliedly agreed about the consequences of an event that 
substantially frustrates a party's principal purpose, the default rule does not apply. See id. 
§ 265 (noting that discharge of the duty does not occur under the default rule if "the 
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary"). 
110 See notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
111 See PERILLO, supra note 2, at 43 ("Indefiniteness in a communication is some 
evidence of an intent not to contract. The more terms that are omitted in an agreement the 
more likely it is that the parties do not intend to contract." (internal citations omitted)); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. d (2011) ("A 
transaction resulting in an indefinite [bargain] must not be confused with a failed negotiation 
producing no [bargain] at all."). 
112 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33(3)(1981). 
113 Id.§ 33 cmt. c. 
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modem contract law, a gap will rarely result in the bargain not being a 
contract because of indefiniteness. 
B. Misunderstandings 
The second type of indefiniteness-a misunderstanding---occurs when 
the parties to a bargain have expressly or impliedly addressed a particular 
matter (thus, there is no gap in the sense of an omitted term), but what each 
party intends the agreement to mean is different from what the other party 
intends it to mean, or the parties disagree about how the agreement is to 
apply to a particular situation. 114 In other words, the parties have attached 
different meanings to some of the words or conduct that formed the bargain 
(thus there is a gap in understanding). 
1. When language causes a misunderstanding 
When a misunderstanding results despite the parties' agreement to use 
particular words as evidence of their bargain, it is often because of the use 
of either vague language or ambiguous language. 115 Each is discussed 
below. 
a. Vague language 
A vague word is one that is "best depicted as forming not a neatly 
bounded class but a distribution about a central norm."116 It describes 
something that can be imagined on a continuum and covers a range of 
possible meanings, but with the range's boundary being unclear. 117 Thus, 
"[a] word that may or may not be applicable to marginal objects [or events] 
is vague."118 For example, the word "red" is vague because a person might 
114 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1093 (defining "misunderstanding" 
as "[a] situation in which the words or acts of two people suggest assent, but one or both of 
them in fact intend something different from what the words or acts express"). 
115 See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 860 ("Sometimes, because of vagueness or 
ambiguity in the language they have used, the parties will disagree over the meaning of what 
they said or over how their language applies to a situation for which they have provided."); 
see also Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 952-57 (explaining vagueness and ambiguity in the 
context of contract disputes). 
116 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953 (quoting W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 85 (1960)); 
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1689 (defining "vague" as 
"[i]mprecise; not sharply outlined; indistinct; uncertain"). 
117 See FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 330 (noting that vague words cover "a range of 
possible meanings"). 
118 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953. 
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or might not intend her use of that word to include crimson (i.e., exactly 
where red starts and stops is unclear). 119 A party might promise to "take 
care of' another party, but it is unclear what tasks are encompassed with the 
range of that phrase. 120 A party might promise to make a "prompt" 
shipment, but it is unclear after exactly how many days the shipment is no 
longer prompt. 121 Or a party might promise to deliver "chickens," but it is 
unclear what kind of chickens are to be delivered. 122 
Vague words, which are more common than ambiguous words, 123 
also include those that form a distribution about a central norm 
because they are based on individual value judgments. The adjective 
"reasonable," which is defined as "fair, proper, or moderate under the 
circumstances[,]"124 is perhaps the most obvious example, but there 
are others. An employer might promise to Ray an employee "a fair 
share of my profits" in addition to a salary. 1 5 As the court noted in 
that case, a "fair" share was "pure conjecture" and "may be any 
amount from a nominal sum to a material part accordin5 to the 
particular views of the person whose guess is considered." 6 Or a 
person mi9ht promise a "generous" reward for the return of lost 
property. 12 Of course, whether (or the extent to which) such words 
are vague depends upon what they are modifying. As previously 
noted, gaps are often filled with terms including the adjective 
"reasonable,"128 presumably because such things as a reasonable 
119 Id. at 952-53. 
120 See Dombrowski v. Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the 
phrase "take care of' was too vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 
A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917) (enforcing an agreement to maintain and care for one of the parties). 
121 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956-57 (citing Kreg1inger & Femau Ltd. v. Charles J. 
Webb Sons Co., 162 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1958)). 
122 See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'! Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 118 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 441, 451 (providing Frigaliment as 
an example of vague language); Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953. 
123 FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 331 ("Misunderstandings involving true ambiguity 
are rare; those involving a range of possible meanings are more common."). 
124 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,supra note 36, at 1379. 
125 Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823-24 (N.Y. 1916). 
126 Id. at 824. 
127 See Greene v. Heinrich, 300 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238-39 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (enforcing 
the promise of a "generous" reward and concluding that 10% of the value of the returned 
property would be "generous"), afj"d, 319 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Term 1971), aff'd, 327 
N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). 
128 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981) (reasonable 
price); u.c.c. § 2-305 (2013); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981) 
(reasonable time for performance); U.C.C. § 2-309(1). 
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price or a reasonable time for performance would not be subject to a 
wide range of disagreement among reasonable persons. 
Although parties reduce their bargains to written documents to decrease the 
likelihood of a misunderstanding, the inherent indefiniteness of most words 
means this risk can usually not be entirely eliminated. In a certain sense, all 
words are indefinite because "it is men who give meanings to words and 
[thus] words in themselves have no meaning .... " 129 As stated by Justice 
Roger Traynor, the "most prominent state court judge of his generation," 130If 
words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover 
contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they 
were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. 
'A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a 
symbol of algebra or chemistry .... ' The meaning of particular words or 
groups of words varies with the ' ... verbal context and surrounding 
circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience 
of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges) .... A word 
has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective 
meaning, one true meaning.' Accordingly, the meaning of a writing ' ... can 
only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal 
the sense in which the writer used the words.' 131 
Importantly, "the context of words and other conduct is seldom exactly 
the same for two different people, since connotations depend on the entire 
past experience and the attitudes and expectations of the person whose 
d d
. . . . ,,132 
un erstan mg 1s m question. 
b. Ambiguous language 
Ambiguous language comes in three varieties: ambiguity of term, 
ambiguity of syntax, and conflicting language. Each presents essentially 
the same problem: the bargain's language is capable of being interpreted in 
two entirely different ways. 
Ambiguity of term occurs when the parties use an ambiguous word. 133 A 
word is ambiguous if it has "two [or more] entirely different connotations 
so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly 
129 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Paro! Evidence Rule, 50 
CORNELLL.Q. 161, 164 (1965). 
130 Benjamin Field, Traynor, Roger J.' in THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 548, 549 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 
131 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 
(Cal. 1968) (ellipses in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Pearson v. State Soc. Welfare 
Bd., 353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1960)); See also Corbin, supra note 124, at 187). 
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 201 cmt. b (1981). 
133 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954. 
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appropriate and inappropriate .... "134 An example is the word "light," 
which can refer to either color or weight, 135 or the word "ton," which can 
refer to either a long ton (2,240 pounds) or a short ton (2,000 pounds).136 
Or a general contractor and a subcontractor might agree that the 
subcontractor will paint an apartment "unit," but it is unclear whether the 
word "unit" was intended to refer to only the apartment's interior or to both 
the interior and the exterior. 137 
A type of ambiguity of term is proper name ambiflity, which is when 
two or more persons or things share the same name. 13 A famous example 
was involved in Raffles v. Wichelhaus, where the parties agreed to buy and 
sell cotton to be delivered on the ship Peerless sailing from Bombay, but 
there were two ships with that name sailing from that city. 139 Another 
example is Kyle v. Kavanagh, in which the parties agreed to buy and sell 
land on Prospect Street in Waltham, Massachusetts, but there were two 
streets in that city with that name. 140 
An ambiguity of syntax, which is probably more common than an 
ambiguity of term, is an ambiguity caused by grammatical structure. 141 An 
example is an insurance policy that covers any "disease of organs of the 
body not common to both sexes."142 Does "not common to both sexes" 
qualify "disease" or "organs"? Thus, is it the disease or the organs that 
must not be common to both sexes to be covered (for example, is a fibroid 
tumor of the womb covered)?143 Or the parties to a marriage settlement 
agree to "equally pay for the cost of [their] minor child's college tuition, 
134 Id. at 953; see also MERRJAM-WEBSTER, INC., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 39 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "ambiguous" as "capable of being understood in 
two or more possible senses or ways"). 
135 See Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953 (stating that an example of an ambiguous word 
is the use of the word "light" when referring to a feather; the speaker might use the word to 
refer to the feather's color or its weight). 
136 Id. at 954. 
137 See Flower City Painting Contractors v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
138 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954. 
139 See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.). 
14° Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356, 356-57 (1869). A similar ambiguity can result 
when there is no person or thing with the specified name, but two or more persons or things 
with names similar to the specified name. For example, the parties might refer to "the ship 
Lady Adams that is sailing from Nantucket," when there is no ship with that name sailing 
from Nantucket, but one ship sailing from Nantucket named Abigail Adams and another 
sailing from Nantucket named Mrs. Adams. 
141 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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books, supplies and any and all other related expenses."144 Does "related 
expenses" refer to "college" or to just "tuition, books, [and] supplies"? 
Thus, are "related expenses" all those related to college or simply those 
related to "tuition, books, [and] supplies"?145 Ambiguity caused by the use 
of the words "and" and "or" is also an example of ambiguity of syntax.146 
Another source of ambiguity is the use of conflicting language. 147 For 
example, a written document might provide in one provision that a buyer 
agrees to pay a specified rate per item provided; in another, the number of 
items the seller will provide; and in another, the total price to be paid. The 
amount owed according to the first two provisions might, however, conflict 
with the amount specified in the third. 148 Or the price to be paid might be 
identified in both words and numbers, with the amounts specified being 
different. 149 Many of these conflicts appear in form contracts that have 
conflicting language added by the parties. 150 
2. When a misunderstanding is rendered irrelevant under law-the effect of 
the objective theory of contract and other aids to interpretation and 
construction 
Just as the law will often supply omitted terms and, thus, render bargains 
sufficiently definite in law despite the inevitable gaps, under the so-called 
"objective theory of contract," the court will give vague or ambiguous 
language the meaning attached to it by one of the parties if the other party 
was more at fault for the misunderstanding.151 Thus, ifthe first party knew 
or had reason to know of the meaning attached by the second party, and the 
second party did not know or have reason to know of the meaning attached 
by the first party, the second party's meaning is used. 152 This process is 
144 Riera v. Riera, 86 So. 3d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
14s Id. at 1167. 
146 Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 955. 
147 Id. at 956. 
148 See id. 
149 See WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 401 (Arthur L. Corbin 
ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919). 
iso Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956. 
ISi RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 201(2)(a) (1981). 
is2 Id. In deciding whether a party had reason to know of a meaning attached by the 
other party, courts disagree on the type of evidence that should be admitted when the parties 
have reduced their bargain to a written document and the language used is unambiguous on 
its face. There is the more restrictive plain meaning rule, which is the majority rule, and the 
more liberal "contextual" approach. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 463-69 
(explaining the difference between the restrictive view and liberal view). See also PERILLO, 
supra note 2, § 3.10, at 129-30 (explaining that, under the plain meaning rule, "if a writing, 
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really no different from the court filling a gap by supplying a term that is 
reasonable in the circumstances. The parties did not agree on the term's 
meaning, but the court will select one of the parties' meanings if that party 
was less at fault for the misunderstanding because it is reasonable to do so 
in the circumstances (recall that encouraging due care is a policy considered 
when filling gaps). Imposing liability on the party who was more at fault 
for the misunderstanding induces parties to learn what most persons mean 
when they use particular language, thereby reducing future 
. d d" 153 m1sun erstan mgs. 
Various guides to interpretation and construction have been recognized to 
implement this fault standard and to implement other policies. For 
example, one is that "[ o ]rdinarily a party has reason to know of meanings in 
general usage."154 Thus, "[u]nless a different intention is 
manifested, ... where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is 
interpreted in accordance with that meaninf: .... "155 Also, specific terms 
are given greater weight than general terms, 56 and terms that are negotiated 
or a term is plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the 
four comers of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind[,]" though 
some plain-meaning jurisdictions admit evidence of surrounding circumstances) Thus, if the 
court follows the plain meaning rule and the language is unambiguous on its face, no 
extrinsic evidence (other than perhaps surrounding circumstances) is admitted to determine 
which party was more at fault for the misunderstanding (the party who attached a meaning 
different from the plain meaning is deemed more at fault). This is true even if the extrinsic 
evidence would show that the parties attached the same meaning to the word, a meaning that 
is different from its plain meaning. Under the Second Restatement and U.C.C. approach, 
any relevant evidence is admitted to determine the meaning of contract language. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 200-204 (1981); u.c.c. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2013). 
There is considerable tension between the plain meaning rule and the rule followed in some 
jurisdictions that extrinsic evidence is admissible to give meaning to a latent ambiguity. See, 
e.g., 21 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, 21 TENN. PRACTICE: CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE§ 8:56 
(2012) ("A major problem in Tennessee contracts jurisprudence, unacknowledged in the 
decisions, is the tension between the plain meaning rule and the latent ambiguity principle. 
When the contractual text contains no clue that the words might mean more than they say, 
the parties' litigation positions will be predictable. One party will say that the terms should 
receive their usual, ordinary, and plain meaning, limited by the four corners rule, and no 
need exists for further construction. The other party will respond that the rule of latent 
ambiguity entitles the party to present extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning, even though 
the words are clear on their face. Many decisions support both viewpoints; some courts and 
commentators have acknowledged the difficulty ofreconciling these principles."). 
153 POSNER, supra note 90, at 126. 
154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 201 cmt. b (1981). Professor Perillo refers 
to this as a "watered-down version of the plain meaning rule[.]" PERILLO, supra note 2, 
§ 3.13, at 137. 
155 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 202(3)(a) (1981). 
156 Id. § 203(c). 
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between the parties are given greater weight than standardized terms. 157 
Under the ejusdem generis canon (Latin for "of the same kind or class"),158 
"where a contractual clause enumerates specific things, general words 
following the enumeration are interpreted to be restricted to things of the 
same kind as those specifically listed."159 Similarly, under the noscitur a 
sociis canon (Latin for "it is known by its associates"), "the meaning of an 
unclear word or ~hrase should be determined by the words immediately 
surrounding it."
1 
Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon 
(Latin for "expression of one thing is exclusion of another"), "to exclude 
one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative."161 
Another canon provides "that if two terms in a writing conflict, the first 
term controls."
162 
Also, under the "last antecedent rule," when it is unclear 
which word a qualifying phrase refers to, it is construed as applying to the 
last antecedent. 
163 
Because the party who chooses vague or ambiguous 
language is "more likely than the other party to have reason to know of 
uncertainties of meaning," 164 vague or ambiguous language is usually 
construed against the party who chose it. 165 And "consistent with a policy 
of avoiding forfeiture and unjust enrichment,"166 doubts are generally 
resolved in favor of construing the occurrence of an event as a promise and 
d
. . 167 
not an express con itlon. 
Because courts apply a fault standard and other policies to determine 
meaning in the case of a misunderstanding and do not require that the 
parties attach the same meaning to the term, "the meaning of the words or 
other conduct of a party is not necessarily the meaning he expects or 
understands."168 Thus, as a result of the objective theory of contract and 
157 Id. § 203(d). 
158 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 594. 
159 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.13, at 137. 
160 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1160-61. 
161 Id. at 661. 
162 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.13, at 136. 
163 Wohl v. Swinney, 888 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Ohio 2008). 
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (I 981 ). 
165 Id. § 206. "[T]he rule is in practice a makeweight rather than a tie breaker." 
Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). 
Most jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule when the non-drafting party is a 
sophisticated party who was represented by an attorney during the drafting process. Id. at 
858. 
166 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (1981). 
167 See id. § 227(1 ). 
168 Id. § 200 cmt. b (1981). The party whose meaning does not apply might, however, 
avoid the contract under the doctrine of mistake. Id. § 20 illus. 4; § 153 illus. 5, 6. In such a 
situation, however, the mistaken party would have to demonstrate that "the effect of the 
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable," since the 
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other aids to interpretation and construction, most misunderstandings in fact 
will not result in indefiniteness in law. 
Also, where the evidence shows that "the parties have attached the same 
meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof [a so-called mutual 
understanding], it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."169 And 
importantly, part performance after the bargain is formed may show a 
shared meaning of an indefinite term. 170 "The parties to an agreement 
know best what they meant, and their action under it is often the strongest 
evidence of their meaning."171 Thus, an alleged misunderstanding by one 
party might turn out, according to the fact finder, to have not been a 
misunderstanding at all. 
Similarly, conflicting language in a written document might simply have 
been a drafting error by the parties in reducing the bargain's terms to 
written form (a so-called "mistake in expression" or "mistake in 
integration"). 172 In such a situation, there is no misunderstanding regarding 
the bargain's actual terms, just a drafting error, and if such an error is 
proven by clear, strong, and convincing evidence, the court may reform the 
written document to reflect the parties' actual bargain. 173 
mistake is considered a unilateral mistake, not a mutual mistake. Id. § 153(a); see also id. 
cmt. b. 
169 Id. § 201(1); see also Berke Mcore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 A.2d 150, 156 
(N.H. 1953). The Second Restatement uses the phrase "mutual understanding" for when the 
parties attach the same meaning to a term. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 201 cmt. c (1981). As previously discussed, in those jurisdictions that follow the plain 
meaning rule, extrinsic evidence showing that the parties attached the same meaning to a 
particular word might never be admitted into evidence, and the meaning used by the court 
might, therefore, be different from the meaning attached by the parties. See PERILLO, supra 
note 2, § 3.10, at 130. 
170 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 34 cmt. c (1981). 
171 Id. § 202 cmt. g; see also U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 1 (1978) (repealed 2001) ("The parties 
themselves know best what they have meant by their words of agreement and their action 
under that agreement is the best indication of what that meaning was."); Patterson, supra 
note 72, at 836 (noting that under the doctrine of "practical construction," the parties 
"conduct during the course of performance may support inferences as to the meaning of 
language in the contract"). 
172 See DAWSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 421 (referring to a drafting error as a "mistake 
in expression" or "mistake in integration"). 
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 155 & cmt. c (1981); Benyon Bldg. 
Corp. v. Nat'! Guardian Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Hoffman v. 
Chapman, 34 A.2d 438, 439 (Md. 1943). 
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III. WHY PARTIES ENTER INTO INDEFINITE BARGAINS 
There are many reasons why parties enter into bargains with indefinite 
terms. First, the parties might not have thought about a particular matter, 
particularly because it is difficult if not impossible for the parties to foresee 
all of the problems that might arise. 174 Second, the parties might not want 
to spend the time addressing particular matters, especially about events 
unlikely to occur or that seem unimportant at the time.175 Even for 
problems that are foreseeable or even foreseen, persons have limited 
attention and "give [this] 'limited attention' only to a limited number of 
situations which they choose by some initial process of selection."176 In 
particular, time might be of the essence and the parties do not have the 
opportunity to address all of the issues that they otherwise would. Third, 
the parties might not want to raise a troublesome issue that might cause 
delay or the deal to collapse, "perhaps in the hope that the problem may 
never arise or that if it does it can be better dealt with on a business basis 
after a specific dispute has arisen."177 The parties might, therefore, not 
address the topic at all or agree upon a vague term, comfortable to let the 
matter be decided by the appropriate forum if necessary. 178 
174 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981) ("The parties to an agreement may entirely fail to foresee 
the situation which later arises and gives rise to a dispute .... "); Farnsworth, supra note 40, 
at 871 ("Fate may outstrip even the most sybilline [sic] draftsman, with a probability that 
increases with the life of the contract."). 
175 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981) (noting that the parties might not address a matter because 
"the situation seems to be unimportant or unlikely" to occur); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 
95, at 92-93 ("Scholars have primarily attributed incompleteness to the costs of contracting. 
Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a 
given contingency are greater than the benefits. These transaction costs may include legal 
fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and 
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether 
a contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of 
contractually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the probability 
of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that contingency even if 
transaction costs are quite low." (citations omitted)). 
176 Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 869. 
177 Id. at 872; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202 ("Another common cause of 
indefiniteness is the parties' reluctance to raise difficult issues for fear that the deal might 
fall through."); Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956 ("[O]ne or both [of the parties] may have 
foreseen the problem but deliberately refrained from raising it during the negotiations for 
fear that they might fail-the lawyer who 'wakes these sleeping dogs' by insisting that they 
be resolved may cost his client the bargain."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 
cmt. b (1981) ("[D]iscussion of it might be unpleasant or might produce delay or impasse."). 
178 See Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956. This often occurs when an employer and a 
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Fourth, the parties might raise the issue but not be able to agree on a term 
179 to cover the matter and, thus, leave a gap or agree to use a vague term. 
Fifth, the parties might "have expectations but fail to manifest them, either 
because the expectation rests on an assumption which is unconscious or 
only partly conscious."180 Sixth, "it may be difficult to formulate orally or 
write down a term that would properly reflect" the parties' agreement about 
h f . 1 . 181 t e consequences o a part1cu ar event occurrmg. 
Seventh, the parties might reach an oral agreement or prepare a draft 
written agreement with the intention of preparing a more detailed written 
document, but before do in~ so, one of the parties repudiates, leaving behind 
an agreement with gaps. 1 2 Eighth, it might be advantageous to avoid 
specificity, particularly when dealing with long-term agreements that might 
require flexibility. 183 Ninth, the drafters of a written contract might simply 
b 1 
. 184 e c umsy or mept. 
Tenth, the parties might not realize that they each attach a different 
· . 1 185 El h . h . ;: . meamng to a part1cu ar term. event , a party wit more m1ormatton 
about a particular matter (a situation of so-called "asymmetric 
information")186 might strategically withhold that information to avoid 
having to pay a higher contract Jrice that would result if the information 
were known to the other party. 1 Twelfth, an offeror might intentionally 
union draft a collective bargaining agreement. See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor 
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1491 (1959) ("The pressure to reach agreement is so 
great that the parties are often willing to contract although each knows that the other places a 
different meaning upon the words and they share only the common intent to postpone the 
issue and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required."). 
179 Societe Franco Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1961] 2 Q.B. 278, 299 
(1960); see also Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 37 n.128 (2007) (noting that the parties 
might have chosen a vague term because they could not agree on a more precise term). 
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981). 
181 Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity 
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 107 (2000). 
182 A contract can be formed even though the parties manifested an intention to prepare a 
written document evidencing the bargain and then failed to do so. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 27 (1981). 
183 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
114-15 (6th ed. 2010). 
184 Id. at 101. This is the most likely cause of ambiguities of syntax and conflicting 
terms. 
185 See Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Paro/ 
Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 649-50 (1998) 
("Parties may sometimes attach different meanings to the very same words or phrases, 
ignoring the other party's understanding."). 
186 Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 109. 
187 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 94. An example would be a consumer who 
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make the offer's terms vague to render the bargain unenforceable, while 
requiring the offeree to perform first, and, thus, potentially obtaining the 
benefit of the offeree 's performance without having to himself perform. 188 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS REQUIREMENT 
Despite the various rules of law that help make those bargains that are 
indefinite in fact become definite in law (such as through gap filling and the 
objective theory of contract), some bargains will remain indefinite in law. 
Thus, it is necessary for the law to have rules regarding the effect of 
indefiniteness on a bargain's enforceability. 
The Second Restatement provides that "[ e ]ven though a manifestation of 
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so 
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably 
certain."189 Similarly, there is no manifestation of mutual assent if the 
parties attach materially different meanings to the bargain's terms (a 
misunderstanding) and neither party is more at fault than the other for the 
misunderstanding. 190 
The Reporter's Note to the Second Restatement's misunderstanding 
section states that "[i]f a term is so vague that the court cannot interpret it, 
the court should decide enforceability as an issue of the requirement of 
reasonable certainty in contracts," and that "[a] contract should be held 
nonexistent under this Section only when the misunderstanding goes to 
conflicting and irreconcilable meanings of a material term that could have 
either but not both meanings."191 Accordingly, the reasonably certain terms 
requirement applies to indefiniteness caused by gaps and vague words, and 
demands a warranty, signaling to the other party that the consumer places a high value on 
the requested performance. Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 109. 
188 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 105-06 (referring to this as the "perverse 
incentive" to offer an intentionally unenforceable bargain). 
189 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981). 
190 Id. § 20(1); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (Mark 
DeWolfHowe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881) ("[E]ach [party] said a different thing. The 
plaintiff offered one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another."). Under the 
Second Restatement's test, the bargain fails to be a contract if neither party knew of the 
meaning attached by the other, but each had "reason to know" of the meaning attached by 
the other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 20(1) (1981). Thus, the Second 
Restatement adopts a contributory negligence standard, not a comparative negligence 
standard, which seems inconsistent with the Second Restatement's general preference for 
saving bargains. When there is no manifestation of mutual assent because of a material 
misunderstanding, the court does not replace the term that was the subject of the 
misunderstanding with what it considers a "reasonable term" in the circumstances. Speidel, 
supra note 53, at 802-03. 
191 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 20 reporter's note (1981). 
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the misunderstanding doctrine applies to indefiniteness caused by 
ambiguous language. 192 Thus, this Article (which deals with the reasonably 
certain terms requirement) will not further address, in detail, the issue of 
ambiguous language. 
The Second Restatement comment explains that the reasonably certain 
terms requirement "reflects the fundamental policy that contracts should be 
made by the parties, not by the courts .... "193 But "[w]here the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for 
granting a remedy, the same policy [that contracts should be made by the 
parties] supports the granting of the remedy."194 Thus, the doctrine is 
premised on the related ideas that contract law should enforce agreements 
made by the parties, but avoid imposing duties upon them that were not 
voluntarily assumed. This statement of the reasonably certain terms 
requirement's policy is, however, somewhat misleading (and not 
particularly helpful) because of the Second Restatement's position that 
courts should aggressively fill gaps with implied-in-law terms. 195 
Under the Second Restatement's test, a bargain's terms are "reasonably 
certain" as long as "they provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 196 As noted by Professor 
Joseph Perillo, "an agreement must be sufficiently definite before a court 
can determine if either party breached it."197 Although the First 
192 Although the reporter's notes are not approved by the council or ALI, see Wechsler, 
supra note 13, at 150-51, reporter's notes to uniform laws are given substantial weight. See 
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory 
Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 629, 669 n.272 (2001) ("Reporters' notes for uniform 
laws ... receive great weight."). 
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981). 
194 Id. 
195 See id. § 204 ("When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have 
not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and 
duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."). Although 
this black letter rule suggests that gap filling does not occur until after it is determined that a 
contract was formed, the comments to the Second Restatement's section on reasonably 
certain terms suggests otherwise. See id. § 33 cmt. a ("[I]n recurring situations the law often 
supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the contrary."); id. cmt. b ("It is less likely 
that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by construction as to a matter which has been 
the subject of controversy between the parties than as to one which is raised only as an 
afterthought."). 
196 Id. § 33(2). A comment to the Second Restatement refers to this as a "minimum 
standard ofcertainty." Id. § 362 cmt. a. 
197 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 44; see also CORBIN, supra note 2, § 95, at 143 ("A 
court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. a (1981) ("If the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no 
basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract."). 
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Restatement required that the terms of an offer be sufficiently definite, 198 
the current view is that the bargain, not the offer, must be sufficiently 
definite, which takes into account that some offers permit the offeree to 
select among different terms. 199 The Second Restatement's test was 
modeled after the U.C.C.'s reasonably certain terms provision,200 which 
provides that "[ e ]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for 
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy."201 
The tolerated degree of indefiniteness has grown over time.202 Classical 
contract law (the law that developed in the nineteenth century and that 
198 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932). 
199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(1) (1981); PERILLO, supra note 2, 
§ 2.9, at44. 
200 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note l, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn 
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code." (remark by Reporter Robert 
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's 
terms be reasonably certain)). 
201 u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (2013). 
202 The indefiniteness doctrine dates to at least the late sixteenth century. See A.W. 
BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION 
OF AssUMPSIT 532 (1975) (referencing the 1594 decision of Sackford v. Phillips, Moo. K.B. 
689 (1594)). By the seventeenth century, one of the recognized defenses to an assumpsit 
action was that the contract was not "clear and certain." KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 81, 83 (1990). In 1641, in William 
Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances, which was an attempt "to impose some 
order upon the development of assumpsit[,]" it was stated that a requirement of a contract or 
a promise was that it be "clear and certain." SIMPSON, supra, at 506 (internal citation 
omitted). This requirement was related to the need to have certainty in the issue to be tried 
by the jury. See TEEVEN, supra, at 83 ("The requirement is associated with the need to plead 
to the issue in trial by jury by averring the promise with certainty."); SIMPSON, supra, at 532 
("If in the action of assumpsit this certainty in the issue was to be achieved, the promise 
must itself be averred with certainty .... "). Importantly, though, "[t]he principle applied 
both to the promise sued upon and to a promise averred as a consideration, for the latter was 
not a good consideration unless itself actionable, and to be actionable it must be certain." Id. 
Thus, the definiteness requirement was premised on both the practical need to determine a 
breach as well as the requirement of mutuality. Early English decisions applying the 
definiteness requirement were somewhat inconsistent. For example, a promise to pay £100 
within a "short time" in return for a promise to deliver two oxen within a "short time" was 
held too indefinite to enforce as was a promise to forbear from suing for a "little time." See 
TEEVEN, supra, at 83 n.74, (citing Tolhurst v. Brickenden, Cro. Jae. 250, 1 Rolle Rep. 5; 1 
Buist. 91 (1610)); see also SIMPSON, supra, at 532. In contrast, promises to forbear from 
suing for a "reasonable time" and a "great time" were held sufficiently definite. Id. (citing 
Treford v. Holmes, Hutton 108 (1628), and Mapes v. Sir Isaac Sidney, Hutton 46, Cro. Jae. 
683 (1621)). Also, even when a promise to forbear was not limited to any time, the court 
would provide that it "be a total forbearance, or at least a forbearance for a convenient 
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dominated into the early twentieth century)203 was particularly concerned 
with a court not creating a bargain for the parties or creating the bargain's 
terms, as evidenced by rules making it difficult to form a contract while at 
the same time refusing to infer terms excusing non-performance.204 
Classical contract law, therefore, also exhibited intolerance for 
indefiniteness. 205 
But in the twentieth century it was generally accepted that contract law 
went beyond merely implementing the parties' intentions and necessarily 
involved making policy choices.206 With such a concession, courts became 
more willing to risk error in determining the terms of the parties' bargain, 
and made saving the bargain a priority. Thus, so-called modem contract 
law,207 or neoclassical contract law,208 liberalized the formal rules regarding 
time .... " SIMPSON, supra, at 451 (quoting Mapes v. Sir Isaac Sidney, Hutton 46, Cro. Jae. 
683 (1621)). Similarly, "[a]ssumpsit permitted market values or a reasonableness standard 
to be read into a promise [to pay for services]." TEEVEN, supra, at 83. For example, "[i]n 
the late sixteenth century it came to be settled that the action of assumpsit would lie where 
the plaintiff averred a promise to pay an uncertain sum .... " SIMPSON, supra, at 65. Thus, 
even though "[w]ell before the nineteenth century, the common law had a certainty 
requirement associated with the need to plead a promise with certainty in trial by 
jury, ... this did not stand in the way of market values and reasonable standards being read 
into promises in Assumpsit actions." TEEVEN, supra, at 238. 
203 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 855 n.2 
(1978) ("Classical contract law refers ... to that developed in the 19th century and brought 
to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920) and in 
the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932)."). 
204 GILMORE, supra note 62, at 49-53. 
205 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 805, 817 (2000). 
206 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 577 (1933) 
("When courts ... proceed to interpret the terms of the contract they are generally not 
merely seeking to discover the actual past meanings (though these may sometimes be 
investigated), but more generally they decide the 'equities,' the rights and obligations of the 
parties, in such circumstances; and these legal relations are determined by the courts and the 
jural system and not by the agreed will of the contesting parties."); Jay M. Feinman, The 
Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1990) ("The problems of 
classical contract law quickly became apparent to judicial and scholarly commentators. 
Contractual liability, like all other legal liability, did not arise solely from the individual's 
choice but came from the court's imposition oflegal obligation as a matter of public policy; 
a contract was binding because the court determined that imposing liability served social 
interests, not because the individual had voluntarily assumed liability through his 
manifestation of assent."). 
207 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract 
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 766 (2002) ("It has become a commonplace observation 
among contract writers and teachers that American contract law underwent a major 
evolution during roughly the middle half of the last century, from the 'classical' contract law 
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formation and construction. For example, the U.C.C. provided that "[a] 
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of such a contract[,]"209 and provided that "[a ]n agreement 
sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the 
moment of its making is undeterrnined."210 The U.C.C. even rejected "one 
of the sacred rubrics of classical contract law,"211 the mirror-image 
rule,212 which required that an acceptance match the offer's terms in order 
to form an agreement.213 
Likewise, the rules applicable to definiteness were liberalized214 with 
indefinite bargains to be enforced if at all possible, as long as the parties 
had intended to make a contract (presumably still determined 
objectively).215 As previously indicated, the U.C.C. provided that "[e]ven 
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."216 The general 
purpose of this provision was "to prevent the courts from requiring strictly 
that everything be clearly and definitely settled before the Court will find 
that a contract was formed."217 In fact, a "major innovation of Article 2 
[was] its abandonment--0r at least its minimization--0f the common law 
requirements of certainty."218 As stated by Chancellor Murray, "The Code 
standard, in effect, is indefiniteness be damned, as long as two critical 
exemplified by the teaching and writings of Professors Langdell and Williston to what some 
of us at least are accustomed to calling 'modern' contract law."). 
208 See Feinman, supra note 31, at 738 (referring to the law of the U.C.C. and the Second 
Restatement as neoclassical contract law "because it addresses the shortcomings of classical 
law rather than offering a wholly different conception of the law"). 
209 u.c.c. § 2-204(1) (2013). 
210 Id. § 2-204(2). 
211 John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 869, 888 (2002). 
212 u.c.c. § 2-207. 
213 See Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 114 ("The common-law mirror image 
rule holds that a contract is not formed unless the offer and acceptance are identical."). 
214 
TEEVEN, supra note 202, at 261. 
215 The Official Comment to the U.C.C. recognized, however, that "[t]he more terms the 
parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding 
agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter despite omissions." 
U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (2013). 
216 Id. § 2-204(3). 
217 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 86, at 274 (remark by Professor Edwin W. 
Patterson). 
218 Snyder, supra note 179, at 36. 
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elements are present: a manifested intention to make a contract and a 
reasonably certain basis from which a court may afford a remedy."219 
The Second Restatement followed suit, stating in a comment that if "the 
actions of the parties ... show conclusively that they have intended to 
conclude a binding agreement, even though one or more terms are missing 
or are left to be agreed upon ... courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a 
sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain." 220 As noted by Professor 
Robert Braucher (the Reporter for the Second Restatement section dealing 
with formation),221 the Second Restatement's test, "harmonizing with the 
Uniform Commercial Code and with a growing body of authority, tends 
toward greater toleration of indefiniteness and more readiness to enforce 
agreements where the parties intended to be bound."222 
However, because the line between enforcing the parties' bargain and 
creating a different bargain will often be fuzzy, "it will always be difficult 
to draw lines between definite and indefinite promises."223 Of course, if 
there is a gap that relates to an important matter, and the gap relates to a 
particularly subjective matter for which there is no statutory or judicially-
recognized default rule to fill in the gap, then the contract is too indefinite 
to enforce. 
With respect to vague language, "uncertainty as to incidental or collateral 
matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract."224 Thus, vague 
language threatens to prevent the formation of a contract only when the 
language relates to an important term of the bargain. It appears likely that 
the Second Restatement implicitly adopts the approach it takes to contracts 
that have a term that is against public policy: that the rest of the bargain 
would remain enforceable as long as the promise that is too indefinite to 
enforce "is not an essential part of the agreed exchange."225 
Promises will usually be considered too vague to enforce when they are 
"subject to a broad range of equally-plausible interpretations" such "that the 
219 John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 742 (1982). 
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. a (1981). 
221 Professor Braucher served as the Reporter from 1962 to 1971, at which time he was 
appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Herbert Wechsler, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS foreword ( 1981 ). 
222 Braucher, supra note 8, at 307. 
223 ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 119 (2011); see also PERILLO, supra 
note 2, § 2.9, at 44 ("The rule does not supply a precise standard. Indefiniteness is a matter 
of degree."). 
224 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. a (1981); see also id§ 201 cmt. d 
("There may be a binding contract despite failure to agree as to a term, if the term is not 
essential .... "). 
225 Id. § 184(1). 
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intention of the parties cannot be ascertained."226 Stated another way, a 
promise will be considered too indefinite because of vagueness if the 
language chosen makes it a meaningless expression of what the parties 
intended.227 Or, to take account of the objective theory of contract, a 
promise will be considered too indefinite because of vagueness if the 
language chosen makes it too difficult to determine what a reasonable 
person would believe it to mean. 
The difficult question, of course, is how broad the range of plausible 
meanings must be before one cannot ascertain, within an acceptable margin 
of error, what a reasonable person would believe the vague language 
means. Deciding when the range is too broad necessarily involves: (1) 
deciding how broad the usual range may be (the typical acceptable range), 
which requires the court to decide whether to err on the side of over-
enforcement or under-enforcement (the Second Restatement erring on the 
side of over-enforcement); (2) adjusting the typical acceptable range based 
on the importance to the bargain of the particular term (the adjusted 
acceptable range);228 and (3) then comparing the adjusted acceptable range 
to the court's view on how broad a reasonable person would consider the 
range of plausible meanings to be in the particular bargain based on the 
bargain's language and context (the bargain's range of vagueness). If the 
bargain's range of vagueness exceeds the adjusted acceptable range, the 
bargain should be considered too indefinite to enforce. If the bargain's 
range of vagueness does not exceed the adjusted acceptable range, the 
bargain should be considered sufficiently definite. 
For example (and to take the cases at the far ends), if a court believes the 
typical acceptable range is broad because it errs on the side of over-
enforcement, the court views the term as not particularly important, and the 
vague language is not subject to a particularly broad range of plausible 
meanings, the court will find that the bargain is not too indefinite. To the 
contrary, if a court believes the typical acceptable range is narrow because 
it errs on the side of under-enforcement, the court views the term as 
226 Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 802 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
227 See Patterson, supra note 72, at 835 ("An action has been brought upon an alleged 
contract which has vague and meaningless expressions of what would normally be important 
terms; e.g., the quality and quantity of goods are vague, and so is the price. In such a case 
the symbolic conduct will ordinarily be adjudged to be too indefinite to be enforced. 'The 
court cannot make a contract for the parties,' is the basic policy."). 
228 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 3, topic 3, § 33 cmt. a (198l)("Where 
the parties have intended to conclude a bargain, uncertainty as to incidental or collateral 
matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract. If the essential terms are so uncertain 
that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no 
contract." (emphasis added)). 
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important, and the vague language is subject to a particularly broad range of 
plausible meanings, the court will find that the bargain is too indefinite. 
Promises of vague services, or promises conditioned on the performance 
of vague services, are often considered too indefinite. For example, a 
promise to convey land "for services to be rendered" was held too 
indefinite. 229 A promise to leave a business to the promisee if the promisee 
would "attend" to it was held too indefinite.230 A promise to provide 
employment, without specifying its nature, is considered too indefinite to 
enforce.231 Vague promises to care for or help out the promisee tend to be 
too indefinite for the courts. For example, a promise to "help" the promisee 
was found too indefinite.232 Qualifying the type of service with a vague 
adjective often does not help. For example, a promise to an employee of 
"fair" treatment was considered too indefinite,233 as was a promise to give a 
sibling "a good education."234 A promise to "take care of [the promisee] in 
a very comfortable way" was held too vague to enforce.235 Whether a 
promise to use "best efforts" is too indefinite depends largely on the 
circumstances of the bargain. 236 
Promised payments of an unspecified amount (which would be a gap) or 
an amount qualified by a vague adjective (which would be the use of a 
vague word) also tend to be too indefinite, if the court believes the range of 
the possible amount under a reasonable interpretation would be too broad. 
Thus, an employer's promise to an employee of "reasonable salary 
increases" and "reasonable annual bonuses" was held too indefinite.237 A 
promise to another party for the opportunity to obtain more funds from the 
promisor in the future without specifying an amount (or a time period 
within which to provide them) was too indefinite. 238 Promises of 
229 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Sherman v. Kitsmiller, 17 
Serg. & Rawle 45, 1827 WL 2754 (Pa. Oct. 19, 1827)). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
233 Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 607-08 (Mich. 1993) 
234 l WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Bumpus v. Bumpus, 19 
N.W. 29 (Mich. 1884)). 
235 Cohn v. Levy, 725 N.Y.S.2d 376, 376 (App. Div. 2001); see also Dombrowski v. 
Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the phrase "take care of' was too 
vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917) 
(enforcing a promise to maintain and care for the promisee). 
236 E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in 
Contract Law, 46 U. PIIT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984). 
237 Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 799 (1993), overruled on other 
grounds by Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). 
238 Jensen v. Oliver, No. 97 C 1018, 1998 WL 673829, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1998). 
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employment without identifying the compensation have also been held too 
indefinite to enforce.239 Although the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement 
direct courts to supply a price term if the parties intended to conclude a 
bargain (a reasonable price at the time the goods are to be delivered or the 
services are to be provided), this only applies when "nothing is said as to 
price," "the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree," 
or "the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard 
as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or 
recorded. "240 
But presumably because the reasonable range for time for performance 
tends to be narrow (and presumably not as an important matter as the 
services to be provided or the price to be paid), vague references to the time 
for performance tend not to be too indefinite to enforce. Thus, a promise to 
perform "immediately," ''at once," "promptly," "as soon as possible," or "in 
about one month" are not too indefinite.241 
The indefiniteness doctrine is narrowed somewhat by the doctrines of 
cure-by-concession (a type of waiver) and modification. Under the cure-
by-concession doctrine, indefiniteness will be removed if one of the parties, 
after the bargain's formation, concedes to the meaning attached by the other 
party (or to the most favorable meaning possible for the other party).242 
239 I WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Lester v. Pet Dairy 
Products Co., 246 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1957). But a promise to pay a "generous" reward for 
the return of lost property was considered sufficiently definite. See Greene v. Heinrich, 300 
N.Y.S.2d 236, 239 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (enforcing the promise of a "generous" reward and 
concluding that I 0% of the value of the returned property would be "generous"), afj"d, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Term), ajf'd, 372 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 1971). 
240 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2013); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. 
e (1981) (adopting rule set forth in U.C.C. § 2-305(1)). 
241 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33 illus. 3 (1981). 
242 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 212; see also Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to 
Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 389, 393 
("[T]here is a substantial line of cases in which the parties left the payment terms open 'to be 
agreed upon,' where courts applied the doctrine of 'cure by concession' and allowed the 
buyer to enforce the deal if she agrees to make a full payment in cash and with no delay, 
namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller."). The cure-by-concession doctrine is 
impliedly accepted by the Second Restatement's use of the doctrine in an illustration and its 
reference in a comment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 illus. 2 (1981) 
("A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract ofland for $10,000, $4,000 in cash and $6,000 
on mortgage. A agrees to obtain the mortgage loan for B or, if unable to do so, to lend B the 
amount, but the terms of loan are not stated, although both parties manifest an intent to 
conclude a binding agreement. The contract is too indefinite to support a decree of specific 
performance against B, but B may obtain such a decree if he offers to pay the full price in 
cash." (emphasis added)); see also id. § 201 cmt. d. ("In some cases a party can waive the 
misunderstanding and enforce the contract in accordance with the understanding of the other 
party."). 
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Similarly, "part performance ... may have the effect of eliminating 
indefinite alternatives by ... modification."243 
An indefinite offer of a bilateral contract might be construed as also 
offering a unilateral contract that is incorporated within, but divisible from, 
the offer of the bilateral contract.244 The Second Restatement provides the 
following illustration: 
A says to B: "I will employ you for some time at $10 a day." An acceptance 
by B either orally or in writing will not create a contract. But if B serves one 
or more days with A's assent A is bound to pay $10 for each day's service.245 
Further, "[a]n express or implied promise may be found to reimburse 
expenses incurred pursuant to the indefinite agreement."246 The Second 
Restatement provides the following illustration: 
A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific house and lot for $10,000, mortgage 
terms to be agreed. At B's request, reinforced by a threat not to perform, A 
makes certain alterations in the house, which add nothing to its value. B then 
repudiates the agreement without reference to mortgage terms. A may recover 
the cost of alterations. 247 
Recovery could presumably be had under a bargain theory, based on an 
offer of a unilateral contract that was accepted by making the alterations. 
243 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34 cmt. c (1981). 
244 Id. cmt. d. 
245 Id. illus. 4 (emphasis added). 
246 Id. cmt. d. 
247 Id. illus. 5 (emphasis added). The illustration was based on the well-known case of 
Kearns v. Andree, 139 A. 695 (Conn. 1928), a case that permitted recovery under quasi-
contract (not an actual contract). See id. reporter's note, cmt. d ("Illustration 5 is based on 
Keams v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695 (1928) ... . ");see also Kearns, 139 A. at 698. 
Professor Braucher believed that a restitution remedy would not be appropriate in such a 
situation, presumably because no benefit was received by the promisor, and thus the remedy 
had to flow from a promise. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note I, at 326-27 ("We 
have tried to distinguish in the new [section on "certainty"] between those cases where the 
part performance of the contract eliminates the uncertainty and thus forms a contract and 
those cases, of which there are some, where the part performance does not eliminate the 
uncertainty, but nevertheless makes a contractual remedy appropriate, particularly in cases 
where there would be unjust enrichment otherwise. In such cases the Restatement of 
Restitution provides that there may be recovery of benefits conferred under a contract which 
is too indefinite to be enforced, but the restitutionary remedy is not always the appropriate 
remedy, and we have stated that in subsection (3 ), and the illustrations drawn from actual 
cases make it clear that courts do sometimes give contractual remedies after part 
performance, even though the contract would be too indefinite if it were entirely executory 
on both sides." (rema~k by Reporter Robert Braucher regarding the "certainty" section of the 
Second Restatement) (emphasis added)). 
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Also, the Second Restatement takes the position that a promisee can 
assert a claim under promissory estoppel when a bargain did not result in 
the formation of a contract because it lacked reasonably certain terms.248 
Of course, if it is the defendant's promise that is indefinite, and such 
indefiniteness prevents the plaintiff from proving a breach, the claim would 
fail. 249 Also, even if the plaintiff can establish a breach, she would have to 
establish promissory estoppel's demanding standards, including the 
requirement of reliance and the requirement that "injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. "250 If a plaintiff is suing for breach of 
contract, the plaintiff does not have to show actual reliance on the bargain 
to prevail.251 
Under promissory estoppel, not only does the promisee have to establish 
reliance on the promise,252 the reasonableness of the reliance and whether it 
was of a definite and substantial character are factors to be considered in 
deciding whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.253 
Also, the promise's formality is taken into account.254 Thus, whereas 
promises made as part of a bargain usually do not require any particular 
form to be enforceable, a promise's informal nature could result in the court 
refusing to enforce it under a promissory estoppel theory. 
Further, when the promise is enforced under promissory estoppel, "[t]he 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."255 Thus, 
although full-scale enforcement by protecting the promisee's expectation 
interest is often appropriate in a promissory estoppel case, the same factors 
that bear on whether the promise should be enforced will be considered by 
the court in deciding whether a lesser remedy is appropriate.256 
Accordingly, in some instances the court will decide that protecting the 
248 See Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (D. Mass. 2011) 
("[T]he Restatement 'has expressly approved' promissory estoppel's use to protect reliance 
on indefinite promises." (citing Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory 
Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 842 (1990))). 
249 See Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Seif-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REv. 
1397, 1440 n.178 (2009) ("[I]n some jurisdictions, a promissory estoppel claim is available 
to recover expenses made in reliance on an indefinite agreement if the indefiniteness does 
not preclude a finding of breach."). 
250 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). 
251 See id. § 19 cmt. c ("[N]o ... change of position ... is necessary to the formation of a 
bargain . . . . [T]he law must take account of the fact that in a society largely founded on 
credit bargains will be relied on in subtle ways, difficult or incapable of proof."). 
252 Id. § 90( 1 ). 
253 Id. § 90 cmt. b. 
254 Id. 
255 Id.§ 90(1). 
256 Id. § 90 cmt. d. 
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promisee 's reliance or restitution interest is justified in lieu of protecting the 
. , . . 257 
prom1see s expectation mterest. 
V. REMOVING THE UNCERTAINTY FROM THE SECOND RESTATEMENT'S 
TEST FOR REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS 
Despite trying to spell out what is really meant by the reasonably certain 
terms requirement,258 the Second Restatement fails to expressly address two 
important questions about its test: (1) must the plaintiffs promise be 
sufficiently definite; and (2) what is an "appropriate" remedy? The answers 
to these questions depend primarily on whether the Second Restatement 
directs the court to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's 
formation (thus directing courts to ignore post-formation events) or at the 
time of the lawsuit (thus directing courts to consider such events). 
If assessed as of the time of formation, both parties' promises must be 
sufficiently definite because at the time of formation it would not have been 
known which party would breach. Also, only an award protecting the 
parties' expectation interests would be an appropriate remedy because at the 
time of formation neither party would have yet relied on the bargain. In 
such a case, the Second Restatement would treat the reasonably certain 
terms requirement as a so-called "legal formality," which, as previously 
noted, is a requirement that a bargain be in a particular form to be a contract 
and which at times operates contrary to the parties' intentions.259 
If assessed at the time of the lawsuit, it would not be a requirement that 
the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite because the plaintiffs 
promise will not always be relevant to resolving the dispute before the 
court. Also, a remedy short of protecting the plaintiffs expectation interest 
might be an appropriate remedy because the plaintiff might have relied on 
the bargain and might be seeking only reliance damages. In such a case the 
257 Id. The promisee's restitution interest "is his interest in having restored to him any 
benefit that he has conferred on the other party." Id. § 344(c). 
258 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note l, at 326 ("[W]e have tried to be a little 
more helpful in spelling out what is meant by [the reasonably certain terms 
requirement] .... " (remark by Reporter Robert Braucher regarding the Second 
Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's terms be reasonably certain)). 
259 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-94 (discussing legal formalities and noting that 
"they operate through the contradiction of private intentions" and that "the formality means 
that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be 
ignored"); id. at 1692, 1698 (referring to the "sanction of nullity''); Perillo, supra note 23, at 
41 n.22 ("[T]he term 'form' or 'formality' means any manner of expressing or 
memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual expression."); Klass, supra 
note 23, at 1743 ("A legal formality is a type of act, such as the utterance of special words or 
the production of a document in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance."). 
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Second Restatement would not treat the reasonably certain terms 
requirement as a legal formality and would treat it as simply having a 
practical aspect (i.e., its purpose would be to enable the court to resolve the 
dispute before it). 
The language of the Second Restatement's rule in section 33 (no contract 
is formed), 260 along with the rule's placement in the chapter titled 
"Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent,"261 suggests that the ALI intends 
indefiniteness to be assessed as of the time of the bargain's formation. 262 
This would mean the court should ignore post-formation events and that the 
requirement has only a formal aspect. But the Second Restatement sends 
mixed signals and thereby creates confusion because the supporting 
comment b. and its illustrations suggest that indefiniteness should be 
assessed at the time of the lawsuit and, thus, has a practical aspect. For 
example, the supporting comment states that "the degree of certainty 
required may be affected by the dispute which arises and by the remedy 
sought. Courts decide the disputes before them, not other hypothetical 
disputes which might have arisen."263 
260 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981) ("Even though a 
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so 
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis 
added)). 
261 See id. ch. 3 (titled "Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent"). 
262 The rule's language even suggests that an apparent offer without reasonably certain 
terms is no offer at all. See id. § 33(1) (referring to "a manifestation of intention [that] is 
intended to be understood as an offer .. .. "(emphasis added)). 
263 Id. § 33 cmt. b. Leading contracts scholars generally accept that the Second 
Restatement test has solely a practical purpose, and has lost any role as a legal formality. 
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, 
Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 475-76 (1987) 
("Under both the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and more modem case law in some 
jurisdictions [as well as the Second Restatement's test] it is sufficient that the terms have 
been worked out with sufficient certainty to support a conclusion that the parties intended to 
be bound provided that the indefiniteness is not relevant to the remedy requested by the 
plaintiff." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract 
to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 693 (1969) (describing the U.C.C. provision that the 
Second Restatement's test was modeled on as posing the following question: "Is there a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy to this plaintiff, against this 
defendant, in the circumstances of this breach of the agreement?"). Professor Edwin W. 
Patterson's analysis of U.C.C. § 2-204(3) for the New York Law Revision Commission 
reveals that he might have agreed with professor Knapp's analysis of the U.C.C. provision. 
STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 86, at 275 (remark by Professor Edwin W. Patterson). He 
provided three different possible interpretations of that provision, and for one of the 
interpretations he provided a rephrased provision that would have, in his opinion, better 
implemented that interpretation. Id. In the rephrased provision, he made reference to "the 
remedy sought by the aggrieved party." Id. Different courts applying or referencing the 
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In an attempt to remove the uncertainty created by the Second 
Restatement's mixed signals, an analysis of the two requirements of the 
Second Restatement's test-that the terms "provide a basis [1] for 
determining the existence of a breach and [2] for giving an appropriate 
remedy"264 -is undertaken below. The discussion relating to "determining 
the existence of a breach" will focus on whether there are any clues in the 
Second Restatement as to whether the bargain's terms must be sufficiently 
definite such that a court would be able to determine the existence of a 
breach by the plaintiff, even if that is not an issue in the lawsuit. The 
discussion about an "appropriate remedy" will focus on whether there are 
any clues in the Second Restatement as to whether the bargain's terms must 
be sufficiently definite such that a court would be able to determine the 
Second Restatement's test have suggested or hinted at different interpretations. For 
example, some courts have addressed the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise. See Ass'n 
Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 849-52 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Second Restatement section 33 and holding, under Illinois law, that the bargain's failure to 
identify with specificity the plaintiffs obligations meant that a contract had not been formed 
due to the reasonably certain terms requirement, but also referencing a "lack of mutual 
assent"); Bus. Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 547 F.3d 882, 888-90 (7th Cir. 
2008) (applying Illinois law and the Second Restatement's test and holding that a contract 
had not been formed due to the reasonably certain terms requirement because it was not 
clear what work plaintiff promised to do); Kottke v. Scott, No. 03-10-00071-CV, 2011 WL 
1467194, at *4-5 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing the Second Restatement's test and ruling 
that a promise by the defendants to sell their home to the plaintiffs did not result in a contract 
because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs' promise to pay the purchase price was not 
reasonably certain since "[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence as to whether or how often the 
interest was to be compounded, how payments were to be made, or any other terms of a 
purchase or financing agreement"). Other courts, while not explicitly addressing the 
definiteness of the plaintiff's promise (or its lack of definiteness), have suggested the same 
view by using phrases such as "each party's obligation" or "the promises made" when 
discussing the terms needed to make the bargain reasonably certain. See, e.g., Big M, Inc. v. 
Dryden Advisory Grp., No. 08-3567(KSH), 2009 WL 1905106, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 
2009) (applying New Jersey law, and referencing the Second Restatement's test, and stating 
that "[a] court must be able to accurately determine with reasonable certainty each party's 
obligation to enforce the contract" (emphasis added)); McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 
613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (referencing "the promises made" and citing the Second 
Restatement's test within the discussion). At least one court refused to award reliance 
damages for breach when the defendant's promise was too indefinite, which would suggest 
the court believes the test is assessed as of the time of formation and is thus a legal 
formality. Kottke, 2011 WL 1467194, at *6 (reversing the trial court's award of reliance 
damages when the alleged bargain was too indefinite to create a contract). On the other 
hand, another court that cited the Second Restatement's test suggested that the court might 
be concerned only with the definiteness of the defendant's promise because the court's task 
is "to ascertain the scope of the duty it is asked to enforce." Schwarzkopf v. Int'l Bus. 
Machs., Inc., No. C 08-2715 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 1929625, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010). 
264 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) ( 198 l ). 
216 University of Hawai 'i Law Review I Vol. 36: 169 
plaintiffs expectation interest, even if the plaintiff is not seeking a remedy 
that protects that interest (such as seeking only reliance damages). 
A. Determining the Existence of a Breach 
For a bargain to have reasonably certain terms under the Second 
Restatement's test, the terms must provide a basis for determining the 
existence of a breach.265 Obviously, this means that at a minimum the 
bargain's terms must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to 
determine if the defendant breached,266 and in this respect the requirement 
serves a purely practical purpose. But does it do so only incidentally? Is 
there more to the requirement than simply enabling a court to resolve the 
dispute before it? Specifically, must the plaintiffs promise also be 
sufficiently definite such that a court would be able to determine a breach 
by that party, even when the definiteness of the plaintiffs promise is not 
relevant to resolving the dispute before it? 
The first section of this Part will address classical contract law's position 
(as set forth in the First Restatement) that the plaintiffs promise must be 
sufficiently definite and discuss the possible reasons classical contract law 
might have adopted such a position. The second section will address the 
Second Restatement's confused treatment of this issue and conclude that 
the best interpretation of the Second Restatement's test is that it rejects the 
First Restatement's position, and that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs 
promise be sufficiently definite if it is not an issue in the dispute before the 
court. 
1. Classical contract law's treatment of the plaintiff's promise 
Classical contract law (the law that developed in the nineteenth century 
and that dominated into the early twentieth century),267 as set forth in the 
First Restatement of Contracts,268 required that for an offer to be valid, the 
265 Id. 
266 See, e.g., Schwarzkopf, 2010 WL 1929625, at *5 (citing the Second Restatement test 
and stating that "[t]he court must be able to ascertain the scope of the duty it is asked to 
enforce"). 
267 See Macneil, supra note 203, at 855 n.2 ("Classical contract law refers ... to that 
developed in the 19th century and brought to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in THE LA w 
OF CONTRACTS ( 1920) and in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932)."). 
268 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) (stating that classical contract law found its central expression in the 
First Restatement). The First Restatement has been described as the high-water mark of 
classical contract law. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 
HAR.v. L. REV. 678, 678-79 (1984); see also Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern 
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promises and performances to be rendered by each party must be 
reasonably certain.269 Professor Samuel Williston, the Reporter for the First 
Restatement 270 and the "[a ]rchitect of the fundamental concepts of classical 
contract law,"271 provided the following rationale for the reasonably certain 
terms requirement: "[T]he rule ... is one of necessity as well as of law. 
The law cannot subject a person to a contractual duty or give another a 
contractual right unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of 
the parties."272 But this does not explain why the plaintiffs promise would 
need to be sufficiently definite if its definiteness was not relevant to the 
dispute before the court. There are three possible reasons, each of which 
are discussed below. 
a. Deduction from the requirement's status as aformation doctrine 
Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be 
sufficiently definite was likely deduced from the proposition that a contract 
cannot be formed unless its terms are reasonably certain.273 If this doctrinal 
proposition is accepted, it can be deduced that both parties' promises must 
be sufficiently definite because it would be illogical for a formation 
doctrine to take account of post-formation events. As stated by Professor 
Melvin Eisenberg, "The rules of classical contract law concerning 
indefiniteness tended to be static, because generally speaking the 
determination whether an agreement was sufficiently definite to be 
enforceable focused on the terms of the agreement at the time that it was 
made."274 
This basis for requiring both parties' promises to be reasonably certain is 
not, of course, normatively sustainable unless the doctrinal proposition 
Contract Theory, 67 Tux. L. REv. 103, 123 n.136 (1988) (noting that classical contract law 
"reached its pinnacle in the early twentieth century with the Restatement (First) of 
Contracts"). 
269 RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932). 
270 See Wm. Draper Lewis, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS intro. (1932) 
(identifying Professor Williston as the Reporter). 
271 Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 208 
(2005). 
272 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 cmt. a (1932). In Williston's 1920 
Contracts treatise, he simply wrote that "[i]t is a necessary requirement in the nature of 
things that an agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite to enable a court 
to fix an exact meaning upon it." WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56. 
273 Under the First Restatement, an indefinite offer was not a "valid offer," and thus 
prevented a manifestation of mutual assent. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 & 
cmt. a (1932). 
274 Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1795. 
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from which it flows-that a contract is not formed unless the bargain's 
terms are reasonably certain-is itself normatively sustainable.275 And 
classical contract law had a habit of deducing rules from propositions that 
were taken to be axiomatic.276 
b. Mutuality of obligation 
Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be 
reasonably certain was likely also deduced from another doctrinal 
proposition-the rule that neither party should be bound to a bargain unless 
both parties were bound, the so-called requirement of mutuality of 
obligation.277 From this doctrinal proposition, it can be deduced that both 
parties' promises must be sufficiently definite because if the plaintiffs 
promise is too indefinite to enforce, then the plaintiff is not bound. 
For example, at early English common law, the definiteness requirement 
"applied both to the promise sued upon and to a promise averred as 
consideration, for the latter was not a good consideration unless itself 
actionable, and to be actionable it must be certain."278 Williston, in his 
famous 1920 Contracts treatise,279 stated that "[t]he indefiniteness of 
promises is important not simply because of the inherent difficulty of 
enforcing a promise to which no exact meaning can be attached, but also 
because such a promise is insufficient consideration for another 
promise."280 The First Restatement, with Williston as its Reporter,281 
adopted this view, providing that "a promise which is neither binding nor 
capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its terms is insufficient 
consideration" (except under limited circumstances).282 Williston explained 
that "[t]he ultimate basis of the legal requirement of sufficient consideration 
275 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
206, 213 (Peter Benson ed., 200 l ). 
276 Id. at 208. 
277 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing the doctrine of mutuality of 
obligation). 
278 SIMPSON, supra note 202, at 532. 
279 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Williston, Samuel, in THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 593 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (referring to Williston's four-volume 
treatise, The Law of Contracts, as "one of the great textbooks of Anglo-American law"). 
280 WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 49, at 81. Unfortunately, Williston did not provide any 
cases to support this proposition, and although he stated that the matter would be discussed 
more in another section(§ 104), that section does not address the issue directly, discussing 
only illusory promises. Id. at 81-83. 
281 See Wm. Draper Lewis, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS intro (1932) 
(identifying Professor Williston as the Reporter). 
282 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 80 ( 1932). 
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for promises is the belief not only that something should be given in 
exchange for a promise in order to make it binding, but that what is given 
should have value .... "283 Even anti-classicist Professor Arthur Corbin 
stated that "[a] promise can be so vague and indefinite in its expression that 
it cannot be enforced and is therefore not a sufficient consideration."284 
And this appears to remain the general rule. 285 
Thus, classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be 
sufficiently definite was likely based on notions of mutuality of obligation, 
either as a formalistic deduction from that doctrine and the related doctrine 
of consideration or based on the substantive concern that a promise should 
usually only be enforced if given for something of value. 
c. Plaintiff's inability to prove it was ready, willing, and able to perform 
Some courts require that a plaintiff, to establish a claim for breach of 
contract, prove that he either performed or that he was ready, willing, and 
able to perform.286 This requirement is presumably based on the notion that 
if the defendant is held liable for breach despite a plaintiff not having been 
ready, willing, and able to perform, the plaintiff will be put in a better 
position than if the defendant had not breached. If the plaintiffs promise is 
too indefinite, the plaintiff presumably could not establish that it was ready, 
willing, and able to perform its end of the bargain, unless the indefiniteness 
had been removed under cure-by-concession or modification. Classical 
contract law's requirement that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently 
definite might have been premised, at least in part, on the belief that a 
plaintiff whose promise is indefinite cannot prove that he either performed 
or that he was ready, willing, and able to perform. 
283 Id. § 80 cmt. a. 
284 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 143, at 208. 
285 See 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:32, at 883-84 ("Indefinite promises give 
rise not only to the inherent difficulty of enforcing a promise to which no exact meaning can 
be attached but also to a problem of insufficiency of consideration. A promise too indefinite 
to be enforced will, for that very reason, be insufficient consideration for a counterpromise. 
If one promise of a bilateral agreement is too indefinite, neither promise will be enforceable. 
The indefinite promise cannot be enforced because of its uncertainty, and the 
counterpromise, even though in itself definite, cannot be enforced because of lack of 
consideration."). 
286 See Winkleblack v. Murphy, 811 So. 2d 521, 529 (Ala. 2001); Singarella v. City of 
Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Mass. 1961 ). 
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d. The requirement's status as a legal formality 
Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be 
sufficiently definite can also be attributed to its status as a so-called legal 
formality. Although it was not described as such at the time, Professor 
Duncan Kennedy has recognized that the requirement was (and perhaps still 
is) a legal formality. 287 In contract law, a legal formality is a rule providing 
that a party's (or parties') failure to express or memorialize a bargain or 
promise in a particular manner or form will have a specified legal 
consequence, even if that consequence is contrary to the party's (or parties') 
actual or manifested intention(s).288 Requirements of form "operate 
through the contradiction of private intentions."289 As explained by 
Professor Kennedy: 
[T]he formality means that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of 
manifesting their wishes, they will be ignored. The reason for ignoring them, 
for applying the sanction of nullity, is to force them to be self conscious and 
to express themselves clearly, not to influence the substantive choice about 
whether or not to contract, or what to contract for. 290 
287 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-92. 
288 See Perillo, supra note 23, at 41 n.22. Following Professor Perillo, this Article does 
not consider the requirement of a manifestation of mutual assent to be a requirement of form. 
See id. ("Even a simple oral contract made with no particular ritual words has a 
'form.' .... Throughout this Article, however, the term 'form' or 'formality' means any 
manner of expressing or memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual 
expression." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Although a manifestation of mutual 
assent must have a form in the sense that the assent must be manifested, the manifestation 
need not take any particular form. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1) 
(1981) ("The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken 
words or by other acts or by failure to act."); id. cmt. a (1981) ("Where no particular 
requirement of form is made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability of a 
contract, there is no distinction in the effect of the promise whether it is expressed in writing, 
or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways and partly in others. Purely negative 
conduct is sometimes, though not usually, a sufficient manifestation of assent."). 
Accordingly, this Article limits the term "legal formality" to a requirement that a particular 
act have a certain form and does not extend it to an act simply because the act itself has a 
form. To do so would expand the definition of "legal formality" to such an extent that it 
would no longer be a useful concept. Also, this Article does not consider it to be a 
requirement of form that an act be in a form sufficient to permit a fact finder to conclude, 
based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the act occurred. To treat this as a 
requirement of form would mean that every act that must be proven to establish a claim is a 
requirement of form and would likewise expand the definition of "legal formality" to such 
an extent that it would no longer be a useful concept. 
289 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691. 
290 Id. at 1692. 
2014 I REASONABLYCERTAINTERMS 221 
Although formalities "will lead to many instances in which the judge is 
obliged to disregard the real intent of the parties,"291 the hope is that if 
parties generally comply with the formalities, the benefits derived from 
their use will outweigh the occasional miscarriages of justice. 
Contract law has numerous legal formalities. For example, if the 
relevant jurisdiction recognizes the seal as a basis for rendering a promise 
enforceable,292 even when a party intends a promise of a gift to be legally 
binding, if the promisor does not make the promise under seal, then the 
failure to use the proper form might result in a legal consequence contrary 
to the party's intention at the time of making the promise. Similarly, if a 
promisor intends a bargain to be legally binding, but it is oral and within the 
Statute of Frauds, 293 then the failure to evidence the bargain with the proper 
form (a signed writing with the essential terms )294 might result in a legal 
consequence contrary to the party's intention. The common law's mirror 
image rule295 is a legal formality296 because even if the parties intended to 
conclude a deal, no contract was formed if the acceptance deviated from the 
terms of the offer. 297 
291 Id. at 1697. 
292 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, topic 3, statutory note (1981) ("In 
many of the jurisdictions ... recognizing the seal there seems to be no statute or decision 
depriving the seal of its common-law effect as a substitute for consideration."); Klass, supra 
note 23, at 1762-63 ("While the seal is no longer a condition of contractual liability, many 
jurisdictions still recognize it as a substitute for consideration or as triggering a longer statute 
oflimitations."). 
293 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 110 (1981) (describing which classes of 
contract are covered by the Statute of Frauds). 
294 Id. § l3 l. 
295 Id. § 59. See also Weisz Graphics Div. v. Peck Indus., Inc., 403 S.E.2d 146, 149 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that restatement section 59 is known as the "mirror image" 
rule). 
296 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the 
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1982) ("[T]he mirror-image 
rule was a paradigm oflegal formality .... "). 
297 Id. at 1231-32. Even though Professor Lon Fuller famously argued that the 
consideration requirement might be a legal formality, see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941), the modem view that sham consideration is not 
consideration, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71 cmt. b (1981) ("[A] mere 
pretense of bargain does not suffice, as ... where the purported consideration is merely 
nominal. In such cases there is no consideration .... "), means that the consideration 
requirement can no longer be considered a legal formality, if it ever could have been. See 
generally Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre 
for Nominal Consideration is Not Binding, But Should Be, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1809, 1817-21 
(2003) (surveying the cases purportedly holding that nominal consideration was sufficient 
and concluding they can be explained on other grounds). Parties can no longer deliberately 
make a transaction appear to be a bargain so as to render it legally enforceable. Also, 
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It should be recognized that failure to use a legal formality does not 
always mean the promise does not have any legal effect, despite Professor 
Kennedy's reference to the "sanction of nullity"298 and Professor Lon 
Fuller's statement that the "sanction of the invalidity ... is the means by 
which requirements of form are normally made effective .... "299 For 
example, even though it is often stated that a failure to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds' requirement of a signed writing renders a promise within one of the 
Statute's categories unenforceable,300 this is not always true. There are 
exceptions to the Statute's writing requirement, including detrimental 
reliance (at least according to the Second Restatement and some courts).301 
Accordingly, the failure to use the Statute's required form is not 
automatically a sanction of nullity. Rather, it simply means that an 
exception to the Statute will have to be used. Likewise, for those 
jurisdictions that still consider a promise under seal to be enforceable, the 
failure to use the seal does not automatically render the promise 
unenforceable.302 Rather, it simply means that the promisee will have to 
identify an alternative basis for rendering the promise enforceable.303 
whether the parol evidence rule is a legal formality depends on one's approach to the rule. If 
it is simply used to determine whether the parties intended the promise to be part of the 
bargain, then it is not a legal formality because its goal is to implement the parties' 
intentions, not to operate (in some instances) contrary to their intentions. If, however, it is 
designed to discharge promises that were not included in a subsequent written document, 
even if it is believed the parties intended the prior promise to be legally enforceable, then it 
is a legal formality. Similarly, with respect to interpreting the text of a bargain, the plain 
meaning rule is a legal formality because it presumably operates contrary to the parties' 
intentions in certain situations (the legal formality being the use of language that clearly 
describes the parties' intentions), whereas the contextual approach to interpretation is not a 
legal formality because any relevant evidence is admissible. In fact, many of the disputes 
over how contract law rules should be applied are disputes over whether the rules should be 
legal formalities. 
298 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1692. 
299 Fuller, supra note 297, at 803. 
300 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 110(1)(1981). 
301 See id. § 139(1) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the 
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."); Mcintosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 36-37, 
469 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1970) (holding that the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's promise 
of employment for a definite term was sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds). But see 
Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74-75 (Me. 1991) (rejecting the use of 
detrimental reliance to overcome the Statute of Frauds with respect to promises of 
employment). For a recent and thorough treatment of the issue, see generally Stephen J. 
Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of 
Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 73 (2011 ). 
302 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 95 cmt. a (1981) (noting that the 
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Of course, there are some situations in which a legal formality truly is a 
requirement of form in the sense that the failure to use it will result in the 
sanction of nullity. For example, under the federal Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990,304 an employee's release of a federal age 
discrimination claim is of no effect unless certain formalities are complied 
with (including the release being written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the employee; having the waiver specifically refer to claims 
under the federal age discrimination statute; having the employer advise the 
employee in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the 
release; and providing the employee at least twenty-one days to consider 
the release),305 and there are no exceptions.306 
A legal formality can serve a variety of functions. The most widely 
recognized functions are the three identified by Professor Lon Fuller.307 
First, a legal formality can serve an evidentiary function, by providing 
evidence of the bargain and its terms. 308 Although a court could determine 
what occurred without the use of a legal formality (by admitting and 
considering any relevant evidence, irrespective of its form), a requirement 
of form (if complied with) reduces the time and expense involved in this 
determination. Also, if the formality is well known, one would expect that 
it will reduce the error rate involved in the court's factual determination (if 
it is well known, a failure to use the form is good evidence that the alleged 
transaction did not occur). The evidentiary function also benefits the 
parties because it enables them to more reliably predict what the court will 
conclude if the dispute is litigated, thereby giving them greater knowledge 
of their legal rights, which in turn leads to better decision making. 
nonexistence of one of the requirements for a sealed contract "does not preclude the 
formation of a contract binding as a bargain"). 
303 id. 
304 Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
626 (2006)). 
305 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act§ 201(f)(l)(A), (B), (E), (F), 104 Stat. at 983, 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(A), (B), (E), (F) (2006)). 
306 See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1998) (holding that an 
employee's release that fails to comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act is ineffective and cannot be ratified under common-law ratification 
doctrines). 
307 See Fuller, supra note 297, at 800-03. 
308 See id. at 800 ("The most obvious function of a legal formality is ... that of providing 
evidence of the existence and purport of the contract, in case of controversy." (internal 
quotation omitted)); Perillo, supra note 23, at 64 ("A primary function of contractual 
formalities is, of course, to supply and preserve evidence of the contract."); Kennedy, supra 
note 6, at 1691 n.14 ("The evidentiary function includes both providing good evidence of the 
existence of a transaction and providing good evidence of the legal consequences the parties 
intended should follow."). 
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Second, a legal formality can serve a cautionary function, in the sense of 
"acting as a check against inconsiderate action,"309 and "making the parties 
think twice about what they are doing and making them think twice about 
the legal consequences."310 The requirement that a party formalize her 
promise, by reducing it to a signed writing for example, will cause the 
transaction to take more time, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
deliberation and likely impressing upon the prornisor the seriousness of the 
matter. For example, "[t]he seal in its original form fulfilled this purpose 
remarkably well. The affixing and impressing of a wax wafer-symbol in 
the popular mind of legalism and weightiness-was an excellent device for 
inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his 
future."311 Thus, by inducing parties to spend more time thinking before 
they act, the cautionary function helps reduce the number of inefficient 
exchanges caused by hasty and inconsiderate action. 
Third, a legal formality can serve a channeling function by offering "a 
legal framework into which the party may fit his actions,"312 so that the 
party knows how to accomplish a desired end. In other words, "it enables 
the parties to search out and find the appropriate device to accomplish their 
intent to create an obligation."313 For example, a seal permits a person to 
accomplish the objective of making a promise legally enforceable.314 
In addition to the famous tripartite evidentiary, cautionary, and 
channeling functions set forth by Fuller, Professor Joseph Perillo has 
identified many other purposes a legal formality can serve.315 Importantly 
for this Article, Perillo recognized that a formality can serve a clarifying 
function by leading parties to uncover points of disagreement during a 
bargain's formation, which enables them to work the issues out prior to 
finalizing the bargain.316 By doing so, the parties will reduce the number of 
post-formation disputes caused by gaps and misunderstandings.317 
Legal formalities do, however, have at least two harmful effects apart 
from occasionally defeating the parties' expectations. First, because legal 
formalities take time to comply with, they slow the pace of business.318 
309 Fuller, supra note 297, at 800; see also Perillo, supra note 23, at 53 (noting that one of 
the functions of a legal formality "is to caution the promisor that he is entering into a binding 
relationship"). 
310 Kennedy,supranote6,at1691 n.14. 
311 Fuller, supra note 297, at 800. 
312 Id. at 801. 
313 Perillo, supra note 23, at 49. 
314 See Fuller, supra note 297, at 802. 
315 Perillo, supra note 23, at 43-69. 
316 Id. at 56-58. 
317 See id. 
318 Id. at 70. 
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Second, they enable a party to use noncompliance to avoid a bargain 
because the deal has become undesirable.319 The less well known a legal 
formality is, the more often the latter effect is likely to occur. 
The best legal formality is one that is adopted when the following 
conditions exist: the transaction type to which it is applied is in the normal 
course (i.e., without the legal formality) in some sense deficient in 
accomplishing the goals of legal formalities (i.e., there is a need for the 
formality);320 compliance with the legal formality is not so time-consuming 
that the transaction costs involved in complying with it outweigh the 
benefits to be received from the bargain (and thus have the effect of 
discouraging what would otherwise be a mutually beneficial exchange);321 
and the legal formality is well known so that it is made use of;322 and 
miscarriages of justice (i.e., results contrary to the parties' intentions) are 
kept to a minimum. 323 
The consequence of treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as 
a legal formality is that more bargains will fail to be contracts than if the 
requirement was treated simply as a doctrine to implement the parties' 
intentions, and as a restatement of other doctrines designed to enable the 
court to resolve the dispute before it. Also, treating the requirement as a 
legal formality has the strange effect of permitting a plaintiff to proceed on 
a contract theory even though the plaintiff lacks evidence to prove 
expectation damages to a reasonable certainty,324 but prohibiting the 
plaintiff from proceeding on a contract theory if the bargain's terms (as 
opposed to the evidence) in regard to the plaintiffs expectation interest, are 
not reasonably certain.325 The question that needs answering, then, is why 
319 Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 179, at 37 (referencing the possibility that a party will 
rely on the indefiniteness doctrine to escape a bargain that is no longer beneficial to her). 
320 See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("The need for investing a particular transaction 
with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the 
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of 
which the transaction arises .... "(emphasis omitted)). 
321 See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("Forms must be reserved for relatively important 
transactions. We must preserve a proportion between means and end; it will scarcely do to 
require a sealed and witnessed document for the effective sale of a loaf of bread."). 
322 If a formality is not well known, the benefits of the formality will be reduced, and its 
harmful effects will be increased. 
323 See Perillo, supra note 23, at 70 (noting that formalities enable a party to use them to 
avoid a bargain that has become undesirable). 
324 A party can only recover loss up to an amount that the evidence establishes with 
reasonable certainty. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 352 (1981). 
325 The former concept appears applicable to situations in which the contract terms are 
sufficiently definite, but there is insufficient evidence to determine the amount ofloss caused 
by the breach of the definite term. These tend to be situations in which the promised 
performance (which is sufficiently definite) was simply a means to an end for the promisee, 
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classical contract law might have considered contractual invalidity an 
appropriate sanction for entering into a bargain with indefinite terms, even 
when the court has before it all that is needed to implement the parties' 
manifested intentions and to resolve the dispute that has arisen. 
as opposed to being the end in itself. Although the promised performance is clear, the value 
of the performance is not. An example would be a contract between a promoter and a boxer 
for the boxer to fight a particular opponent and the parties to share the profits. See, e.g., Chi. 
Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932). The boxing match is simply a means 
to an end for the parties-the end being revenue. Accordingly, although the contract's terms 
are sufficiently definite (it is clear what each party is to do), the loss from a breach of the 
contract might be difficult to prove, and, thus, the value of the promise to box is uncertain. 
Another example would be the breach of a contract to publish a novel. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 ·cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981); Freund v. Wash. 
Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1974). The promise to publish the novel might be 
definite, but the evidence might not permit the loss caused by the failure to publish 
(including lost royalties and loss to reputation) to be established to a reasonable certainty. 
As the court in Freund noted, "the value to [the] plaintiff of the promised performance-
publication-was a percentage of sales of the books published and not the books 
themselves." Id. at 422. A further example is a landowner who breaches a promise to sell 
land to a prospective buyer, when the buyer plans to build a drive-in theater on the land. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981). In such a situation, 
even though the parties' promises are sufficiently definite, the prospective buyer might not 
be able to prove the lost profits to a reasonable certainty. Id. In these cases, it is simply the 
loss that is uncertain and not any of the contract's terms. 
The latter concept deals with a situation in which the difficulty of proving the 
promisee's expectation interest is caused by the vagueness of the promise that was breached. 
An example is the well-known case of Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973). 
In that case, the patient alleged that a surgeon "promised to perform plastic surgery on her 
nose and thereby to enhance her beauty and improve her appearance .... " Id. at 184. There 
seemed to be little doubt that the promise was breached: the patient alleged that the result of 
the surgeries was to leave her with a nose that "had a concave line to about the midpoint, at 
which it became bulbous; viewed frontally, the nose from bridge to midpoint ws [sic] 
flattened and broadened, and the two sides of the tip had lost symmetry." Id. at 185. One of 
the reasons the court only awarded reliance damages was because, in cases involving a 
doctor's promise to a patient regarding the results of a medical procedure, "to put a value on 
the condition that would or might have resulted, had the treatment succeeded as promised, 
may sometimes put an exceptional strain on the imagination of the fact finder." Id. at 188. 
Presumably, it would be too difficult to prove with reasonable certainty the position the 
plaintiff would have been in had the defendant performed as promised. 
A related situation is when the promise is definite and the promised performance was 
an end in itself, such that it is clear the position the non-breaching party would have been in 
had there been performance, but it is difficult to put a dollar value on that position. For 
example, in the famous case of Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929), what the doctor 
promised the patient was arguably not vague ("a hundred per cent perfect hand or a hundred 
per cent good hand"), id. at 643, but it might be difficult to put a dollar value on a 100% 
perfect or good hand. 
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To identify the purposes served, it is important to identify the harm 
caused by bargains lacking reasonably certain terms, beyond making it 
difficult for a court to resolve the dispute before it. Indefinite bargains 
make it difficult for the parties to know their legal rights and duties arising 
from the bargain, which increases the likelihood of misunderstandings, and 
which in turn increases the likelihood of post-formation disputes. When the 
bargain has a gap and the unanticipated event occurs, the parties might 
disagree as to which gap-filling term is "reasonable in the circumstances" 
or, more importantly, which gap-filling term a court will conclude is 
"reasonable in the circumstances."326 
Similarly, when the bargain has a vague term, and it is unclear whether 
an event that occurs is within or outside the term's range of meaning, the 
parties might disagree as to how a court would interpret the term. The 
likelihood of these disagreements is increased by each party having an ex 
post incentive to advocate for the meaning that is now most favorable to 
itself. A post-formation dispute not only results in lost time and inefficient 
expenditures during the dispute, it presumably also increases the likelihood 
that the parties' post-formation, pre-dispute, reliance expenditures will be 
wasted if the parties cannot resolve it. Also, such disputes would likely 
disrupt the plans of third parties who relied on the expected performance of 
the bargain. 
Further, if one party's promise is not reasonably certain, and the other 
party's performance is due first, one would expect that there is an increased 
chance the latter party will repudiate the bargain before performing. The 
latter party will understandably be reluctant to perform when the contours 
of the performance to be received in exchange are uncertain and when there 
is an incentive for the first party to construe the indefinite return 
performance narrowly. Although the latter party entered into the bargain 
even when the other party's promised performance was not reasonably 
certain, the latter party might have done so without sufficient deliberation 
or attention to the lack of certainty-and only at the time for its own 
performance, came to recognize that it was unclear exactly what it had 
bargained for. If the court requires a plaintiff, when seeking expectation 
damages, to prove its cost or loss avoided from not having to perform, this 
will provide a further incentive. 
Misunderstandings arising from indefinite bargains also increase the 
chance the exchange is not beneficial for one of the parties, and thus run 
counter to one of contract law's principal aims, which is to encourage 
326 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
460-61 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."). 
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mutually beneficial exchanges.327 Indefinite bargains are also likely to have 
been entered into without careful deliberation, further increasing the chance 
the exchange is not mutually beneficial. 
There is an increased chance these problems will be avoided if the 
reasonably certain terms requirement is treated as a legal formality, is 
applied at the time of the bargain's formation, and requires both parties' 
promises to be sufficiently definite. A sanction of contractual invalidity 
that applied only if the promise sought to be enforced is indefinite would 
only enhance, at the time of the bargain's formation, each party's interest in 
ensuring that the promise of the other party was sufficiently definite. The 
promisee would have an incentive to ensure that the other party's promise 
was sufficiently definite because if it was not, the promisee would not 
acquire a contract right to performance by the promisor. A rule that did not 
require the plaintiffs promise to be sufficiently definite would not itself 
provide an incentive for a party to ensure that its own promise was 
sufficiently definite because indefiniteness would not affect the party's 
acquisition of a contract right to performance by the promisor. The other 
party would, of course, have an incentive under the rule to make sure the 
first party's promise was sufficiently definite, but for each promise there 
would only be an incentive under the rule for one of the two parties to make 
sure the promise is reasonably certain. 
There would, of course, be incentives originating from sources other than 
the rule for a party, at the time of the bargain's formation, to ensure its own 
promise is sufficiently definite. A party whose promise is indefinite runs 
the risk of a post-formation dispute with the other party, something the 
party will want to avoid.328 And worse still, the post-formation dispute 
might lead to a lawsuit with the indefinite promise being construed against 
the party. Also, if a party's promise is indefinite, it may be difficult for the 
party to determine its cost of performance, which would thereby make it 
difficult to determine if the exchange is beneficial to her. 
These incentives to enter into bargains with reasonably certain terms 
might suggest that there is no need for the reasonably certain terms 
requirement to be treated as a legal formality. As previously noted, a legal 
formality is best reserved for those situations in which the transaction type 
is, in the normal course (i.e., without the legal formality), deficient in 
accomplishing the goals of legal formalities (i.e., there is a need for the 
formality). 329 These incentives, however, might be considered insufficient 
327 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 783 (1999) (noting that one of contract law's principal aims is to 
promote mutually beneficial exchanges). 
328 See Perillo, supra note 23, at 57. 
329 See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("The need for investing a particular transaction 
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to avoid indefinite bargains. As previously discussed, there are a host of 
reasons why the parties might enter into a bargain that lacks reasonably 
certain terms.330 These circumstances will lead to indefinite bargains 
despite the incentives to avoid indefinite bargains, and in turn lead to all of 
the problems caused by such bargains. 
The court might, therefore, consider it advisable to add an extra incentive 
for the parties to make the terms of their bargain reasonably certain. 
Imposing the sanction of contractual invalidity when the plaintiffs promise 
is indefinite might provide such an incentive. If the party is aware of the 
rule, it will know that if a court determines its promise is not reasonably 
certain, it will be unable to enforce (under a contract theory) the other 
party's promise.331 This increases the likelihood that both parties will have 
an incentive to make sure that all of the promises in the bargain are 
reasonably certain. Under this approach, the reasonably certain terms 
requirement operates as a deterrent to entering into an indefinite bargain, 
even if it turns out that the way in which the bargain is indefinite is 
irrelevant to resolving the dispute that ends up before the court.332 
So what functions of form might the reasonably certain terms 
requirement serve if it is treated as a legal formality and used as a sanction 
for entering into an indefinite bargain? The evidentiary function would not 
be served in the respect of providing the court with evidence of the bargain 
and its terms because that function would already be served by treating the 
requirement as nothing more than a restatement of other rules needed by the 
court to resolve the dispute before it.333 The evidentiary function would 
also not be served with respect to gaps in the bargain. The evidentiary 
function is designed to provide evidence of the bargain and its terms,334 and 
if there is a gap, there was no manifested agreement on a particular issue, 
and thus, there is no term of which to provide evidence. 
with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the 
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of 
which the transaction arises .... "(emphasis omitted)). 
330 See supra Part III. 
331 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981)(1) ("Even though a 
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so 
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain."). 
332 Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 97 (discussing the Uniform Commercial 
Code's zero-quantity default rule as a potential penalty for both parties). 
333 The evidentiary function would, however, be served in this respect if the reasonably 
certain terms requirement provided that the terms of the defendant's promise must be more 
definite than simply enabling the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant's promise was breached. 
334 Fuller, supra note 297, at 800; see also Perillo, supra note 23, at 64; Kennedy, supra 
note 6, at 1691 n.14. 
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But the evidentiary function would be served by providing evidence to 
the parties that they attached the same meaning to a vague term, preventing 
one of the parties from later denying that shared meaning. 335 By offering an 
additional incentive for a party to ensure its own promise is reasonably 
certain, the parties are more likely to avoid vague terms and are more likely 
to draft them in a way that reflects their mutual understanding of the term's 
meaning. This will then eliminate the ability of a party, after the bargain's 
formation, to take advantage of the vague term and deny that there was a 
mutual understanding. 
Treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality 
also serves the cautionary function of form. Providing an additional 
incentive for a party to ensure that its own promise is sufficiently definite 
will increase that party's deliberation about her promise, thus encouraging 
the party to think carefully about whether it desires to enter into the 
bargain.336 This will reduce the number of bargains that are not beneficial 
to one of the parties. 
And, perhaps most importantly, treating the reasonably certain terms 
requirement as a legal formality serves the clarifying function of form. 
Providing an additional incentive for a party to ensure that her own promise 
is sufficiently definite will result in parties uncovering points of 
disagreement during a bargain's formation, which thereby enables them to 
work issues out prior to finalizing the bargain.337 
By treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality, 
the requirement would be, as argued by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert 
Gertner, a "penalty default."338 It would penalize the parties (or a party) for 
not affirmatively specifying the details of the bargain, and thereby 
encourage them to be more specific.339 And although treating the 
reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality was not a policy 
referenced by Williston in the First Restatement,340 it seems likely that this 
rationale contributed, at least in part, to classical contract law's requirement 
that both parties' promises be sufficiently definite to form a contract. 
335 This would be important because where the evidence shows that "the parties have 
attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof [a so-called mutual 
understanding], it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981); see also Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 A.2d 
150, 155-56 (N.H. 1953). 
336 See Perillo, supra note 23, at 53-56 (discussing the cautionary function of formalities). 
337 See id. at 56-58 (discussing the clarifying function of formalities). 
338 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 97. 
339 See id. at 99. 
340 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS § 32 (1932). 
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2. The Second Restatement's treatment of the plaintiff's promise 
The Second Restatement "completely reformulated" the First 
Restatement's rule on reasonably certain terms,341 and part of its 
reformulation included replacing the First Restatement's reference to "the 
promises and performances to be rendered by each party"342 in the black 
letter rule with the requirement that "the terms of the contract [be] 
reasonably certain."343 The Second Restatement then provided that the 
"terms" are reasonably certain "if they provide a basis for determining the 
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy."344 
Intentionally or not, an express statement of whether the plaintiffs promise 
must be sufficiently definite was left out of the black letter rule's 
reformulation. 345 
With respect to the doctrinal proposition that a contract is not formed 
unless the bargain's terms are reasonably certain (a basis upon with the 
First Restatement's position regarding the plaintiffs promise having to be 
sufficiently definite was likely based), the Second Restatement's black 
letter rule maintains the reasonably certain terms requirement as a 
formation doctrine. 346 The rule expressly provides that unless the bargain's 
terms are reasonably certain, an offer cannot be accepted "so as to form a 
contract. "347 
Though the doctrines of cure-by-concession and modification (which 
focus on post-formation events and render an otherwise indefinite bargain 
sufficiently definite )348 might suggest that the reasonably certain terms 
requirement cannot possibly be a formation doctrine, a Second Restatement 
comment states that in situations such as these "it may be impossible to 
identify offer or acceptance or to determine the moment of formation."349 
Thus, subsequent action by one party removing the indefiniteness could be 
viewed as an acceptance of the other party's original offer (which might 
have been an acceptance, not an offer, at the time of formation of the first 
unenforceable bargain), with the understanding that the otherwise indefinite 
341 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 reporter's note (1981 ). 
342 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1932). 
343 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981). 
344 Id. § 33(2). 
345 See id. § 33(1 )-(3). 
346 See id. § 33(1) ("Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be 
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the 
contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)). 
347 Id. 
348 See supra Part IV. 
349 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34 cmt. c (1981). 
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offer would be construed by a reasonable person as impliedly including 
within it an offer to contract on the terms most favorable to the offeror.350 
If both parties manifest assent to the subsequent action as a method of 
performance, then the subsequent action would be a modification of the 
bargain's terms with the bargain becoming enforceable upon formation of 
the modified bargain.351 Thus, the Second Restatement's reference to these 
doctrines is not inconsistent with it treating the reasonably certain terms 
requirement as a formation doctrine. 
Its treatment of the requirement as a formation doctrine would logically 
lead to the conclusion that under the Second Restatement's test, both 
parties' promises must be sufficiently definite.352 If the Second 
Restatement's supporting comment points in the other direction, the 
language of the Second Restatement's black letter rule and its supporting 
comment must be in conflict. 
In contrast to carrying forward classical contract law's treatment of the 
reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine, the Second 
Restatement does not appear to retain the mutuality of obligation rationale 
as a basis for the reasonably certain terms requirement. For example, 
concern for mutuality of obligation is not referenced in the Second 
Restatement comment as a basis for the definiteness requirement. Instead, 
the only policy referenced is the policy against a court making a contract 
for the parties,353 which would only implicate the court's concern with 
resolving the dispute before it. Also, mutuality of obligation is, in general, 
downplayed in the Second Restatement.354 For example, under the Second 
Restatement, as long as an agreement has consideration, there is no 
additional requirement of mutuality of obligation,355 and a promise 1s 
consideration as long as it was bargained for and is legally sufficient. 356 
350 The subsequent action would not be a counter-offer because a counter-offer proposes 
"a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by the original offer." Cf id. § 39 
(emphasis added). The offeror repudiating prior to the offeree's concession would, however, 
terminate the power to accept the incorporated offer, see id. § 36(l)(c) (providing that 
revocation terminates the offeree's power of acceptance), unless an option contract had 
arisen, perhaps through reliance. See id. § 87(2) (offer rendered irrevocable as a result of 
foreseeable and substantial reliance by offeree). 
351 Cf id. § 39. 
352 See id. § 33. 
353 Id. § 33 cmt. b. 
354 See Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of 
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1933 (2001) (noting that the Second Restatement 
"relaxed the doctrine [of mutuality of obligation] in several areas of application"). 
355 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) (1981). Clause (c) of Second 
Restatement section 79, which expressly rejects a requirement of mutuality of obligation as 
long as consideration exists, did not have a counterpart in the First Restatement. See id. § 79 
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Importantly, the Second Restatement does not state that an indefinite 
promise is legally insufficient (other than an illusory promise, of course, 
which is no promise at all).357 In fact, merely because one of the parties' 
promises is voidable or unenforceable does not affect the enforceability of 
the other party's promise.358 Rather, the only bargained-for promises that 
are legally insufficient are promises to perform a legal duty owed to the 
promisee;359 promises to forbear from asserting a clearly invalid claim or 
defense when the promisor does not believe "the claim or defense may be 
fairly determined to be valid"360 conditional promises when the promisor 
knows the condition cannot occur;361 and promises where the prornisor 
reserves a choice of alternative performances and one of the alternatives is 
not consideration.362 
In fact, a Second Restatement comment strongly suggests that a 
bargained-for indefinite promise (indefinite in the sense of being vague, not 
illusory) is consideration by stating as follows: 
The value of a promise does not necessarily depend upon the availability of a 
legal remedy for breach, and bargains are often made in consideration of 
promises which are voidable or unenforceable. Such a promise may be 
consideration for a return promise. But it is sometimes suggested that a 
promise is not consideration if it is not binding, or if it is "void." The 
examples used commonly involve ... indefinite promises (see §§ 33-
34) .... 363 
The comment goes on to state that the examples provided are not 
exceptions to the Second Restatement's general rule that a promise is 
consideration as long as it is bargained for. 364 
Thus, whereas the Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably 
certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine is evidence that it is 
necessary that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite (even if not 
reporter's note (1981) ("Clause (c) is new."). 
356 Id. § 71(1) & cmt. b. 
357 See id. § 77 (addressing the issue of illusory promises). 
358 See id. § 78 (stating that a voidable or unenforceable promise can still be valid 
consideration). 
359 Id. § 73. 
360 Id. § 74(1)(b). 
361 Id. § 76(1). 
362 See id. § 72 ("Except as stated in §§ 73 [legal duty rule] and 74 [settlement of claims 
rule], any performance which is bargained for is consideration."); id. § 75 ("Except as stated 
in§§ 76 [conditional promises] and 77 [illusory and alternative promises], a promise which 
is bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised performance would be 
consideration."). 
363 Id. § 75 cmt. d (internal citations omitted). 
364 Id. 
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relevant to the dispute), its apparent treatment of bargained-for indefinite 
promises (again, indefinite in the sense of being vague, not illusory) as 
consideration is evidence that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs promise 
be sufficiently definite. This does not mean, of course, that a court could 
not still consider the imbalanced nature of an exchange when the defendant 
received an indefinite promise from the plaintiff that cannot be enforced. 365 
The Second Restatement, however, does not appear to consider such 
imbalance as a reason to always require that the plaintiffs promise be 
sufficiently definite (which would, in fact, be in keeping with the Second 
Restatement's famous shift from rules to standards).366 
Additional evidence points away from the Second Restatement requiring 
that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite. As previously noted, the 
Second Restatement comment states: "[T]he degree of certainty required 
may be affected by the dispute which arises ... Courts decide the disputes 
before them, not other hypothetical disputes which might have arisen."367 
The comment's emphasis on the dispute brought before the court suggests 
that the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise will not automatically 
render the bargain unenforceable under the reasonably certain terms 
requirement. 
For example, with respect to determining whether the defendant 
breached, it would only be relevant that the plaintiffs promise is too 
indefinite if the defendant asserts that the plaintiff breached his promise 
first and uses this as an excuse for the defendant's non-performance. 368 But 
when the defendant was to perform first, or if the defendant repudiated 
before the plaintiffs performance was due, the indefiniteness of the 
plaintiffs promise is irrelevant to the court's ability to determine the 
existence of a breach. There is also no suggestion within the Second 
Restatement comment that the indefiniteness doctrine is premised, at least 
in part, on the requirement that the plaintiff be able to prove that she 
performed her end of the bargain or that she was ready, willing, and able to 
perform. 369 
365 To consider the First Restatement as having a greater concern than the Second 
Restatement for imbalanced exchanges would, of course, be a surprising position. 
366 See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to 
Standards, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 634, 634-35 (1982) (discussing the Second Restatement's 
move from rules to standards). For explanations of the differences between rules and 
standards, see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1687-1701; Baird & Weisberg, supra note 296, at 
1227-31. 
367 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981). 
368 See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render 
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured 
material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time."). 
369 See id. § 33 cmts. a-f. 
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Further, the Second Restatement comment states that when a court is 
deciding whether to fill a gap in the bargain, it is more likely to do so if the 
gap is one that is not important with respect to the dispute that has arisen.370 
If gap-filling takes into account the dispute that has arisen (as opposed to 
assessing the perceived importance of a term as of the time of the bargain's 
formation), it would be consistent to assess indefiniteness at the same point 
in time, in which case a plaintiff's indefinite promise should be ignored if it 
is irrelevant to resolving the dispute. The comment further states that 
"[ w ]here the parties have intended to conclude a bargain, uncertainty as to 
incidental or collateral matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the 
contract."371 Consistent with the Second Restatement's approach to gap-
filling, the comment likely contemplates an assessment of whether a matter 
is "incidental or collateral" based on the dispute that arises.372 
Considering the importance of a vague or omitted term to the dispute that 
has arisen is likely designed to prevent parties from taking advantage of the 
indefiniteness doctrine when their non-performance was due to other 
reasons (such as wanting to avoid a bad bargain). For example, Professor 
Franklin Snyder has recognized that this concern most likely caused the 
U.C.C. drafters to relax the reasonably certain terms requirement,373 and 
also likely motivated (at least in part) the Second Restatement drafters. For 
example, Professor Joseph Perillo has stated that: 
The courts must take cognizance of the fact that the argument that a particular 
agreement is too indefinite to constitute a contract frequently is an 
afterthought excuse for attacking an agreement that failed for reasons other 
than indefiniteness. In such instances, the court should not be too fussy to 
determine how the gaps should have been filled. 374 
This is consistent with Perillo' s assertion that the indefiniteness doctrine 
"is designed to prevent, where it is at all possible, a contracting party who is 
dissatisfied with a bargain from taking refuge in the doctrine to wriggle out 
of an agreement."375 And Perillo expressly links this concern to the Second 
Restatement's statement that the degree of certainty required is affected by 
370 See id. § 33 cmt. b ("It is less likely that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by 
construction as to a matter which has been the subject of controversy between the parties 
than as to one which is raised only as an afterthought."). 
371 Id. § 33 cmt. a. 
372 See id. § 33 cmts. a-b. 
373 See Snyder, supra note l 79, at 37-38. 
374 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, l CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 4.1, at 535-
36 (rev. ed. 1993). 
375 PERILLO, supra note 2, at 55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. 
b (1981)). 
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the dispute that arises.376 This in tum suggests that the plaintiff's promise 
being sufficiently definite is not a requirement because doing so would not 
permit the court to consider whether the defendant is simply using the 
requirement as an afterthought to avoid liability. 
The first illustration in the Second Restatement's section on reasonably 
certain terms provides further evidence that the indefiniteness of the 
plaintiff's promise does not automatically render the bargain 
unenforceable.377 The illustration is loosely based on, and intended to 
repudiate, the 1940 House of Lords decision in G. Scammell & Nephew, 
Ltd. v. Ouston.378 In that case, the House of Lords reversed the court of 
appeal and the trial court and held that a bargain to sell a new motor-van on 
hire-purchase terms over a two-year period379 was too indefinite to be 
enforced by the buyers because the details of the hire-purchase terms were 
not agreed upon.380 There was no suggestion in Scammel/ that the 
defendant's promise was too indefinite to enforce,381 and the defendant 
apparently repudiated before any reliance by the plaintiffs on the bargain.382 
The defendant repudiated because he objected to the condition of a trade-in 
van that the plaintiffs promised to give to the defendant as part of the 
exchange383 (a position found to be unjustified),384 and not because the hire-
purchase terms had not J;>een agreed upon. 385 
The decision included an opinion by Lord Wright,386 who has been 
described as an "innovative traditionalist,"387 and his opinion in the case has 
been used as an example of his reluctance at times to "follow his argument 
that courts should be willing, in commercial law matters, to see the law play 
second fiddle to established business practices."388 Lord Wright believed 
376 
CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 374, § 4.1, at 536 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981)). 
377 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b, illus. l (1981). 
378 [1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.) (Eng.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 
reporter's note cmt. b (1981) (stating that illustration l repudiates the reasoning of 
Scammell). 
379 G. Scammell & Nephew Ltd., [1941] A.C. at 251. 
380 Id. at 254, 257, 261, 273. 
381 There was apparently no dispute as to the type of motor-van the seller promise to 
provide to the buyer. See id. at 258 (Lord Russell) (setting forth the specifications of the 
motor-van); id. at 261-62 (Lord Wright). 
382 See id. at 252. 
383 Id. at 263 (Lord Wright). 
384 See id. at 267. 
385 See id. 
386 Id. at 261-73. 
387 Neil Duxbury, Lord Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 265, 
265 (2009). 
388 Id. at 302. In this respect Lord Wright's opinion is reminiscent of Judge Benjamin 
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that the defendant's unjustified motive in repudiating the bargain did not 
prevent him from relying on the bargain's indefiniteness as a defense: 
It is true that when the [defendant] broke off the affair [he] gave reasons for 
doing so which [he] could not justify. But when [he was] sued for breach of 
contract [he was] entitled to resist the claim on any good ground that was 
available, regardless of reasons which [he] had previously given .... [I]f a 
party repudiated a contract giving no reasons at all, all reasons and all 
defences in the action, partial or complete, would be open to him. Equally 
would this be so, I think, if he gave reasons which he could not substantiate. 
If there never was a contract, they could not be made liable for breach of 
contract. 389 
The House of Lords' decision in Scammel/ was a model of classical 
contract law's approach to indefiniteness (though decided during the time 
classical contract law was waning). Because the vague term had nothing to 
do with the reason the defendant repudiated, the court's focus was 
necessarily on the definiteness of the bargain as of the time of formation, 
and not at the time of the lawsuit. The plaintiffs promise was held too 
indefinite to form a contract, without any discussion of whether such 
indefiniteness would affect the ability of the court to determine the 
existence of a breach by the defendant or to give an appropriate remedy to 
the plaintiff (though its indefiniteness would presumably have made it 
difficult to determine the cost avoided by the plaintiff from not having to 
perform).390 Also, the defendant's motive in repudiating the bargain was 
Cardozo's controversial opinion in Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass 'n v. Remington Paper & 
Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923), in which he held a bargain too indefinite to enforce. 
Id. at 471-72. With respect to the controversial nature of the opinion, see Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1379 
(1995): 
Many have observed that it was peculiar for Cardozo, widely regarded as a "contract 
maker," to have refused to find a contract worth enforcing in Sun Printing. For 
example, Cardozo could have accepted the buyer's argument that the parties had 
entered into one or more option contracts and enforced the contract in these terms very 
easily. Accordingly, something else must have led Cardozo to act as a "contract 
breaker." Corbin hinted at one possibility: "Was Cardozo less moved to cure defects 
in the work of the well-paid lawyers of two rich corporations?" 
Id. at 1394 n.77 (citations omitted). The Second Restatement and the U.C.C. each reject 
Cardozo's rationale in Sun Printing (that the bargain was too indefinite because the parties 
failed to agree on a price). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981) 
(stating that the court should fill in the gap with a reasonable price); U.C.C. § 2-305 (2013) 
(same); Cunningham, supra at 1407 (recognizing that "the received understanding of Sun 
Printing-holding that a contract that does not fix a price term is unenforceable-had been 
reversed by section 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code"). 
389 G. Scammell & Nephew Ltd., [1941] A.C. at 267-68 (Lord Wright). 
390 See generally id. 
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considered irrelevant.391 The House of Lords' permitted range of 
indefiniteness was also narrower than that used by the lower courts with the 
House of Lords concluding that there were simply too many different terms 
of the indefinite hire-purchase agreement that would be reasonable in the 
circumstances. 392 
The Scammell decision caught Professor Arthur Corbin's attention when 
Professor Lon Fuller included it in a draft of the mutual assent portion of a 
casebook they were collaborating on at the time.393 In a December 1941 
letter to Fuller discussing Fuller's selection of cases for that portion, Corbin 
told him that "[ m ]y impression was generally good, although the opinion in 
Scammell v. Ouston did not impress me very well."394 Fuller was 
apparently not impressed by the opinion either (despite including it in the 
draft casebook), referring to it in his famous 1958 Harvard Law Review 
article, replying to H.L.A. Hart,395 as an "outstanding example"396 of the 
British courts, in recent years in the field of commercial law, falling "into a 
'law-is-law' formalism that constitutes a kind of belated counterrevolution 
against all that was accomplished by Mansfield."397 
In his famous 1950 Contracts treatise, Corbin explained that the Court of 
Appeal's reasoning that the parties should "be bound to perform according 
to some reasonable and customary 'hire-purchase' agreement" was one that 
he believed "seem[ ed] reasonable."398 Thus, Corbin considered the House 
of Lords' decision to be incorrectly decided because the terms of the hire-
purchase agreement could be supplied by industry custom, and thus the 
391 See id. at 267-68 (Lord Wright) (stating that if there was never a contract, the 
repudiating party could not be made liable for breach, regardless of the reason given for the 
repudiation). 
392 See id. at 256 (Viscount Maugham) ("[A] hire-purchase agreement may assume many 
forms and some of the variations in those forms are of the most important character, e.g., 
those which relate to termination of the agreement, warranty of fitness, duties as to repair, 
interest, and so forth."); id. at 260-61 (Lord Russell) ("An alleged contract which appeals for 
its meaning to so many skilled minds in so many different ways, is undoubtedly open to 
suspicion. . . . [The contemplated hire-purchase agreement] could be brought about in 
various ways, and by documents containing a multiplicity of different terms."); id. at 268 
(Lord Wright) (basing his decision not only "on the actual vagueness and unintelligibility of 
the words used, but ... the startling diversity of explanations, tendered by those who think 
there was a bargain, of what the bargain was"). 
393 See generally Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller's Cases on Contracts (1942?): The 
Casebook that Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (2003) (discussing the collaboration). 
394 Id. at 622. 
395 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630, 637 n.5 (1958). 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 637. 
398 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, l CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 293 n. l 0 (1950). 
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buyer's promise was not too indefinite.399 Corbin was a consultant on the 
Second Restatement until his death in 1967 ,400 and his distaste for the 
decision perhaps played a role in the inclusion of an illustration loosely 
based on the case-an illustration that, according to Professor Braucher, the 
Reporter, "repudiates the reasoning of G. Scammell & Nephew v. 
Ouston ... .'.4°1 
If the illustration was designed simply to repudiate the House of Lords' 
reasoning in Scammell, then the illustration would have little relevance to 
determining whether the Second Restatement requires the plaintiffs 
promise to be sufficiently definite. In such a case, the illustration would 
simply stand for the unremarkable proposition that the Second 
Restatement's tolerance for vague language is greater than classical 
contract law's tolerance for such language. The illustration, however, 
throws a curveball by including within the bargain's terms a liquidated 
damages provision that did not exist in the bargain in Scammell and then 
suggesting that it is the liquidated damages provision (not industry custom) 
that results in the bargain's terms being sufficiently definite. The 
illustration provides as follows: 
A agrees to sell and B to buy goods for $2,000, $1,000 in cash and the 
"balance on installment terms over a period of two years," with a provision 
for liquidated damages. Ifit is found that both parties manifested an intent to 
conclude a binding agreement, the indefiniteness of the quoted language does 
not prevent the award of the liquidated damages.402 
Although the illustration does not indicate which party allegedly 
breached, if the illustration is loosely based on Scammell, one can assume 
that A, the seller, repudiated. 
The strange inclusion of a liquidated damages provision in the bargain 
suggests that the illustration's drafters considered the bargain's terms, in the 
absence of that provision, to be too indefinite because important details of 
the plaintiffs promise to pay off the balance were not agreed upon (e.g., the 
number of installments, how much per installment, and how much interest). 
The inclusion of a liquidated damages provision (and presumably a 
plaintiffs request to be awarded the liquidated damages) is apparently what 
399 Id. One wonders if Corbin also believed that a liberal approach to gap filling was 
appropriate in the case because the defendant's motive for repudiating was not related to the 
indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise. 
400 Herbert Wechsler, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS foreword (1981); see 
generally Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755 (1993) (describing some of Corbin's work as a consultant on the 
Restatement). 
401 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 reporter's note cmt. b (1981). 
402 Id. § 33 cmt. b, illus. 1 (emphasis added). 
240 University of Hawai'i Law Review I Vol. 36:169 
makes the bargain's terms sufficiently definite (which, making things 
stranger, would not, in fact, repudiate the House of Lords' reasoning in 
Scammell, as stated by Braucher403). This in tum suggests that as long as 
the plaintiff can prove that the defendant breached (which the plaintiff can 
in the hypothetical if it is based on Scammell because there was a 
repudiation not based on the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise), the 
indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise is irrelevant because it does not 
affect the ability of the court to give an appropriate remedy (here, liquidated 
damages). 
This does not mean that the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs' promise 
could not become relevant to the dispute before the court if the facts were 
different; if, for example, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs breached 
first, thereby excusing the defendant's non-performance; or if there were no 
liquidated damages provision, and the plaintiffs sought expectation 
damages and the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs' promise made it difficult to 
determine the plaintiffs' cost avoided from not having to perform. But this 
illustration suggests that the reasonably certain terms requirement does not 
require that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite. Thus, it does 
seem to repudiate the decision in Scammell to the extent the House of Lords 
took the position that the plaintiffs promise must be sufficiently definite, 
but not for the reason that made the decision objectionable to Corbin. 
Further evidence in support of the conclusion that the Second 
Restatement's "determining the existence of a breach'.404 requirement is 
assessed at the time of the lawsuit is provided by the rule's requirement that 
the terms be sufficiently definite to determine both the existence of a breach 
and to give an appropriate remedy. If the time for assessing definiteness is 
as of the time of formation, and if the terms are sufficiently definite to 
determine the existence of a breach, they necessarily must be sufficiently 
definite for purposes of giving an appropriate remedy. For example, if the 
terms are sufficiently definite at the time of formation to determine the 
existence of a breach, the court will necessarily be able to identify the 
position the promisee would have been in had there been performance, and 
thus will be able to protect the prornisee's expectation interest. There 
would be no reason to have two requirements; a single requirement 
providing that the terms must be sufficiently definite to determine the 
existence of a breach would be sufficient. 
Conversely, if the time for assessing definiteness is at the time of the 
lawsuit, the two requirements could serve different functions. At the time 
of the lawsuit, a court might be able to determine the existence of a breach 
403 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 reporter's note cmt. b (1981). 
404 Id. § 33(2). 
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because the defendant's actions (or inaction) were beyond the scope of a 
vague promise's range of plausible meanings, which would surely be the 
case if there was a repudiation or no attempt at performance, as was the 
case in Scammell.405 Yet the terms of the vague promise might not be 
sufficient to protect the promisee's expectation interest because, even 
though it is clear there has been a breach (or repudiation), the promise's 
vagueness makes it impossible to determine the position the promisee 
would have been in had there been performance. The vagueness of the 
plaintiffs promise might also make it impossible to determine the position 
the plaintiff would have been in had there been performance because the 
"cost or other loss" avoided by the plaintiff in not having to perform might 
be impossible to determine.406 Alternatively, a promised performance 
might be sufficiently definite to protect the promisee's expectation interest, 
but the duty to perform might be subject to a vague condition. In such a 
situation, the terms would not be sufficiently definite to determine the 
existence of a breach, though they would be sufficiently definite to 
determine the position the promisee would have been in had there been 
performance. 
Also, in general, "[t]here has been movement to weaken or eliminate 
formal requirements for contract."407 An interpretation that does not require 
the plaintiffs promise to be sufficiently definite is in keeping with this 
movement. Similarly, such an interpretation is consistent with a modem 
desire, when assessing the indefiniteness of a bargain, to look past the time 
the bargain was formed, even while paying homage to the requirement's 
status as a formation doctrine. Professor Larry DiMatteo described this 
tendency at work, relying on a 1979 California appellate decision and 
quoting from the opinion: 
The modem trend toward enforceability and the notion offaimess plays a role 
in the court's "forward-looking" or result-oriented rationale. The formalism 
of classical contract law is discarded in favor of the "norm of enforcement": 
"The modem trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts [and] to 
lean against their unenforceability because of uncertainty .... " '"[I]f it is 
possible [for a court] to reach a fair and just result,"' then the uncertainty 
norm of classical contract should not hold sway. In place of the contract 
voiding rationales of uncertainty, liberal rules of construction and gap-filling 
405 See G. Scammell & Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston, [1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.) 264 (Eng.) (Lord 
Wright) (stating that at trial there was found to have been a repudiation of the contract). 
406 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (1981) (providing that in 
measuring the plaintiff's expectation interest for purposes of awarding expectation damages, 
the amount must be reduced by "any cost or other loss that [the plaintiff] has avoided by not 
having to perform"). 
407 Gergen, supra note 249, at 1440 n.178. 
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devices should be utilized to salvage contracts that show a reasonable 
modicum of contractual intent.408 
In the end, what supports a conclusion that the Second Restatement's 
reasonably certain terms requirement requires the plaintiffs promise to be 
sufficiently definite is the inclusion of the requirement in the formation 
section409 and the black letter statement that unless the bargain's "terms" 
are reasonably certain a contract is not formed.410 The reference to "terms" 
is not, however, particularly significant. The requirement that the "terms" 
be reasonably certain is defined in the black letter rule as requiring that 
"they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for 
giving an appropriate remedy,"411 and the supporting comment and 
illustrations strongly suggest that being able to determine the existence of a 
breach is assessed at the time of the lawsuit, not at the time of formation.412 
Although the Second Restatement retaining the requirement as a 
formation doctrine is strong evidence that the "determining the existence of 
a breach''413 analysis is assessed at the time of the bargain's formation, the 
substantial evidence to the contrary leads, on balance, to the conclusion that 
the requirement is assessed at the time of the lawsuit, and therefore does not 
require that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite. This in tum 
suggests that the Second Restatement's requirement that a bargain's terms 
be sufficiently definite to determine the existence of a breach serves a 
purely practical purpose, and not a formal purpose. 
A formal aspect would be retained, however, if the court required that the 
terms' definiteness be greater than that which would be necessary to 
establish the existence of a breach by a preponderance of the evidence.414 If 
408 Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of 
Satisfaction"-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 413 (1995) (quoting Larwin-
Southem Cal., Inc. v. JGB Inv. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 52, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). 
409 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (which is placed in Chapter 3 
titled "Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent"). 
410 Id. § 33(1 ). 
411 Id. § 33(2). 
412 See, e.g., id. § 33 cmt. b ("[T]he degree of certainty required may be affected by the 
dispute which arises and by the remedy sought." (emphasis added)). 
413 Id. § 33(2). 
414 A somewhat similar issue is involved with respect to whether the Second 
Restatement's requirement that "[d]amages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount 
that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty." Id. § 352. The 
Second Restatement does not make it clear whether this standard is designed to make it more 
difficult to recover contract damages than under a preponderance of the evidence standard 
that would apply irrespective of the black letter rule. See, e.g., MindGames, Inc. v. W. 
Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (stating that the requirement in a 
contract action that lost profits be proven to a reasonable certainty is simply the rule that is 
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the court applied a narrow acceptable range for indefiniteness,415 the rule 
would presumably result in decisions contrary to the manifested intentions 
of the parties. For example, even though the evidence before the court was 
sufficient to enable one to conclude, based on a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, that the defendant had breached a vague promise, a court 
applying a narrow acceptable range might consciously decide that the 
reasonably certain terms requirement demands greater certainty for finding 
a breach. 
Although the Second Restatement does not address this issue, the use of 
the phrase "provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach'.416 
suggests that the court is not to apply a standard more demanding than 
whether the terms are sufficiently definite to determine the existence of a 
breach by the preponderance of the evidence standard. This is further 
supported by the comment's statement that "[t]he test is not certainty as to 
what the parties were to do ... .''417 
A final argument against the conclusion that the Second Restatement's 
requirement that the terms be sufficiently definite to determine the 
existence of a breach serves a purely practical purpose must be 
considered-namely, that if it serves a purely practical purpose, it is no 
more than a restatement of the general requirement, that the plaintiff prove a 
breach of contract by a preponderance of the evidence.418 And if this is so, 
why include it as a black letter rule? 
It is likely that the drafters desired to have a black letter rule and a 
section on "certainty" that encompassed various issues involving 
indefiniteness.419 And one of those issues is that the indefiniteness of a 
bargain's terms (as opposed to the indefiniteness of what occurred after 
formation, which is likely what one usually means when referring to 
proving a breach by the preponderance of the evidence) might prevent the 
plaintiff from proving that the defendant breached the bargain. 
Although it might have been better to place this doctrine in Chapter 10 of 
the Second Restatement (dealing with "Performance and Non-
Performance"),420 there is evidence that the drafters included in the 
"Certainty" section doctrines that are, in fact, simply restatements of other 
applicable to the recovery of damages in general). 
415 See supra Part IV. 
416 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(2) (1981). 
417 Id. § 33 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
418 See Pisani v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 710, 719 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the plaintiff in a breach of contract action has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached the contract). 
419 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (titled "Certainty''). 
420 See id. § § 231-260. 
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doctrines. For example, the comment's discussion of the greater degree of 
certainty needed to obtain an award of specific performance421 shows that 
this doctrine, which is not a formation doctrine,422 is encompassed within 
the Second Restatement's "Certainty" section and is within the black letter 
rule's reference to the terms having to be sufficiently definite to give an 
appropriate remedy.423 Also, the "Certainty" section's third subsection 
addresses the issue of whether indefiniteness means that the parties have 
not manifested assent to a bargain,424 an issue that is analytically distinct 
from the requirement that a bargain's terms be reasonably certain and is in 
fact a particular application of the black letter rule on preliminary 
negotiations.425 Thus, the "Certainty" section, including its comment and 
illustrations, although placed in the formation chapter, appears to be a 
hodgepodge of analytically distinct issues (some of which have nothing to 
do with contract formation) whose only commonality is that they involve 
whether a bargain's terms are indefinite. 
Further support for the conclusion that the "determining the existence of 
a breach'.426 requirement is simply a restatement of the requirement that the 
plaintiff prove a breach is the Second Restatement's downplaying of the 
former requirement in favor of the "appropriate remedy" requirement.427 
Although the comment, when discussing the reasonably certain terms 
requirement in general, states that "[i]f the essential terms are so uncertain 
that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or 
421 See id. § 33 cmt. b ("In some cases greater definiteness may be required for specific 
performance than for an award of damages ... "). 
422 See id. § 3 62 cmt. a: 
Id. 
One of the fundamental requirements for the enforceability of a contract is that its 
terms be certain enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate remedy. See 
§ 33. If this minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no contract at all. It 
may be, however, that the terms are certain enough to provide the basis for the 
calculation of damages but not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of 
specific performance or an injunction and to determine whether the resulting 
performance is in accord with what has been ordered. In that case there is a contract[,] 
but it is not enforceable by specific performance or an injunction. 
423 See id. § 33(2) (referring to the need for terms to be sufficiently definite to enable the 
court to give an appropriate remedy). 
424 Id. § 33(3). 
425 See id. § 33 cmt. c ("The rule stated in Subsection (3) is a particular application of the 
rule stated in § 26 on preliminary negotiations."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. d (2011) ("A transaction resulting in an indefinite 
[bargain] must not be confused with a failed negotiation producing no [bargain] at all."). 
426 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33(2)(1981). 
421 Id. 
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broken, there is no contract,"428 the comment heading for the discussion of 
the subsection listing the two requirements is simply titled "Certainty in 
basis for remedy."429 Also, there are no references in that particular 
comment to the requirement that the terms be definite enough to provide a 
basis for determining the existence of a breach.43° Further, Professor 
Braucher, when discussing the two requirements, simply referred to there 
having to be "a reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy."431 The test 
was also modeled after U.C.C. § 2-204(3),432 which refers only to "a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."433 All of this 
suggests that the "determining the existence of a breach" requirement was 
simply a restatement of the general requirement that a plaintiff prove a 
breach of contract and that the "appropriate remedy" requirement was the 
true test for the reasonably certain terms rule (at least to the extent it exists 
as a rule separate from others). We will now tum to that requirement. 
B. An "Appropriate" Remedy 
For a bargain to have reasonably certain terms under the Second 
Restatement's test, not only must the terms be sufficiently definite to 
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach, they must also 
provide a basis for giving an "appropriate" remedy.434 This language was 
not used in the First Restatement, and was modeled after a U.C.C. 
provision.435 The Second Restatement does not indicate, however, which 
remedies are "appropriate."436 In particular, the Second Restatement fails to 
state whether protecting the plaintiffs reliance interest is an appropriate 
remedy or whether appropriate remedies are limited to those protecting the 
plaintiff's expectation interest.437 
428 Id. § 33 cmt. a. 
429 See id. § 33 cmt. b (titled "Certainty in basis for remedy"). 
430 See id. 
431 Braucher, supra note 8, at 308. 
432 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn 
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code.") (remark by Reporter Robert 
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provisions on reasonably certain terms). 
433 u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (2013). 
434 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981 ). 
435 Braucher, supra note 8, at 308 (noting that the test provided for the reasonably certain 
terms requirement is based on U.C.C. section 2-204(3)). 
436 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) (defining 
"expectation interest," "reliance interest," and "restitution interest"); id§ 33 (not explaining 
what constitutes an "appropriate" remedy). 
437 The promisee's expectation interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain 
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
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If the ability of a court to give an appropriate remedy is assessed as of the 
time of the bargain's formation, an appropriate remedy is presumably 
limited to the protection of the parties' expectation interests. If the 
requirement is assessed as of this time, considering reliance damages to be 
an appropriate remedy would be nonsensical because there cannot be 
reliance on a bargain until after the bargain's formation.438 One would 
either have to take the position that the possibility of reliance means that the 
bargain's terms are always sufficiently definite to provide a basis for giving 
of an appropriate remedy (which would defeat the purpose of including an 
"appropriate remedy" requirement) or that the possibility of reliance should 
not be considered (which would defeat the purpose of concluding that 
reliance damages are an appropriate remedy). 
But if the ability of a court to give an appropriate remedy is assessed at 
the time of the lawsuit, an appropriate remedy presumably could include the 
protection of the plaintiffs reliance interest, provided the plaintiff has 
relied on the bargain and seeks such a remedy.439 Whether the bargain's 
terms are sufficiently definite to provide an appropriate remedy for the 
defendant would be irrelevant as long as the defendant is not asserting a 
counterclaim for breach of contract. 
The Second Restatement's comments include portions that suggest 
partial enforcement of a promise, such as through an award of reliance 
damages, might be considered an appropriate remedy for purposes of an 
indefiniteness analysis. For example, the comments state that there must be 
"a reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy," that "uncertainty may 
preclude one remedy without affecting another," and that "the degree of 
certainty required may be affected ... by the remedy sought. ,Mo Another 
Second Restatement black letter rule states that "[a]ction in reliance on an 
agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even though 
uncertainty is not removed."441 The rule's reference to reliance making a 
performed .... " Id§ 344(a). 
438 Reliance damages protect the promisee's reliance interest. The promisee's reliance 
interest is "his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by 
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been 
made .... " Id. § 344(b). 
439 See id. (defining the reliance interest). 
440 Id. § 33 cmt. b. Even when a plaintiff has suffered no loss or cannot prove any loss, 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages. See id. § 346(2). Because this is just "a 
small amount," it would be difficult to argue that an award of nominal damages is an 
appropriate remedy. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 447 (defining 
nominal damages as "[a] small amount fixed as damages for breach of contract without 
regard to the amount of harm"). Also, this would render the adjective "adequate" irrelevant. 
441 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34(3) (1981). 
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remedy "appropriate" suggests that reliance damages are, in fact, an 
"appropriate remedy" under the indefiniteness test. 
This language is consistent with statements by Professor E. Allan 
Farnsworth in his hombook that suggest that the plaintiff's choice of 
remedy, including a request for reliance damages, could render an 
otherwise indefinite bargain sufficiently definite.442 He states that "[ e ]ven 
where damages [as opposed to specific performance] are sought, the effect 
of indefiniteness on the ability to estimate loss depends on the measure of 
damages involved. It is usually easier to estimate damages based on the 
reliance interest than on the expectation interest."443 
But another portion of the Second Restatement suggests otherwise. With 
respect to the Second Restatement's black letter rule stating that "[a ]ction in 
reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even 
though uncertainty is not removed,"444 the supporting comment suggests 
that the reliance might not make an award of reliance damages an 
appropriate remedy.445 The comment states that because of a promisee's 
reliance, "partial or full enforcement through an award of damages for 
breach of contract or a decree of specific performance may become 
appropriate," and then cites to section 90 for support,446 which is the section 
dealing with promissory estoppel.447 Here, it is important to remember that 
the Second Restatement considers a promise enforceable as a result of 
reliance to be a contract,448 thus showing that the reference to a remedy for 
"breach of contract" could have been intended to refer to a claim for 
promissory estoppel. Professor Joseph Perillo seems to agree that the claim 
here would be under promissory estoppel and not for breach of contract.449 
Further, the premise that any award protecting less than the expectation 
interest is not an appropriate remedy is supported by any such award being 
an inadequate remedy at law for purposes of obtaining an equitable 
remedy.450 
442 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 207. 
443 Id. (emphasis added). 
444 
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 34(3)(1981). 
445 See id. § 34 cmt. d. 
446 Id. 
447 See id. § 90. 
448 See id. § l (defining contract as "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes 
as a duty"). 
449 
PERILLO, supra note 2, at 56 & n.112 (stating that a discussion of Restatement section 
34 comment d and detrimental reliance on an indefinite bargain is discussed in the 
hombook's chapter 6, which deals with promissory estoppel). 
450 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 359(1) (1981). 
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Similarly, Professor Farnsworth, in his hornbook, uses Kearns v. 
Andree451 and Wheeler v. White452 as examples of courts protecting the 
reliance interest when the terms are too indefinite to give an expectation 
damages award.453 The former was based on an implied-in-law contract 
theory454 and the latter a promissory estoppel theory.455 Also, Professor 
Farnsworth, when explaining the rationale for the definiteness requirement, 
stated that the requirement: 
[I]s implicit in the premise that contract law protects the promisee's 
expectation interest [because] [i]n calculating the damages that will put the 
promisee in the position in which the promisee would have been had the 
promise been performed, a court must determine the scope of that promise 
with some precision.456 
Professor Kevin M. Teeven suggests the same, stating that "[i]n order for 
a court to decide on expectation damages, a court must know the scope of 
the promise ... .'.457 One court also explained that the reason a claim for 
promissory estoppel does not require reasonably certain terms is because 
the usual remedy (according to that court) is not expectation damages: 
The reason for the distinction between the contract requirement of reasonable 
definiteness and the promissory estoppel requirement of reasonable and 
foreseeable reliance is the nature of the remedy available. Promissory 
estoppel only provides for damages as justice requires and does not attempt to 
provide the plaintiff damages based upon the benefit of the bargain. The 
usual measure of damages under a theory of promissory estoppel is the loss 
incurred by the promisee in reasonable reliance on the promise, or "reliance 
damages." Reliance damages are relatively easy to determine, whereas the 
determination of "expectation" or "benefit of the bargain" damages available 
in a contract action requires more detailed proof of the terms of the 
contract. 458 
451 139 A. 695 (Conn. 1928). 
452 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965). 
453 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
454 See Kearns, 139 A. at 698. 
455 See Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 96-97. 
456 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 108 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted); see 
also id. at 201 ("We have seen that the requirement of definiteness is implicit in the principle 
that the promisee's expectation interest is to be protected."). 
457 TuEVEN, supra note 202, at 238. 
458 Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Neb. 1990). Many jurisdictions award 
expectation damages in promissory estoppel cases if such damages can be proven to a 
reasonable certainty. See also Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 99, 147 (2000) ("[C]ourts today often award expectation damages even in promissory 
estoppel cases, at least when the expectation damages are measurable."). 
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Also, considering reliance damages to be an appropriate remedy under 
the Second Restatement's test would render "appropriate" a virtually 
meaningless qualification to "remedy" because most contracts will induce 
reliance.459 Also, considering reliance damages to be an appropriate 
remedy would leave only the restitution interest and nominal damages as 
candidates for the label "inappropriate." Further, if a remedy was 
appropriate as long as it was sought by the plaintiff, all remedies would be 
appropriate, and the Second Restatement, rather than referring to 
"appropriate remedy," would have stated that that the bargain's terms are 
sufficiently definite as long as they enable the court to give the remedy 
sought by the plaintiff. 
The Second Restatement section on certainty provides only two 
illustrations with respect to the definiteness necessary to enable the court to 
give an appropriate remedy, and neither deals with a plaintiff seeking 
reliance damages.460 The first illustration is loosely based on Scammell and 
Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston461 and shows that an award ofliquidated damages is 
an appropriate remedy.462 The second is used to show that a plaintiff 
seeking specific performance can waive or remove the indefiniteness within 
the plaintiffs promised performance (which would be relevant to the 
remedy sought because an order of specific performance will make the 
plaintiffs performance a condition of the remedy) by offering to perform in 
the manner most favorable to the defendant.463 These illustrations do, 
however, suggest that a bargain's indefiniteness is only relevant if it 
precludes an award of the specific remedy sought by the plaintiff. This in 
turn would suggest that a request for reliance damages would be an 
appropriate remedy as long as the indefiniteness of either party's promise 
does not make it difficult to determine whether a particular act was in 
reliance on the bargain. 
But such a conclusion drawn from these two illustrations is contradicted 
by the previously discussed citation to section 90 (the promissory estoppel 
section) in the Second Restatement comment, when it states that in many 
cases reliance on an indefinite bargain will make partial or full enforcement 
appropriate.464 So how can the differing treatment be reconciled? 
459 See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT4 (1979) (stating that 
except for situations in which the promisor has made some mistake and quickly attempts to 
withdraw the promise, "the probability is that some action in reliance (or some payment) 
will soon be performed by the promisee"). 
460 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b, illus. 1, 2 (1981). 
461 [1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.)(Eng.). 
462 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981 ). 
463 See id. § 33 cmt. b, illus. 2. 
464 See id. § 34 cmt. d. 
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The Second Restatement's rule is that the bargain's terms must "provide 
a basis for ... giving an appropriate remedy,"465 and the supporting 
comment explains that the requirement "reflects the fundamental policy that 
contracts should be made by the parties, not by the courts, and hence that 
remedies for breach of contract must have a basis in the agreement of the 
parties.''466 With respect to a party conceding to a meaning that is most 
favorable to the opposing party via the cure-by-concession doctrine,467 or 
the court granting liquidated damages,468 the bargain's terms provide a basis 
for giving the requested remedy. The cure-by-concession doctrine 
essentially alters the terms and permits full enforcement of the promise. 
The liquidated damages provision is part of the original bargain. 
A remedy of reliance damages, however, has no basis in the parties' 
agreement.469 Also, when it is a party's reliance that makes an agreement 
enforceable, the plaintiff is usually required to proceed under a promissory 
estoppel theory.470 Thus, the comment's citation to section 90 and the 
illustrations can be reconciled by recognizing that reliance does not result in 
the bargain's terms enabling the court to provide an appropriate remedy, 
whereas the cure-by-concession doctrine and a liquidated damages 
provision do result in the bargain's terms enabling the court to provide an 
appropriate remedy. Of course, part performance can remove 
uncertainty,471 but the issue here is whether mere reliance is sufficient to 
make an award of reliance damages an appropriate remedy, even if the 
reliance does not remove the indefiniteness. In fact, the black letter rule's 
reference to reliance making a contractual remedy appropriate "even though 
uncertainty is not removed,''472 suggests that the bargain remains too 
indefinite to be enforced as a contract. 
For those who find such reconciliation objectionable as being based 
solely on word parsing, the different treatment of the cure-by-concession 
doctrine and liquidated damages on the one hand, and reliance damages on 
the other, makes practical sense. The first two situations are ones that 
involve conduct that should be encouraged. Rewarding a cure-by-
465 Id. § 33(2). 
466 Id. § 33 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
467 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 242, at 421 ("Under the doctrine of 'cure by concession,' 
when the contract is silent over a material term the indefiniteness is overcome by granting 
the plaintiff the option to concede the missing term in accordance with the defendant's most 
favorable arrangement."). 
468 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 356 (1981). 
469 Reliance damages are defined as an "interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by 
reliance on the contract .... " Id. § 344(b) (emphasis added). 
470 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981). 
471 Id. § 34(2). 
472 Id. § 34(3). 
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concession by permitting a claim on the contract encourages a party to 
resolve a dispute by conceding to the meaning of a bargain that is most 
favorable to the other party. Rewarding the inclusion of a liquidated 
damages provision encourages parties to use such clauses, and such a 
provision "saves the time of courts, juries, parties and witnesses and 
reduces the expense of litigation. ,,.473 In contrast, reliance on indefinite 
bargains (at least to the extent the reliance does not remove the bargain's 
uncertainty) should be discouraged because it will often be inefficient 
behavior. Indefinite bargains often lead to disputes with the result being 
that one or both of the parties' reliance expenditures are wasted. 
Also, if a bargain's terms simply had to be sufficiently definite to provide 
the plaintiff with the remedy being sought (and assuming, as previously 
discussed, that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs promise to be 
sufficiently definite if not relevant to the dispute), the reasonably certain 
terms requirement would be designed solely to enable the court to resolve 
the dispute before it. While this might not be objectionable from a 
normative standpoint, it would render irrelevant a separate doctrine 
involving reasonably certain terms, and thus destroy it. By treating the 
plaintiffs expectation interest (or liquidated damages) as the only 
appropriate remedies, it explains the survival of the reasonably certain 
terms requirement as a separate doctrine. 
Accordingly, the Second Restatement's comments and illustrations 
support the conclusion that an "appropriate" remedy is only one that 
permits full enforcement of the parties' bargain (i.e., an award protecting 
the expectation interest or an award of liquidated damages) as opposed to 
partial enforcement (e.g., an award protecting the reliance interest or the 
restitution interest, or an award of nominal damages).474 
What then, is to be made of the comment's statement that "the degree of 
certainty required may be affected by ... the remedy sought"?475 The most 
likely explanation is that the comment refers to the higher degree of 
certainty needed to award specific performance as opposed to expectation 
damages. Shortly after this statement, the first. statement after two 
sentences addressing how the degree of certainty required may be affected 
by the dispute which arises (as opposed to the remedy sought), in the 
473 Id. § 356 cmt. a. 
474 If protecting the reliance interest is not an appropriate remedy, an award protecting 
the restitution interest would not be an appropriate remedy because the restitution interest is 
usually smaller than the reliance interest. See id. § 344 cmt. a ("Although [the restitution 
interest] may be equal to the expectation or reliance interest, it is ordinarily smaller because 
it includes neither the injured party's lost profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance 
that resulted in no benefit to the other party."). 
475 Id. § 33 cmt. b. 
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comment notes that "[i]n some cases greater definiteness may be required 
for specific performance than for an award of damages ... .'"'76 Shortly 
thereafter, a citation is given to the Second Restatement sections on specific 
performance and injunctions.477 The statement might also be referring to a 
plaintiff who is only seeking liquidated damage. Although the comment 
includes a statement that "[p ]artial relief may sometimes be granted when 
uncertainty prevents full-scale enforcement through normal remedies,'"'78 
this statement most likely refers to the following section dealing with 
reliance on an indefinite bargain, which, as previously discussed, cites to 
section 90, the promissory estoppel section.479 
Thus, on balance the evidence supports the conclusion that the Second 
Restatement's test only considers a remedy to be appropriate if it has a 
basis in the parties' agreement, which means either a remedy protecting the 
plaintiff's expectation interest, including an award of specific performance 
or expectation damages, or an award of liquidated damages (i.e., so-called 
full enforcement).480 Anything less, such as reliance damages, restitution, 
or nominal damages (so-called partial enforcement),481 would not be 
considered an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, if one assumes parties 
intend bargains to be enforceable in the sense of protecting the parties' 
expectation interests, then the appropriate remedy requirement (by not 
considering partial enforcement to be an appropriate remedy) has a formal 
aspect to it, and thus, at least in part, serves the various functions of form 
that were served by classical contract law's requirement that the plaintiff's 
promise be sufficiently definite, even if not relevant to the dispute. 
Before moving to the next topic, the effect this conclusion has on the 
previously discussed issue-whether the plaintiffs promise must be 
sufficiently definite even if it is not relevant to the dispute-must be 
recognized. By concluding that the bargain's terms must be sufficiently 
definite to enable the court to fully enforce the defendant's promise, the 
indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise, although not a requirement under 
476 Id. 
477 Id. (citing id. §§ 357-62). 
478 Id. 
479 See supra notes 444-45 and accompanying text. 
480 See Edward Yorio & Steve Tuel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 
111, 114 n.16 (1991) (stating that expectation damages constitute a full enforcement of the 
promise); Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 630 (2001) (stating that if a liquidated damages 
clause is part of the bargain, then full enforcement of the clause will be consistent with the 
parties' intentions). 
481 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. d (1981) (discussing "partial 
enforcement"). 
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the reasonably certain tenns test, will often make the court unable to fully 
enforce the defendant's promise.482 
If the plaintiff's promise is indefinite (and that indefiniteness has not 
been removed under the cure-by-concession doctrine or by modification), 
and the plaintiff's cost or other loss avoided from not having to perform is 
too difficult to determine as a result of the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's 
promise, then the bargain's terms are too indefinite for the court to give an 
appropriate remedy unless the bargain included a liquidated damages 
provision. The court cannot award specific performance because an order 
directing the plaintiff to perform cannot be framed. The court cannot award 
expectation damages because it cannot determine the position the plaintiff 
would have been in had the bargain been performed.483 
Thus, if the only appropriate remedy is full enforcement of the 
defendant's promise, the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise (though 
irrelevant to the "determining the existence of a breach" analysis) often will 
render the bargain too indefinite under the "appropriate remedy" analysis. 
This would be the case even if the court, after concluding that a contract 
had been formed, places the burden on the defendant to prove the plaintiff's 
savings from not having to perform.484 
VI. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT'S TEST: NEOCLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW 
(TOA FAULT) 
With the help of supporting comments and illustrations, a drawing of the 
Second Restatement's vague black letter rules on the definiteness doctrine 
has been sketched above, bringing the rule's contours more into focus. And 
482 See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965), discussed infra notes 520-25 
and accompanying text. 
483 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (1981) (providing that in 
measuring the plaintiff's expectation interest for purposes of awarding expectation damages, 
the amount must be reduced by "any cost or other loss that [the plaintiff] avoided by not 
having to perform"). 
484 See generally Kearsarge Computer, Inc. v. Acme Staple Co., 366 A.2d 467, 470 (N.H. 
1976). 
The general rule is: 
If the plaintiff's required expenditures are of cash or material, the tendency is to put the 
burden of allegation and proof of the amount thereof on him, but if his expenditures 
would be of time or labor, the burden is normally placed on the defendant. The court 
usually decides whether the plaintiff's performance requires an outlay of money or 
material from the nature of the contract, without a specific raising of the point by the 
parties. 
Id. at 470 (quoting R.F. Martin, Annotation, Burden of Proving Value of Relief From 
Performing Contract in Suit Based on Defendant's Breach Preventing or Excusing Full 
Performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 968, 972 (1951 )). 
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the image revealed is unmistakably that of a work of neoclassical contract 
law. 
Neoclassical contract law is the name given to the law that started to 
develop in the 1920s in response to classical contract law, and which 
produced the U.C.C. in the middle of the century and the Second 
Restatement in the latter part of the century.485 Whereas classical contract 
law was the law of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston,486 neoclassical 
contract law is the law of Corbin and Llewellyn.487 "[T]he rules of classical 
contract law were centered ... on a single moment in time, the moment of 
contract-formation,"488 whereas neoclassical contract law is willing to take 
account of post-formation events to ensure a just outcome.489 Neoclassical 
contract law has been described as follows: 
[It] attempts to balance the individualist ideals of classical contract with 
communal standards of responsibility to others. The core remains the 
principle of freedom of contract, distinguishing contract from tort and other 
areas, but this principle is "tempered both within and without [contract's] 
485 See Curtis Nyquist, Single-Case Research and the History of American Legal 
Thought, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 594 (2011) ("Neoclassical contract law begins to come 
into focus in the 1920s and 1930s and still dominates the practice of law."); Hillman, supra 
note 268, at 123 n.136 (noting that "[n]eoclassical contract law [is] evidenced by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code"). 
486 See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1749 ("In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the school of thought now referred to as classical contract law, which found its 
central inspiration in Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, and its central expression in the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts ... held virtually absolute sway over contract theory."). 
487 Knapp, supra note 207, at 766-67. 
488 Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1748. See generally Macneil, supra note 203, at 863-65 
(describing classical contract law's focus on the moment of formation with respect to the 
rights and duties that arise between the parties). 
489 See generally Murray, Jr., supra note 211, at 881-82 (explaining neoclassical contract 
law's willingness to consider post-formation events); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise 
of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. 
REV. 293, 320 (1997). On the other side of neoclassical contract law (i.e., moving further 
away from classical contract law and its emphasis on the time of formation) is so-called 
relational contract theory, which places more emphasis on post-formation events than 
neoclassical contract law. See generally Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and 
the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139 (1988) (describing the characteristics 
of relational contract theory). Relational contract theory has not, however, had a significant 
impact on the rules of contract law. See Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 805. 
Id. 
The identification of relational contracts as a critical construct and an important field 
of study has led to important insights concerning the economics and sociology of 
contracting. It has not, however, led to a body of relational contract law: that is, we do 
not have a body of meaningful and justified contract law rules, either in place or 
proposed, that apply to, and only to, relational contracts. 
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formal structure by principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, that 
focus on fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on parties' 
actual agreements." In deciding the scope of contractual liability, courts 
weigh the classical values ofliberty, privacy, and efficiency against the values 
of trust, fairness, and cooperation, which have been identified as important by 
post-classical scholars.490 
Also, whereas classical contract law favored inflexible, abstract rules that 
did not take into account the particular parties involved or the 
circumstances (beyond determining if the rule applied),491 neoclassical 
contract law is more willing to adopt flexible standards to enable a court to 
reach what it believes is a fair result based on the particular facts before 
it.492 
The Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably certain terms 
requirement is quintessentially neoclassical contract law. It keeps one foot 
in the formalism of classical contract law by maintaining the reasonably 
certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine493 and by seemingly 
rejecting reliance damages (and anything less) as an "appropriate" 
remedy.494 It puts the other foot squarely in modem contract law by 
modeling its test for reasonably certain terms on the U.C.C.'s provision, by 
stating that "the degree of certainty required may be affected by the dispute 
which arises and by the remedy sought"495 and by stating that "[ c ]ourts 
decide the disputes before them, not other hypothetical disputes which 
might have arisen"496 (and by apparently not requiring the plaintiffs 
promise to be sufficiently definite). 
49° Feinman, supra note 206, at 1287-88 (internal footnote omitted). 
491 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CASE STUDY 20 (1965) ("[T)he 'pure' law of contract [of the nineteenth century] is an area 
of what we can call abstract relationships. 'Pure' contract doctrine is blind to details of 
subject matter and person."); Macneil, supra note 203, at 863 ("[Classical contract law] 
treats as irrelevant the identity of the parties to the transaction."). 
492 See James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. I, 6 (2003) ("[W]here classical contract law was rule-based, 
neoclassical contract law is more willing to adopt standards."). For explanations of the 
differences between rules and standards, see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1687-1701; Baird & 
Weisberg, supra note 296, at 1227-31. 
493 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (placed in the chapter on 
"Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent"); id. § 33(1) ("Even though a manifestation of 
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a 
contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)). 
494 See id. § 34 cmt. d ("In some cases partial or full enforcement through an award of 
damages for breach of contract or a decree of specific performance may become appropriate. 
See § 90 [promissory estoppel]."). 
495 Id. § 33 cmt. b. 
496 Id.; see also Macneil, supra note 203, at 873 (discussing neoclassical contract law's 
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The drafters seemed unwilling to let go of the past and jettison the idea of 
the reasonably certain terms requirement being a formation doctrine, while 
at the same time wanting to take account of and apparently approve of 
courts' propensities to take into consideration post-formation events so that 
justice can be done in individual cases.497 Unlike classical contract law, the 
Second Restatement's test seems to encourage courts to peek at post-
formation events when deciding if a contract was formed at an earlier time: 
Did the indefinite term tum out to be unimportant to the dispute that arose? 
Is the defendant simply using indefiniteness as an afterthought to avoid 
what turned out to be a bad bargain? 
But this compromise approach comes at an intellectual price. The 
reasonably certain terms requirement cannot be both a formation doctrine 
and a doctrine that assesses definiteness based on the dispute that arises. It 
is either a formation doctrine, or it is not. If it is a formation doctrine, no 
peeking should be permitted: The only conceivable way to make these 
positions consistent would be to maintain that a contract-defined as "a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a 
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty"498-is never really formed until a court gives a remedy or recognizes 
a duty between specific parties. But the Second Restatement rejects this 
approach, indicating that a legal duty to perform as promised arises from 
operative acts occurring prior to a court recognizing such a duty.499 
How and why the Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably 
certain terms requirement ended up lacking clarity and containing apparent 
inconsistencies is unclear, but it was perhaps due to one or more of the 
following: a belief that the reasonably certain terms requirement is rarely 
invoked by modem courts and was thus not worthy of substantial 
attention;500 the combining of related, yet analytically distinct, concepts 
within a single Second Restatement section dealing with "certainty," 
resulting in perfunctory and unfocused treatment of the reasonably certain 
treatment of the reasonably certain terms requirement). 
497 See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 203, at 870 (stating with respect to neoclassical contract 
law's treatment of the reasonably certain terms requirement that the "system may be seen as 
an effort to escape partially from such rigorous [focus on the time of formation], but since its 
overall structure is essentially the same as the classical system it may often be ill-designed to 
raise and deal with the issues"). 
498 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § l (1981 )(emphasis added). 
499 See id. cmt. d (discussing the operative acts necessary to create a legal duty to 
perform). 
500 See Scott, supra note l 0, at 1651 ("The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps 
in incomplete contracts has led commentators to assume that the common law indefiniteness 
doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal enforcement."). 
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terms requirement;501 an apparent desire to deemphasize classical contract 
law's focus on the moment of contract formation,502 even with respect to 
the reasonably certain terms requirement503 without recognizing the 
confusion this might cause; simply relying on the reasonably certain terms 
provision in the U.C.C.,504 which was itself not explained in any detail and 
refers only to gaps, not vague terms;505 a desire to have the requirement left 
501 Second Restatement section 33 is simply titled "Certainty" and incorporates the 
related, yet analytically distinct, concepts of whether a reasonable person would construe an 
apparent offer with gaps as mere preliminary negotiations and not a manifestation of assent, 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(3) & cmt. c (1981), the requirement that a 
bargain have reasonably certain terms to be a contract, see id. § 33( I )-(2), and the 
requirement that greater definiteness is usually required for an order of specific performance 
than an award of damages. See id. § 33 cmt. b ("In some cases greater definiteness may be 
required for specific performance than for an award of damages .... "). 
502 See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1749 ("[T]he rules of classical contract law were 
centered .... on a single moment in time, the moment of contract-formation."). 
503 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b (1981) ("[T]he degree of 
certainty required may be affected by the dispute which arises and by the remedy sought."). 
504 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn 
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code.") (remark by Reporter Robert 
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provisions on reasonably certain terms). 
505 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2013) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."). All that 
the Official Comment provides regarding the reasonably certain terms requirement is the 
following: 
Subsection (3) states the principle as to "open terms" underlying later sections of the 
Article. If the parties intend to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection 
recognizes that agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any 
reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy. The test is not certainty as to what the 
parties were to do nor as to the exact amount of damage due the plaintiff. Nor is the 
fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough of itself to defeat an 
otherwise adequate agreement. Rather, commercial standards on the point of 
"indefiniteness" are intended to be applied, this Act making provision elsewhere for 
missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the like. The more 
terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a 
binding agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter 
despite the omissions. 
U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (2013); see also PERJLLO, supra note 2, at 55 ("What is not clear is 
when a court will find that 'there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy.'"). Professor Edwin W. Patterson, as part of his analysis of§ 2-204(3) for the New 
York Law Revision Commission, stated that while the section's "general purpose 
[was] ... to prevent the courts from requiring strictly that everything be clearly and 
definitely settled before the Court will find that a contract was formed[,]" then provided the 
following cautionary note: "[T]he ways in which this general purpose is to be implemented 
are not clear. While the comment to this subsection indicates that only 'a reasonably certain 
basis for granting a remedy' is requisite, no illustrations are given." STATE OF NEW YORK, 
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vague so that courts would be able to apply it flexibly;506 a desire to 
completely strip the reasonably certain terms requirement of its formal 
aspect without wanting to say so explicitly; or simply describing what they 
saw (courts considering the requirement as a formation doctrine, but often 
unable to bite the bullet and ignore post-formation events).507 
No matter the reason, the result is unfortunate. As stated by Herbert 
Wechsler, ALI director from 1963 to 1984,508 the Restatements are 
"essential aid[s] in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth 
and adaptation of the common law."509 It is well known that the 
Restatements often seek to move the law in a particular direction,510 but the 
result should not be a black letter rule and supporting comments and 
illustrations that cause confusion and create inconsistencies. If the ALI 
desired to jettison the reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation 
doctrine, it should have done so expressly. And if it desired to retain it as a 
formation doctrine, it should have removed comments referencing post-
supra note 86, at 274 (remark by Professor Edwin W. Patterson). The leading treatise on the 
U.C.C. does not provide much explanation of the Code's reasonably certain terms 
requirement, simply stating that Article 2 "makes contracts easier to form," then setting 
forth, as one example, the text of§ 2-204(1) and lastly noting that "Article 2 itself helps 
provide this 'reasonably certain basis' through numerous provisions which fill gaps in an 
agreement that might otherwise fail for indefiniteness." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 29 (6th ed. 2010). The authors direct the reader to 
chapter 4 of the book, which deals with filling in gaps in an incomplete contract. Id. at ch. 4. 
It is clear that Professors White and Summers consider the reasonably certain terms 
requirement to be a dead letter under the U.C.C. 
506 My thanks to Professor Stephen Leacock for suggesting this motive. 
507 The official comment to the U.C.C. provision on unconscionability recognized the 
tendency of courts to manipulate unfavorable doctrines to reach just results. See U.C.C. § 2-
302 cmt. 1 (2013). 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against 
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such 
policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation 
of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to 
public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. 
Id. Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Article 2 of the U.C.C., see Lisa Bernstein, The 
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2 's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 712 (1999), famously referred to this as the use of "covert tools." 
K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939). Professor Grant Gilmore 
colorfully referred to this as "courts avoid[ing] practicing on weekdays what they so 
eloquently preached on Sundays." GILMORE, supra note 62, at 52. 
508 Silber, supra note 13, at 578. 
509 Wechsler, supra note 13, at 150. 
510 See Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 V AND. L. REV. 1663, 1665 (1995) (book 
review) ("[A] restatement seeks improvement of the law through simultaneous ordering and 
change."). 
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formation events, except with respect to cure-by-concession and 
modification. What it left us, however, is a treatment of the reasonably 
certain terms requirement that provides something for everyone and that 
permits a reader to construe it whichever way she wants. 
Also, the ALI's apparent desire for courts to consider post-formation 
events when assessing indefiniteness is puzzling when one considers that 
promissory estoppel is available as an alternative claim. Under the Second 
Restatement, the sanction for failing to have a bargain with reasonably 
certain terms is not the sanction of nullity, but the sanction of contractual 
invalidity.511 By making the requirement one for contract formation, a 
promisee is not precluded from seeking to enforce an indefinite bargain 
under an alternative theory. Importantly, the Second Restatement, like the 
First Restatement,512 expressly recognizes promissory estoppel,513 and the 
Second Restatement even recognizes promissory estoppel as an alternative 
claim when a bargain's terms are too indefinite to form a contract.514 This 
doctrine, with its emphasis on a promisee's reliance and its goal of avoiding 
injustice,515 enables a court to consider post-formation events to ensure a 
just outcome in a particular case. 
This does, of course, still operate as a sanction for entering into a bargain 
with indefinite terms because it is more difficult for a promisee to enforce a 
promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel than to enforce a 
promise within a contract.516 But relegating a promisee to a promissory 
estoppel claim when the bargain's terms are too indefinite to form a 
contract seems to be an appropriate compromise between enforcement of 
the promise under a contract theory (no sanction) and automatic non-
enforcement (the sanction of nullity). This is so because even though there 
are benefits to encouraging parties to have their bargains include reasonably 
certain terms, there might be situations in which the benefits of enforcement 
outweigh the benefits of non-enforcement, reinforcing the requirement's 
formal aspect. The flexibility given to the court by promissory estoppel's 
injustice element makes it an ideal device for the court to weigh the 
511 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981) ("[A manifestation of 
intention] cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are 
reasonably certain." (emphasis added)). 
512 RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS § 90 (1932). 
513 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981 ). 
514 See Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (D. Mass. 2011) 
("[T]he Restatement 'has expressly approved' promissory estoppel's use to protect reliance 
on indefinite promises." (quoting Metzger & Phillips, supra note 242, at 842)). 
515 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981). 
516 See Hillman, supra note 29, at 580 (1998) (reporting a low success rate for 
promissory estoppel claims). 
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competing benefits of enforcement versus non-enforcement. As stated by 
one court, promissory estoppel "supplies a needed tool which courts may 
employ in a proper case to prevent injustice."517 
For example, in deciding whether the injustice from not enforcing the 
promise would outweigh the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality, 
the court might take into consideration, among any other relevant 
circumstances, the following, many of which are post-formation events: 
how reasonable it was for the plaintiff to rely on the indefinite bargain 
(which would presumably require a comparison of the amount of reliance to 
the degree of indefiniteness and the bargain's informality);518 whether the 
plaintiffs reliance was definite and substantial;519 whether the defendant 
encouraged the plaintiff to rely on the bargain because the reliance 
benefited the defendant;520 the degree of fault on the part of the plaintiff in 
failing to specify the bargain's terms with greater definiteness, including 
the "relative competence and the bargaining position of the parties;"521 
whether the defendant in the lawsuit is simply trying to take advantage of 
the reasonably certain terms requirement to avoid what has become a bad 
bargain;522 and whether the defendant intentionally drafted indefinite terms 
to have an excuse for non-performance. 523 
Thus, an example of when the court might conclude that the benefit to 
enforcement outweighs the benefit of reinforcing the legal formality 
through the sanction of nullity would be when one party encourages the 
other to take substantial action in reliance on the indefinite bargain because 
such reliance benefits the promisor, then refuses to perform for a reason 
unrelated to the bargain's indefiniteness, and then relies on the bargain's 
indefiniteness as a defense to the lawsuit.524 In fact, as previously 
517 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1965). 
518 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. b (1981) (noting that factors to 
consider in deciding whether injustice will occur from not enforcing the promise include 
"the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" and "the formality with which the promise is 
made"). 
519 See id. (noting that a factor to consider in deciding whether injustice will occur from 
not enforcing the promise includes the "definite and substantial character [of the reliance] in 
relation to the remedy sought"). 
520 See, e.g., Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011), 
discussed infra notes 539-49 and accompanying text. 
521 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 87 cmt. e (1981). 
522 See CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 374, § 4.1, at 535-36 ("The courts must take 
cognizance of the fact that the argument that a particular agreement is too indefinite to 
constitute a contract frequently is an afterthought excuse for attacking an agreement that 
failed for reasons other than indefiniteness."). 
523 See, e.g., Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 336, discussed infra notes 539-49 and 
accompanying text. 
524 The rule in the Second Restatement that provides that an option contract arises when 
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discussed, parties taking advantage of indefiniteness to escape a bargain for 
an unrelated reason was the most likely reason the U.C.C. relaxed the 
reasonable certainty requirement. 525 
The well-known cases of Wheeler v. White526 and Hoffman v. Red Owl 
Stores, Inc. 527 are perhaps examples of such a situation. In those cases, the 
plaintiffs' reliance on the indefinite bargain was substantial, and in each 
case the defendant encouraged the plaintiff to rely on the indefinite bargain 
and then used its indefiniteness as a defense. 
In Wheeler, the parties entered into a bargain under which the defendant 
promised to secure a loan for the plaintiff (or, if unable to secure it from a 
third party, to provide the loan himself) so that the plaintiff could build a 
commercial building or shopping center on his land, and in exchange he 
promised to pay the defendant a specified sum of money.528 The bargain's 
terms with respect to the promised loan, however, "failed to provide the 
amount of monthly installments, the amount of interest due upon the 
obligation, how such interest would be computed, [and] when such interest 
would be paid."529 The parties also agreed that the defendant would receive 
a commission on the rent received from any tenants he obtained for the 
commercial building or shopping center.530 Thus, the defendant 
presumably had an incentive for the plaintiff to proceed with the plans to 
build the commercial building or shopping center before the defendant 
secured the loan, so that it would be easier for the defendant to secure the 
loan in the first place and so that the defendant could begin earning 
commissions on rent sooner. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, before securing a loan from a 
third party, urged the plaintiff to demolish the existing buildings on the land 
and to otherwise prepare the land for the commercial building or shopping 
center, which the plaintiff did, only to have the defendant then tell him 
there would be no loan.531 When the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach 
of contract, the defendant argued that the bargain lacked reasonably certain 
an offeree foreseeably and substantially relies on an offer and injustice would result if the 
offeror were able to revoke the offer before acceptance, would not apply because this rule 
results in the formation of a contract (though "[t]ull-scale enforcement of the offered 
contract is not necessarily appropriate in such cases"). Id. § 87 cmt. e. No contract can be 
formed ifthe terms are not reasonably certain. Id. § 33(1). 
525 Snyder, supra note 179, at 37-38. 
526 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965). 
527 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
528 See Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 94 n.l, 95. 
529 Id. at 95. 
530 Id. 
531 Id. 
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terms and therefore no contract was formed. 532 The court held that although 
the complaint did not state a claim for breach of contract because the terms 
of the promised loan were indefinite, the complaint stated a claim for 
promissory estoppel. 533 
In Hoffman, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) alleged that the defendant, 
Red Owl Stores, promised the plaintiff husband that he only needed 
$18,000 in capital to start up a Red Owl grocery store,534 but the bargain (if 
one had been reached)535 did not specify "the size, cost, design, and layout 
of the store building; and the terms of the lease with respect to rent, 
maintenance, renewal, and purchase options."536 The plaintiffs alleged that 
after making this promise, the defendant encouraged them, among other 
things, to sell their bakery building and business, to buy the inventory and 
fixtures of a small grocery store to gain experience, to then sell the small 
grocery store, and to obtain an option to buy land on which to build the Red 
Owl store.537 Professor Robert Scott has suggested that the defendant had 
an incentive to encourage the plaintiffs to undertake these actions in 
reliance on the defendant's promise of a Red Owl store: "All these actions 
gave Red Owl some further indication of the kind of franchisee that 
Hoffman was likely to be-was he enterprising and resourceful, or was he a 
bit of a doofus?"538 
After these actions in reliance on the promise, the defendant raised the 
required amount of capital investment to $34,000.539 When the plaintiffs 
sued the defendant for breaching the promise, the defendant argued that the 
terms were insufficiently definite.540 The court held, however, that the facts 
supported enforcing the promise under promissory estoppel, even though 
the promise was insufficiently definite to form a contract.541 
In these cases the defendant is perhaps primarily responsible for the harm 
(the wasted reliance) caused by the indefinite bargain. Thus, permitting the 
532 Id. at 94-95. 
533 Id. at 97. 
534 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 268 (Wis. 1965). 
535 It is unlikely that a bargain was entered into in Hoffman because there was likely no 
offer and, if there was an offer, no acceptance. See id. at 274-75. The promise in Hoffman 
seems to have been a promise by the defendant to make an offer to the plaintiffs and to have 
the promise within the offer conditional on a promise by the plaintiffs of a capital 
contribution ofnot more than $18,000. See id. 
536 Id. at 274. 
537 Id. at 268-70. 
538 Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual 
Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 93 (2007). 
539 Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 271. 
540 See id. at 274. 
541 Id. at 275. 
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promise to be enforced under promissory estoppel in these instances will 
have the beneficial effect of deterring such behavior. A party will no longer 
have an incentive to encourage the other party to rely on the contract to the 
benefit of the promisor and then use the indefiniteness of its own promise 
as a defense. Of course, if, as argued by Professor Scott, the dispute in 
Hoffman arose because of a misunderstanding regarding the amount of 
financing,542 then perhaps the sanction of nullity (as opposed to simply the 
sanction of contractual invalidity) would have been warranted. 
A recent example is Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,543 which arose out 
of the subprime mortgage crisis.544 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
promised to consider their eligibility for a mortgage loan modification if 
they took certain steps, including defaulting on their mortgage loan 
payments and submitting certain financial information to the defendant.545 
The plaintiffs alleged that they did these things, but that the defendant 
refused to modify their mortgage loan and instead proceeded to foreclose 
on their home. 546 The plaintiffs then sued the defendant, asserting a claim 
for promissory estoppel.547 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, 
asserting, among other things, that any promise it made was insufficiently 
definite.548 
The court seemingly recognized that the defendant's promise to negotiate 
a mortgage loan modification was not enforceable as part of a contract 
because (in addition to not being supported by consideration) the parties 
had not "elaborate[ d] on the boundaries of that duty to negotiate" and the 
duty was thus too indefinite.549 The court held, however, that the complaint 
stated a claim for promissory estoppel. 550 The court noted that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel is well suited for situations in which the defendant's 
conduct was "designed to take advantage of the promisee,"551 and when 
'"there has been a pattern of conduct by one side which has dangled the 
542 See Scott, supra note 540, at 97; see also Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores 
and the limits of the Legal Method, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 863 (2010) ("[T]he best inference 
to be drawn from the record was that the breakdown in the negotiations between Joseph 
Hoffmann [the court misspelled Hoffmann's name, see id. at 861 n.5] and Red Owl officials 
was primarily attributable to a fundamental misunderstanding between the parties as to the 
amount and nature ofHoffmann's capital contribution to the franchise operation."). 
543 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011). 
544 See id. at 360. 
545 Id. at 339. 
546 Id. 
547 Id. at 338-39. 
548 Id. 
549 Id. at 343. 
550 Id. at 348. 
551 Id. at 344. 
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other side on a string. "'552 The court stated that "[ w ]hi le there is no 
allegation that its promise was dishonest, [the defendant] distinctly gained 
the upper hand by inducing the [plaintiffs] to open themselves up to a 
foreclosure action."553 
A particularly egregious form of this behavior (which would occur at the 
time of formation) is when an offeror intentionally makes an indefinite 
offer to induce reliance that benefits the offeror, planning from the outset 
on refusing to perform based on the bargain's lack of certainty. For 
example, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner argue that an exception 
to the general rule that indefinite bargains should not be enforced should be 
"[ w ]hen the indefiniteness is clearly attributable to one party and induces 
inefficient reliance from the other party .... "554 They use the well-known 
case of Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc.555 as an example 
of the suggested exception. 556 
In Lefkowitz, the defendant published two advertisements in the 
newspaper.557 In the first, the defendant stated that it was selling three 
brand new fur coats "[w]orth to $100" for one dollar, "[f]irst [c]ome [f]irst 
[s]erved."558 In the second, published one week later, the defendant stated 
it was selling a stole "[w]orth $139.50" for one dollar, also "[f]irst [c]ome 
[f]irst [s]erved.".559 The plaintiff was the first person at the appropriate 
counter of the store on each day, but the store refused to sell to him because 
he was a man. 560 The court held that the advertisements were offers and 
that the defendant breached a contract to sell the stole for one dollar,561 but 
held that the trial court properly disallowed the plaintiffs claim for breach 
of contract to sell a fur coat because "the value of these articles was 
speculative and uncertain."562 The court stated that "[t]he only evidence of 
value was the advertisement itself to the effect that the coats were 'Worth to 
$100.00,' how much less being speculative especially in view of the price 
for which they were offered for sale."563 
552 Id. (quoting Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.2d 621, 622 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1987)). 
553 Id. at 346. 
554 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 106. 
555 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957). 
556 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 105-06. 




561 Id. at 691. 
562 Id. at 690. 
563 Id. 
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Professors Ayres and Gertner argue that a situation like Lefkowitz should 
be an exception to the general rule that indefinite offers will not be 
enforced. 564 They argue that the penalty of non-enforcement will in fact 
encourage sellers to create indefinite (and hence unenforceable) offers that 
induce inefficient reliance by offerees because the inefficient reliance is in 
fact beneficial for the offeror.565 The seller in Lefkowitz was not interested 
in the sale of the fur coats or the stole, he wanted to induce persons to come 
to the store with the hope they would make other purchases.566 Thus, there 
will be some cases in which the offeror has an incentive to make indefinite 
(and hence unenforceable) offers because the offeror will obtain the desired 
performance from the offeree without having to himself perform. 567 
The Lefkowitz problem, however, is solved not by relaxing the 
reasonably certain terms requirement for the formation of a contract but by 
permitting the plaintiff to proceed under a promissory estoppel theory. If 
the offeror made an intentionally indefinite promise to obtain performance 
from the offeree with the expectation of not having to perform his end of 
the bargain (because no contract will be formed), that motive will support 
the conclusion that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise."568 Even if many cases like Lefkowitz (including Lefkowitz itself) 
do not involve reliance of a definite and substantial character, reliance of 
that character is not a requirement for a recovery under promissory 
estoppel,569 but is simply a factor that weighs in favor of enforcement.570 If 
the plaintiff could prove that the defendant made an intentionally indefinite 
offer to encourage reliance that was beneficial to the defendant with the 
expectation that he would not have to perform his end of the bargain, this 
would be sufficient to conclude that injustice would result from non-
enforcement irrespective of the character of the reliance. 
Thus, because of situations like Wheeler, Hoffman (assuming it was not 
simply a case of a misunderstanding), Dixon, and Lefkowitz (assuming the 
defendant had a bad motive), the sanction of contractual invalidity, and not 
564 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 106. 
565 Id. 
566 See id. 
567 See id. 
568 
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 90(1)(1981). 
569 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) ("A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and 
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or 
forbearance .... ") (emphasis added), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) 
(1981) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promise ... and which does induce such action or 
forbearance .... "). 
570 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) cmt. b (1981). 
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the sanction of nullity, would seem appropriate. The flexible nature of 
promissory estoppel's injustice element will permit courts to balance the 
benefits of enforcing the promise against the benefit of reinforcing the legal 
formality. This flexibility will permit courts to conduct that balancing on a 
case-by-case basis, and there will likely be situations other than those such 
as Wheeler, Hoffman, Dixon, and Lefkowitz in which courts will conclude 
that enforcement under promissory estoppel is warranted. 
The flexible nature of promissory estoppel will also permit those courts 
that favor legal formalities more than other courts to assign greater weight 
to the benefits from reinforcing the legal formality. 571 Thus, a court would 
be able to deny enforcement under promissory estoppel in a particular case 
if it believes it would ultimately be more harmful to protect a party to a 
commercial transaction who did not protect himself. 572 The court will also 
be able to enforce the promise but only award reliance damages. For 
example, in Wheeler, the court, although enforcing the promise under 
promissory estoppel, concluded that an award of reliance damages, not 
expectation damages, was appropriate because the plaintiff was partly at 
fault for the bargain's indefiniteness.573 If, however, the defendant's 
behavior was egregious, an award of expectation damages might be 
appropriate, assuming the bargain's terms and the evidence permit such an 
award. Although punitive damages are usually not recoverable for the 
breach of a contract,574 the character of the defendant's conduct is 
sometimes taken into account when determining the amount of damages to 
award.575 
Thus, a court has three options when confronted with a promissory 
estoppel claim based on a promise within a bargain whose terms are too 
indefinite to create a contract. These options are as follows: enforce the 
promise under promissory estoppel and award expectation damages (for 
those cases in which the injustice from not enforcing the promise 
substantially outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality, and 
571 See id. ("The principle of this Section is flexible."). 
572 See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. 
Hand, J.) ("[I]n commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice 
to ... aid ... those who do not protect themselves."). 
573 Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965). 
574 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
575 See id. § 352 cmt. a (stating that with respect to the requirement that a plaintiff prove 
damages to a reasonable certainty, "[a] court may take into account all the circumstances of 
the breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of 
certainty .... "); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 509 (2002) ("[I]n 
construction contracts, the degree of willfulness of a contractor's breach helps courts 
determine whether to grant expectancy damages measured by the cost of repair or the 
diminution in value caused by the breach, the latter often a smaller measure."). 
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the indefiniteness does not prevent the expectation interest from being 
determined); enforce the promise under promissory estoppel but award only 
reliance damages (for those cases in which the injustice from not enforcing 
the promise substantially outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal 
formality, but the expectation interest cannot be determined either because 
the breached promise is indefinite or the evidence does not permit the 
expectation interest to be proved to a reasonable certainty, and those cases 
in which the injustice from not enforcing the promise only moderately or 
slightly outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality); or 
refuse to enforce the promise under promissory estoppel (when the benefit 
from reinforcing the legal formality outweighs the injustice from not 
enforcing the promise). 
This flexibility provided by promissory estoppel makes it puzzling that 
the Second Restatement's test encourages courts to consider post-formation 
events when determining whether a bargain's terms were sufficiently 
definite to form a contract. A solution to the ALI' s desire to maintain the 
reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine while at the 
same time encouraging courts to consider post-formation events to achieve 
a just outcome in a particular case was just down the road in section 90. So 
what happened? 
One possibility for the ALI' s failure to rely on promissory estoppel as a 
way to consider post-formation events was through an uncritical reliance on 
the U.C.C. provision. The U.C.C. was drafted at a time when promissory 
estoppel was not well received with respect to commercial transactions,576 
and it is, therefore, understandable that the U.C.C. would not have relied on 
promissory estoppel as a device for relaxing the certainty requirement. 
Another possibility is that the ALI itself believed the goal of relaxing the 
certainty requirement and encouraging courts to focus on post-formation 
events would suffer if relegated to the Second Restatement's promissory 
estoppel section, a section setting forth a controversial doctrine. 577 In other 
words, the ALI might not have wanted its goal of relaxing the certainty 
requirement to be jeopardized by throwing its lot in with promissory 
estoppel. Or perhaps the ALI was concerned that injustice would still occur 
in some situations in which the plaintiff could not establish any reliance 
576 The U.C.C. was drafted in the 1940s and 1950s. Robert Braucher, The Legislative 
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799-804 (1958). During 
this time, courts were reluctant to use promissory estoppel in commercial transactions. 
Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel.· Justifiable Reliance and Commercial 
Uncertainty Before Williston 's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 604-05 (2004). 
577 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 V AND. L. 
REV. 1003, 1039-40 (2010) ("[M]ost commentators have seen promissory estoppel as 
controversial .... "). 
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(though without reliance it would seem unlikely injustice would occur). Or 
maybe the ALI simply wanted to abolish the certainty requirement. In any 
event, the suitability of promissory estoppel for taking into account post-
formation events makes it puzzling that the ALI incorporated such concerns 
into a doctrine dealing with the formation of a contract. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ALI, in the Second Restatement of Contracts, sought to make the 
reasonably certain terms requirement clearer, but its effort fell short. 
Despite providing a test for reasonably certain terms-whether the terms 
"provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy"578-the ALI failed to make clear whether the 
plaintiffs promise must be sufficiently definite and whether an award 
protecting the plaintiffs reliance interest is an appropriate remedy. 
This Article has shown that, though the answer is far from clear, the 
better interpretation of the Second Restatement's test is that it is not 
necessary that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite, but (somewhat 
paradoxically) only an award protecting the plaintiff's expectation interest 
(or an award of liquidated damages) is an appropriate remedy. Thus, while 
the Second Restatement retains the reasonably certain terms requirement as 
a doctrine of contract formation, it also encourages courts to consider some 
post-formation events (but not others, such as the remedy sought). Thus, 
the test has a practical aspect but retains a formal aspect as well. In this 
respect, it is a model of neoclassical contract law. But because a formation 
doctrine cannot logically consider post-formation events, it is also 
inconsistent. The drafters therefore failed in their goal "to be a little more 
helpful in spelling out what is meant by [the reasonably certain terms 
requirement]. "579 
The issue is, of course, just one piece of the larger struggle over 
whether the better model for contract law is one where parties are 
expected to comply with established rules and suffer the consequences if 
they do not, or whether courts should seek a just outcome in individual 
cases. An unwillingness to take a firm position on this issue, at least with 
respect to the reasonably certain terms requirement, is perhaps what led 
the ALI to give us a test for reasonably certain terms that is not only a 
578 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) ( 1981 ). 
579 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note I, at 326 (remark by Reporter Robert Braucher 
regarding the Second Restatement of Contract's provision on the requirement that a 
contract's terms be reasonably certain). 
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model of neoclassical contract law, but a model of confusion and 
inconsistency. 
